THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA DEFENSE POLICY IN RESPONSE TO DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA MILITARY DEVELOPMENT IN KOREAN PENINSULA (2014-2016)

By

TIFFANY GOLDINA TOMBATU

016201300148

A thesis presented to the Faculty of Humanities, International Relations Study Program President University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for Bachelor Degree in International Relations Major in Strategic and Defense Studies

2017
This thesis entitled "The Implementation of Republic of Korea Defense Policy in response to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Military Development in Korean Peninsula (2014-2016)" prepared and submitted by Tiffany Goldina Tombatu in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in International Relations in the Faculty of Humanities has been reviewed and found to have satisfied the requirements for a thesis fit to be examined. I therefore recommend this thesis for Oral Defense.

Cikarang, Indonesia, January 26th, 2017

Recommend and Acknowledged by,

Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D.

Thesis Adviser
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that this thesis entitled "The Implementation of Republic of Korea Defense Policy in response to Democratic People's Republic of Korea Military Development in Korean Peninsula (2014-2016)" is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an original piece of work that has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, to another university to obtain a degree.

Cikarang, Indonesia, January 26th, 2017

Tiffany Goldina Tombatu
The Panel of Examiners declare that the thesis entitled "The Implementation of Republic of Korea Defense Policy in response to Democratic People's Republic of Korea Military Development in Korean Peninsula (2014-2016)" that was submitted by Tiffany Goldina Tombatu, majoring in International Relations from the Faculty of Humanities was assessed and approved to have passed the Oral Examinations on 1 February, 2017.

Teuku Rezasyah, Ph.D.
Chair – Panel of Examiner

Indra Alverdian, SS., MA.
Thesis Co-Adviser – Examiner

Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D.
Thesis Adviser
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.1. Background of the Study

At the beginning, Korean Peninsula or *Choson*¹ was an integral region and one kingdom led by Yi dynasty. The mainland of Korea was colonized by Japan in 1910 until 1945 when Japan conceded defeat of the United States (here after U.S.) from World War II. The Korean Peninsula then is divided into two regions namely Republic of Korea (here after ROK) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (here after DPRK). ROK was occupied by the U.S. Capitalist-Liberalist ideology and DPRK was occupied by the Soviet Union’ Socialist-Communist ideology until both countries achieved independence in 1948. DPRK and ROK won its independence from the Soviet Union on August 15, 1948.²

Since the state of the Korean Peninsula was divided into ROK and DPRK, the conflict between two states remains unresolved until today. Though there has been an urge of ROK through some of its leaders to realize the reunification, the lack of firmness of DPRK who deny this became the reason for the two countries to have not been able to achieve reunification. The relations between both countries even became more strained with nuclear technology development in both countries and their efforts to continuously improve it more than others. The consequence of this is not only bad for the development of the two countries but also bad for the future of international security.

Military weapons capabilities between ROK and DPRK are increasingly raises international awareness regarding the two countries’ decision in the use of weapons. Since the 1950s, the circumstances on the Korean Peninsula have become an additional review of many parties in viewing the international security situation today. Eventually, the issues that arise are not only about nuclear weapons, but also the involvement of other countries.

---

Figure 1 Korean Peninsula Map (The Borderline between ROK and DPRK)


---

After the fall of Soviet Union and the Cold War ended, the U.S. emerged as the sole superpower in the world, but the emergence of the U.S. as a superpower in the world will not necessarily guarantee the stability of the international security at that time. On the contrary, there was more instability in global politics with the emergence of competition between the countries around the world, ethnic disputes, competition in possession and sales of arms races, including nuclear weapons development. Asia is a great potential for conflict between countries, particularly in East Asia between ROK and DPRK.4

The actors that influence the tension in Korean Peninsula are not only the two countries on the Korean Peninsula but also involve great nation behind it. This can be seen through the involvement of U.S. that have an interest in ROK, as well as the involvement of China in DPRK. However, DPRK is more closed and less dependent on the international community and even with China, allowing it to take independent decisions without being bound to influence and involvement of other countries than ROK.5

With the emergence of the U.S. as the one and only superpower in the world at that time, so DPRK considered that the U.S. is a threat to DPRK so that in the decade of the 1980s DPRK began developing a nuclear reactor as an alternative energy and making nuclear weapons to strengthen the military defense to face the threats from the outside, especially ROK, who is supported by the U.S.6

---

4 Geographical proximity is a place where mutual security relations between states fastened. The threat was greater because of the proximity. In East Asia, the geographical position of China, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan are very close. The position of this frontier become a very potential for armed conflict. (Gallaud, D., & Torre, A. (2004). Geographical Proximity and Circulation of Knowledge through Inter-Firm Cooperation. *Academia-Business Links*, 137-158. Retrieved from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/7040150.pdf in October 16, 2014).


6 The North Korean nuclear weapons program was started in 1980s. In the 1980s, North Korea was focusing on practical uses of nuclear energy and developing nuclear weapon. North Korea also began to operate uranium fabrication and conversion facilities. It began construction of a 200 MWe nuclear reactor and nuclear reprocessing facilities in Taechon and Yongbyon, and conducted
capable of producing nuclear weapons, with a safer kind of light-water nuclear reactors. During the implementation of this program, the U.S., Japan, and ROK formed the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). But in 1998, DPRK conducted a nuclear test and successfully launched the first missile named Taepodong-1, which made the U.S. considered the development of a nuclear DPRK as a threat to the stability of regional and the world security. Any actions were done by the U.S. to isolate and DPRK’s nuclear program by imposing sanctions and cut off economic and humanitarian aid to DPRK.

Seeing the development of the conflict, it is clear that the conflict in the Korean Peninsula attracts international attention, both related to the nuclear technology development as well as the indirect involvement of the major powers in the conflict. The conflict between ROK and DPRK accidentally encourage other countries to take action on the developing security of the region. The Korean Peninsula has been affecting the international security situation, especially regarding DPRK’s military development. It is stated in ROK Defense White Paper 2014 that:

“The National Vision of the Park Geun-hye administration is to open a “New Era of Hope” in which the happiness of the people and national development are put in a virtuous circle. To achieve the vision in the field of national security, the administration has established the National Security Strategy. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is concentrating its efforts on attaining the National Security Strategy by proactively responding to ever-changing security environments and supporting national policies by maintaining a solid security posture”.

The 2014 ROK Defense White Paper (here after DWP) highlights the major achievements and defense policy modifications made during the first two
years of the Park Geun-hye administration, which chose “Construction of a Robust Security Posture” as one of the tenets of its national security strategy. \(^{10}\) This publication contains details on ROK’s capability to respond to DPRK’s nuclear and missile threats.

DPRK has focused its energy on consolidating its monolithic rule and stabilizing its regime since Kim Jong-un took over. \(^{11}\) It has constantly used provocation-dialogue tactics in order to take the initiative in inter-Korean relations and escape from international sanctions and isolation. DPRK continues to pose a serious threat to the ROK and the international community by developing WMD such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

I.2. Problem Identification

The Korean Peninsula security situations in general and DPRK’s nuclear programs, in particular, have been marked by worsening inter-Korean relations for most of the past years. They reached a culmination in 2010, when the two Koreas were on the verge of a hot war. At the same time, the efforts to decrease the tensions on the peninsula were almost completely ineffective in 2011. \(^{12}\) This applies both to bilateral format and also to the main international tool designed to meet those goals which is the Six-Party Talks in Beijing. \(^{13}\) After that, the military conflict between ROK and DPRK raised, which resulted in the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, 2010. \(^{14}\)

The case of the sinking patrol vessel of the ROK Navy named Cheonan in March 2010 and the shellfire at the Yeonpyong Island of ROK in November 2010 done by the DPRK raised the tension on Korean Peninsula.\textsuperscript{15} DPRK also had significant development when Kim Jong Il succeed to be the leader of DPRK. Kim Jong Il’s regime focused on enhancing the military for the survival of the country. The DPRK’s attack on ROK’s Cheonan and Yeonpyong Island have led to a shift in the focus of ROK’s military from how to manage a full-scale war with DPRK to how to respond to DPRK’s localized military actions by the DPRK. DPRK continues to pose a serious threat to ROK. It is stated in 2014 DWP of Republic of Korea, as follows:

\textit{“North Korea has focused its energy on consolidating its monolithic rule and stabilizing its regime since Kim Jong-un took over. It has constantly used provocation-dialogue tactics in order to take the initiative in inter-Korean relations and escape from international sanctions and isolation. North Korea continues to pose a serious threat to the ROK and the international community by developing WMD\textsuperscript{16} such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles\textsuperscript{17}, reinforcing its conventional forces, conducting armed provocations in enemy contact areas, and continuously carrying out provocations such as cyber-attacks and infiltration of small UAVs\textsuperscript{18}.\textsuperscript{19}”}

It is also stated in ROK DWP 2014 that one of the national defense objectives of ROK is protecting the country from external military threats and invasions from DPRK’s threat.


\textsuperscript{16} According to FBI, WMD refers to materials, weapons, or devices that are intended to cause (or are capable of causing) death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or precursors, a disease organism, or radiation or radioactivity, including (but not limited to) biological devices, chemical devices, improvised nuclear devices, radiological dispersion devices, and radiological exposure devices. (https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/wmd)

\textsuperscript{17} According to Oxford Dictionary, ballistic missile is a missile with a high, arching trajectory, which is initially powered and guided but falls under gravity on to its target.

\textsuperscript{18} According to Oxford Dictionary, UAVs is an unmanned aerial vehicle (an aircraft piloted by remote control or onboard computers)

“First, “protecting the country from external military threats and invasions” means being prepared to meet the present military threats from North Korea and at the same time being prepared to meet other potential threats to our peace and security. North Korea poses a serious threat to our security by developing and increasing its large-scale conventional arsenal, nuclear program, missiles and other weapons of mass destruction, and by continually perpetrating acts of armed provocation such as the attack on the ROK Ship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo Island. As long as these threats persist, the North Korean regime and its armed forces, which are the entities who pose these threats, will remain as our enemies.”20

From the statement above, it is clear that ROK sees DPRK as a threat. Hence, ROK continued to perform military cooperation with the U.S. In 2008, there were 37 thousand American troops stationed in ROK.21 Both countries were also joint intense military exercises. This military exercise was an annual agenda of both countries. In 2009 the annual exercise Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL), involving about 10,000 U.S. troops and lasted for 12 days.22 UFL computer simulated war training was aimed to respond to the issue of the DPRK invasion. DPRK routinely denounces the exercises as preparation for an attack, but the ROK itself was not affected by the severe warning from DPRK because according to ROK, the training itself was aimed as an act of defense. There were many actions that ROK done in response to DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula. Therefore, this research will analyze the implementation of ROK’s defense policy in response to DPRK’s military development.

I.3. Statement of the Problem

It could be measured by the issues shown that the problem of this thesis would be as follows.

*How was the implementation of ROK’s defense policy in response to DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula (2014 – 2016)?*

I.4. Research Objectives

The purpose of this thesis is to find the answer to the questions using descriptive and analytical methods. The methods are chosen as for the main objectives of this research would be to portray the characteristics of a particular situation (Kothari, 2004). Therefore, the objective of this research is to explain ROK’s defense policy in response to DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula.

I.5. Significance of Study

This study is aimed to give a greater insight on the defense policy of ROK in response to DPRK’s military development in the Korean Peninsula. In order to get a clear and focused understanding, analysis on ROK’s defense policy served in this thesis is hoped to contribute to the development of security and strategic studies in East Asia.

I.6. Theoretical Framework

Several theories and concepts would be applied to explain the issues and to gain an understanding of how to answer the problems.
I.6.1 Security

Security is the about the pursuit of freedom and the ability of states and/or societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which is hostile. (Buzan, 1991)

In the article “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty First Century”23, Buzan examines the different sectors of security in relation to perception to threats. According to Buzan, there are five sectors of security which are political, military, economic, societal, and environmental. The obvious threats that are most pressing concerns in the present are military threats which are capable of posing threats to the state on several levels.

The first one that will be used in this research is military threats. All components of state can be affected by the military threats. It can put as the basic duty of a state to protect its citizens as well as have an adverse effect on the “layers of social and individual interest”.24 Military threats were put in the special category when it comes to security because it involve the use of force, and also the level and objectives of military threat can take on different levels of importance.

The second one is political threats. Political threats had become a constant concern for a state as well. However, political threats can be more ambiguous and difficult to identify in relation to military threats.25 As state itself is a political entity, a political threat that can weaken the state itself can be put in the same level as the military threat. The threat can come within the competition amongst ideologies or an attack to the state itself.

---

I.6.2 Defense Policy

Defense policy is a strategy of a state in the shape of action that aims to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other issues relating to the conduct of military affairs, consistent with state’s security strategy. Defense policy is a variety of continuous activities undertaken by the states to ensure its national security. (Tagarev, 2006)

Defense policy is a public instrument that focused on dealing with military and the international security. Defense policy also encompassed the measure and initiatives about government’s decision making and to determine the strategic goals. The decision making process include on government’s decision on when and how to execute the national military or armed forces. The function of defense policy is to make sure the safekeeping of the liberty in national development and how to cope with the threat faced from the aggressive and hostile external actors.

National interest is also very crucial to devising a defense policy. Defense policy should provide the guidance about the purpose, structure, and deployment of the armed forces. Defense policy must be in support of national and foreign policies. Building on Clausewitz, the purpose of a defense policy is:

“To develop and maintain assets, including combat forces, which can be used in the support of the security policy of a state, and to ensure that coherent arrangements exist, agreed across government, for their possible employment.”

Defense policy uphold and promote the values and interests of a state, the underlying security strategy and the role of the military among the instruments of state power. The defence policy marked by the establishment of the DWP as an official statement made by government official. The concept of how ROK implements its defense policy can be divided into 3 sectors which are military, technology, and economy.

I.6.2.1 Military

Defense policy making is dominated by the military, and is largely technical in its orientation. Defense policy delivered the statements about the desired capabilities of the military organization, armed forces, weaponry system, and cooperation with other countries in terms of military or political relationships. The defense also stated about the achievement of the military objectives and goals and the details of the allocation of the defense budget.

ROK has been building its military potential according to the strategic plan in defending the country. The readiness of the armed forces that can be seen on the military organization, personnel, equipment, logistic facilities, military arms, science and technique development of the military. The implementation on the military field consists of two basic elements, manpower and weaponry. The manpower represent by the existence of the ROK Army while the weaponry represent by all military weapons prepared by ROK military during peacetime and wartime.

I.6.2.2 Technology

To keep the stability of the national defense, technology plays an important role. Building the scientific and technological potential of the all-people’s national defense is closely linked with the development of science and technology of the country.

ROK has been doing investment in research and development in science and technology as a part of the policy implementation. ROK has been develop its military science and technology to meet the requirements of military equipment and weapons for the arm forces and new weapon that might be needed in the future to face DPRK’s nuclear threat.

I.6.2.3 Economy

---

27 Ibid.
29 Ibid. Page 184-185.
Ensuring a proper ethnic or linguistic balance in the defense forces and making sure that defense spending is seen to be fairly distributed are major issues in defense policy making.\textsuperscript{30} In economic aspect, the implementation of the defense policy is manifested in such fields as human, material, financial resources of the economy that could possibly be mobilized to deal with peacetime and wartime situations. The economic potential is important to support the implementation of the defense policy, the allocation of the military budget for defense requirements is absolutely needed to support the implementation of the defense policy.

ROK has allocated a necessary portion of the state budget for defense requirements on both for the acquisition of the equipment and weapons for the armed forces. As the increased number of ROK’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) year by year, the budget allocation for the force buildup projects has increased as well. This shows that the role of economic potential is important to sustain the implementation of the defence policy.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{I.6.3 Defensive Realism}

Defensive realism is the general term for some theories of international politics and foreign policy that build upon Robert Jervis’s security dilemma and Kenneth Waltz's balance-of-power theory.\textsuperscript{32} The situations of anarchy made a state’s effort to increase its security decrease the security of other states. This situation of security dilemma made a state become insecure about another state’s future intentions and power. Even though a state’s purpose is purely to pursue security, it can unintentionally generate conflict. According to Defensive Realism, a state that feels threatened by a stronger state will try to protect itself through ambitious military, economic and diplomatic strategies. (Blazevic, 2012)


I.6.4 Balance of Power

The international system is considered to be anarchic with no system-wide authority being formally enforced of its agents. (Waltz, 1979, pg 88)

As a theory, balance of power predicts that rapid changes in international power and status especially attempts by one state to conquer a region will provoke counterbalancing actions.\(^\text{33}\) Because of this reason, the balancing process helps to maintain the stability of the relationship between states. The practice of balance of power theory can be seen effectively when alliances are fluid or easily formed or broken regardless of history, ideology, religion, or form of government.

Sometimes, a single state will play as the balancer role, shifting its support to oppose whatever state or alliance is strongest. State can reach the policy of balance of power by increasing their power by engaging in armaments race or by adding power of other states to their own power by embarking a policy of alliances and cooperation.

I.6.5 Security Dilemma

Countries have incentives to take offensive action to increase their security and they have an inherent mistrust of each other because they cannot determine their neighbors intentions from their actions. (Jervis, 1977)

A security dilemma is a situation where two or more states are drawn into conflict, tension, or even war over security concerns even though none of them wants conflict to happen.\(^\text{34}\) Security dilemma can occurred when there is insecurity in the relation between other states. None of the states involved in this situation want the relationship worsen, let alone for war to be happened, but because each state acts diplomatically or militarily to secure itself, other states might interpret its actions as threatening. This causes unintended provocations to

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

emerge, resulting in the escalation of the conflict that might eventually lead to open warfare.

I.7. Scope and Limitations of Study

To explain ROK’s defense policy in response to DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula, this research operates under these scopes and limitations:

1. ROK’s defense strategy (military modernization, budget, personnel) in response to DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula.
2. Analysis of the actor interaction will be limited to the state level. ROK and DPRK as the key actors, with the addition of the China, Russia, and Japan as the marginal actors, and United States as the extra-regional actor.
3. The time frame for this research is set from the year of 2014 – 2016, under ROK’s President Park Geun Hye governance, when the economic growth of ROK is increasing.
4. The dimension of analysis will be on military and political dimension.

I.8. Research Methodology

This study will be using the qualitative approach with literature review as the technique of research. The qualitative approach involves purposeful use for interpreting, explaining, elaborating and describing, explaining the collected data.35

35 Qualitative Research Methods Overview. 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001) alleged that “qualitative research is less structured in description because it formulates and builds new theories”.\(^{36}\)

Qualitative research can also be described as an effective model that occurs in a natural setting that enables the researcher to develop a level of detail from being highly involved in the actual experiences. (Creswell, 2003)

Qualitative approach is chosen to discover the underlying motives of states behavior and assessing interactions which in line with the purpose of this research. The author used the literature review for this research, by collecting and analyzing the documents related to the chosen topic retrieved from online sources and some books that relevant to the topic.


Chapter I – Introduction

The first chapter will introduce the fundamental aspects of the thesis, including the essential information and purpose of the thesis. It is aimed to overview the thesis as a whole in which is structured into background of the study, problems identification, statement of problems, research objectives, significance of the study, research methodology, theoretical framework, scope and limitations of the study, and thesis structure itself. This chapter is aimed to provoke the reader to look further into the thesis.

Chapter II – The Dynamic of Strategic Environment in Korean Peninsula

The second chapter will be used to highlight the regional security environment of Korean Peninsula, and ROK’s security environment. This chapter will explain the significance of Korean Peninsula for ROK and ROK’s military strategy in Korean Peninsula. The actors discussed in this chapter will be ROK and DPRK as the main actors and the United States, China, Russia, and Japan as

the extra-regional actor. This chapter will also explain about DPRK’s interest in Korean Peninsula. In addition, it will also include the extra-regional actors’ interests in the region.

Chapter III – The Defense Policy of Republic of Korea

The third chapter will elaborate about the defense policy of ROK. This chapter will also examine how DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula affected ROK’s security environment.

Chapter IV – The Implementation of ROK’s Defense Policy in Response to DPRK’s Military Development in Korean Peninsula

The fourth chapter is the main analysis of this thesis. This chapter will elaborate about how ROK implement its defense policy in response to DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula. It will further explain about ROK’s military strategy in Korean Peninsula in terms of the increased military budget, military build-up and the development of military personnel.

Chapter V – Conclusion

This fifth chapter is a closing statement that will conclude contents and contexts that elaborated in the previous chapters.
CHAPTER II

THE DYNAMIC OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN KOREAN PENINSULA

II. 1 Strategic Environment of Korean Peninsula

Korean Peninsula has become the historic war-point where the intention to control it is the beginning of wider campaign to dominate the Asian region. Korean Peninsula since centuries has become the area of several direct clashes for geopolitical interests. This mainland of Korea has become the history witness of the China-Japan war\(^\text{37}\) as well as Russia-Japan War\(^\text{38}\) where strategic purposes and historic engagements took place.

In the 1980s, the strategic environment in Northeast Asia surrounding the Korean Peninsula was fluid and uncertain due to the heightened tension in U.S.-Soviet relations\(^\text{39}\), the continued China-Soviet conflict\(^\text{40}\), and the improvement in China-American and China-Japanese relations.

In the 2010s, the military tensions in the Korean Peninsula were rising. The rising tensions were caused by the case of the sinking patrol vessel of the ROK Navy named Cheonan in March 2010 and the shellfire at the Yeonpyong

---

\(^{37}\) The China-Japan war also known as Sino-Japanese war, a military conflict between the China and the Empire of Japan. There are two Sino-Japanese war. The first Sino-Japanese War happened in 1894–1895 and the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to 1945.

\(^{38}\) The Russia-Japan war also known as Russo-Japanese War, occurred in 8 February 1904 – 5 September 1905, a military conflict between the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan over rival imperial ambitions in Manchuria and Korea.

\(^{39}\) The Cold War was a state of political and military hostility between U.S. and Soviet Union after World War II, from 1945 to 1990.

\(^{40}\) China-Soviet conflict also known as Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1960–1989 was the deterioration of political and ideological relations between the neighboring states of the PRC and USSR during the Cold War.
Island of ROK in November 2010 done by the DPRK. DPRK’s recent nuclear test and rocket launch have also heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. As the ROK responded to DPRK’s nuclear and military threat by enhancing military cooperation with U.S., China started to worry about the stronger military cooperation between U.S. and ROK.

II.1.1 Geostrategic of Korean Peninsula

During the cold war, Korea was a location where the global contest between East and West happened. The great powers at that time, which are U.S., Japan, China and Soviet Union chose sides on the peninsula. The U.S. and Japan developed close relations with the South while Soviet Union and China allied themselves to the North. The North-South competition can be considered as a zero-sum game where the advantage achieved by one side means danger by the other.

Ever since the end of the Korean War, the conflict between ROK and the DPRK has become the context of the balance of regional power between four global powers involving U.S., China, Soviet Union, and Japan. Because of these complex relationships, the peace and stability on Korean Peninsula is very difficult to be maintained.

The Korean peninsula located in Northeast Asia, positioned at a critical point where the interests of the continental and oceanic powers come into collision. Historically, because of its geostrategic position, many foreign countries came to invade Korea. At the end of the World War II, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to divide responsibility for disarming the Japanese forces in

42 Lying at the center of Northeast Asia, the Korean peninsula has long been a strategic intersection where continental powers trying to advance to the ocean and maritime powers heading toward the continent have collided. (Kang-nyeong, Kim. (2012). National Strategic Value and Role of Jeju Naval Base. Defense Policy Study, No. 96: The Korea Institute for Defense Analysis. Retrieved January 15, 2017 from Korea Focus website: http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/layout/content_print.asp?group_id=104343).
Korea. The line of demarcation was the 38th parallel which bisects the Korean peninsula, with the USSR in the North and the U.S. in the South.

The geographical position of Korean Peninsula itself has attracted great powers for geopolitical factors. Korean Peninsula is a land-connected location in East Asia where the U.S., the current global power stage a significant military operation. ROK is one of U.S. closest allies with good infrastructure like modern large ports and excellent transportation system for supply management. If the U.S. wanted to strengthen itself in the region and carry out some military action that involves land war against China, Russia, or DPRK, the Korean Peninsula is the best place to do so.

![Figure 2 Map of Korean Peninsula and Surrounding Area](Source: Business Insider. http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-2016-3?IR=T&r=US&IR=T/#the-korean-peninsula-and-surrounding-area-1)
Korea is a peninsula jutting southward from Manchuria surrounded by the Yellow and Japan seas. It shares a 880-mile-wide border with China and has a 30-mile frontier with Russia. Korea’s northeastern border is about 70 miles from Vladivostok, Russia’s major eastern port. The southeast corner juts to within 100 miles of Japan to its south, and the peninsula’s southwest shore angles westward only about 300 miles from Shanghai.43

The Korean Peninsula, therefore, can become potential threat to China, Russia, and Japan, not because of the action of any government on Korean Peninsula, but simply just because of its geographical position. Korea could threaten Japan’s access to the East China Sea and the Pacific from the Sea of Japan. Korea can also potentially disturb China’s access to the Yellow Sea and potentially to Shanghai.

Japan and China were two countries that have invaded the Korean Peninsula on several occasions. Its geographical position and size relative to Japan and China made the attacks on Korea inevitable. For that reason, the mainland Korea has been invaded by both Japan and China and later by Russia and US in the 20th century.

II.1.2 DPRK’s Strategic Position in Korean Peninsula

DPRK is a convenient medium to distract U.S.’ closest allies which are ROK and Japan. DPRK can be used as the media and opportunities for China to operate its controlled military bases with direct access to the Sea of Japan and exit towards North Pacific Ocean.

Figure 3 North Korean Ground Forces Deployment (Source: Business Insider. http://www.businessinsider.co.id/branch-by-branch-a-look-at-north-koreas-massive-military-2016-3/?r=US&IR=T)

Figure 4 North Korean Air Forces Deployment (Source: Business Insider. http://www.businessinsider.co.id/branch-by-branch-a-look-at-north-koreas-massive-military-2016-3/?r=US&IR=T)
DPRK act as China’s guard post and strategic buffer zone in Northeast Asia. With a shared border of 1,400 kilometers, DPRK becomes the guard post of China from the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in ROK.

At present, DPRK has acquired certain nuclear capabilities through testing that has greatly irritated the U.S., though the provocation has not yet made U.S. to use force. The U.S. has to maintain military pressure in the Korean Peninsula to prevent DPRK from taking pre-emptive action. However, the deterrent that DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons obtains could further restrict the U.S. military’s opportunities to take action in the Korean Peninsula.

II.1.2.1 DPRK’s Threat Perception

For years, the U.S. and the international community have tried to negotiate an end to DPRK’s nuclear and missile development and its export of ballistic missile technology; UN Security Council’s sanction on DPRK, the combined ROK-U.S. military exercises, and the simulations of the U.S. nuclear submarines and B-2 and B-52 fighter jets over the Korean Peninsula. DPRK has long been a key challenge for the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The UN stepped up its sanctions against DPRK by adopting Resolutions 2087 and 2094 to respond to DPRK’s long-range missile launch on December 12, 2012 and its third nuclear test conducted on February 12, 2013. But despite being threaten, DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons and missiles, threatening the international community.

In September 2016, DPRK military released a white paper condemning ROK and the U.S. for conducting joint military exercises. In the white paper, it is

stated that, "If they persistently resort to military exercises and other nuclear war exercises against the DPRK, they will face a most merciless and miserable end".46

The white paper branded the U.S.-ROK joint military exercises as a direct threat toward the DPRK.

II.1.2.2 DPRK’s Strategic Interests in Korean Peninsula

DPRK’s strategic interest in Korean Peninsula is to have the Korea unification under communism led by DPRK. In the ROK DWP 2014, it is stated that,

“North Korea aims to unify the Korean Peninsula under communism. To fulfill this goal, it has pursued provocation-dialogue tactics and a disguised peace offensive which repeats a cycle of “provocation, dialogue, compensation, and another provocation” in order to continuously develop nuclear weapons and missiles and secure practical gains from the South under the objective of unifying the Korean Peninsula under communism”.47

II.1.2.3 DPRK’s Strategic Action (DPRK’s Military Development) in Korean Peninsula

DPRK’s strategic interest in Korean Peninsula is to unify Korea under communism. To achieve the interest then DPRK will need to drive off U.S. troops from ROK first and then overthrow of the anti-communist government in ROK and establish a pro-communist people’s democratic regime so that unification under communism through cooperation with DPRK and ROK can be achieved. According to ROK, it is stated in ROK White Paper that

“In order to secure military superiority over the South, North Korea focuses on reinforcing asymmetric forces such as WMD, including nuclear

weapons, missiles, long-range artillery, an underwater force, special operation forces, and cyber warfare units".\textsuperscript{48}

In 1980s, DPRK began developing a nuclear reactor to strengthen the military defense especially from ROK who is supported by U.S. In 1998, DPRK conducted a nuclear test and successfully launched the first missile named Taepodong-1. In April 2009 and 2012, DPRK launched two long-range missiles using Taepodong-2 but failed. DPRK launched the Unha-3 rocket in December 2012, which successfully placed a satellite in space orbit.

DPRK launched a long-range missile on December 12, 2012 and carried out its third nuclear test on February 12, 2013. On March 5, it declared the Armistice Agreement invalid in a statement issued by the spokesperson of the Supreme Command, and on March 8, it declared it would scrap the Inter-Korean Non-Aggression Agreement in its entirety. Then on March 30, DPRK issued a special statement in the name of its government, party and groups announcing that the inter-Korean relationship had entered into a state of war. On April 8, it issued a unilateral order that called for the withdrawal of the North Korean workers in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, putting a halt to its operation that had lasted for a decade.

**II.1.3 ROK’s Strategic Position in Korean Peninsula**

In term of natural resources, the Korean Peninsula can be categorized as poor in that field. Because of that, the economy of ROK depends on world trade where its import and export activities will depends on supply lines from the sea. The fact that ROK controls one side of the important Strait of Korea (Tsushima), which is one of the four main choke points for entrance into the Sea of Japan from the Pacific increase ROK’s strategic value.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. Page 27.
DPRK’s missile and nuclear program is a major threat to ROK, as well as Japan and others in the region. In ROK DWP 2014, it is stated that,

“North Korea continues to pose a serious threat to the ROK and the international community by developing WMD such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, reinforcing its conventional forces, conducting armed provocations in enemy contact areas, and continuously carrying out provocations such as cyber-attacks and infiltration of small UAVs”.

According to the Nautilus Institute, “an artillery attack against Seoul would likely result in 3,000 deaths in the first few minutes, and up to 30,000 deaths within a short period of time thereafter, along with massive damage to infrastructure”.

Aside from the short-range missile threat, DPRK possesses medium range missiles, such as the Nodong missile, that can hit all of ROK and most of Japan. Importantly, the Nodong missile is believed to be able to carry a small nuclear weapon.

II.1.3.2 ROK’s Strategic Interests in Korean Peninsula

ROK’s interest is to strengthening the combined defense posture on the Korean Peninsula and expanding the strategic contribution towards security in East Asia and the world. With regard to DPRK’s provocation and asymmetric threats, ROK needs to build and strengthen military cooperation and strategy to effectively counter DPRK’s asymmetric threat such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including nuclear capabilities. It is stated in ROK 2014 Defense White Paper that,

“First, protecting the country from external military threats and invasion means being prepared to meet the present military threats from North

---

Korea and at the same time being prepared to meet other potential threats to our peace and security.”  

II.1.3.3 ROK’s Strategic Action in Korean Peninsula

ROK’s strategic action is stated in the 2014 Defense White Paper. It is stated that,

“In order to address such an increasing threat, the MND cooperates with the related agencies to prepare against various terrorist threats, and actively participates in security cooperation activities, thereby maintaining a close collaboration system with the international community.”

To encounter DPRK’s nuclear weapon development, ROK started to increase defense budget due to the situation in Korean Peninsula, build strong ROK Army, increase military troops deployment in Korean Peninsula, military modernization, and also enhance military cooperation with U.S. DPRK routinely denounces the exercises as preparation for an attack, but the ROK itself was not affected by the severe warning from DPRK because according to ROK, the training itself was aimed as an act of defense.

II.2 Actors Involved in Korean Peninsula

The tension in Korean Peninsula keeps increasing from time to time. The tension in Korean Peninsula is caused by the military development and military deployment in the area. The state actors that are involved in Korean Peninsula tension are divided into three categories which are the core actors, marginal actors, and extra-regional actor.

---

54 Ibid. Page 56.
55 Ibid.
57 Classification of actors who play a role in International Relation issues (core, marginal, and extra regional) was explained in detail by lecturer, Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita Ph.D, during class session “Strategic Environment” 2015.
II.2.1 Core Actors (ROK and DPRK)

The core actor is an actor who holds the key role in the region. The core actor determines the interaction that will shape the pattern of interaction in the region. In Korean Peninsula tension, the actor that hold an important role is ROK and DPRK, as the purpose of this research focus on analyzing ROK and DPRK as the core actors that play an important role in the military tension in Korean Peninsula.

The Korean War ended in an armistice, with neither side able to claim outright victory. The war has ended, but the tension is still there. Even ROK in its 2014 DWP stated DPRK as its enemy. Legally, ROK and DPRK are still in war because no peace treaty has been signed. DPRK’s nuclear development and ROK-U.S. join military exercise makes the tension in Korean Peninsula worsen.

The conflict between ROK and DPRK accidentally encourage other countries to take action on the developing security of the region. The Korean Peninsula has been affecting the international security situation, especially regarding DPRK’s military development. The actions of the extra-regional actors are revolving around ROK and DPRK which makes ROK and DPRK the main actors.
II.2.2 Marginal Actors (China, Russia, Japan)

The marginal actors are involved state actors in the region, yet having less influence compared to the core actors. The marginal actor is also the neighboring countries that have interest in the region. In Korean Peninsula tension, China, Russia and Japan are the marginal actors.

II.2.2 Extra-regional Actor (U.S.)

The extra-regional actor is an actor from outside the region yet involved in the region’s power politics. The purpose of the extra-regional actor to intervene the region is because of the state’s interest in the region and the military expansion of the territory. U.S. is the extra-regional actors that involved in Korean Peninsula tension. The extra-regional actor has its own interest to be involved in Korean Peninsula tension even though they come from outside the region. The interests of each actor will be further explained in the next sub-chapter.

II.3 National Interests of the Actors Involved

National interest is a term that expressed a state’s goals and ambitions for a specific field and related to the policy-making of the state. National interests establish based on state’s interpretation over the specific field. The national interest has considerable power in that it helps to constitute as important and to legitimize the actions taken by states, thus consider related to the foreign policy goals. (Burchill 2005)

II.3.1 DPRK

“North Korea aims to unify the Korean Peninsula under communism. To fulfill this goal, it has pursued provocation-dialogue tactics and a disguised peace offensive which repeats a cycle of “provocation, dialogue, compensation, and another provocation” in order to continuously develop nuclear weapons and missiles and secure practical gains from the South
under the objective of unifying the Korean Peninsula under communism” .

DPRK’s interest in Korean Peninsula is to unify Korea under communism. In order to secure military superiority over the Korean Peninsula and to take an action towards ROK-U.S. military cooperation, DPRK need to focuses on reinforcing asymmetric forces such as WMD, including nuclear weapons, missiles, long-range artillery, an underwater force, special operation forces, and cyber warfare unit because the ROK-U.S. join military exercise has become a threat to DPRK’s military.

II.3.2 ROK

“First, protecting the country from external military threats and invasions means being prepared to meet the present military threats from North Korea and at the same time being prepared to meet other potential threats to our peace and security”.

ROK’s interest is to increase the security from the growing military tension in Korean Peninsula. DPRK’s nuclear development has been a major threat not just for ROK itself but also the international community. ROK must focus on strengthening the combined defense posture on the Korean Peninsula and military cooperation and strategy to effectively counter DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including nuclear capabilities in the region.

II.3.3 United States

In the “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula”, the Task Force (2010) emphasizes that,

"Despite the difficulty of the challenge, the danger posed by DPRK is sufficiently severe, and the costs of inaction and acquiescence so high, that the United States and its partners must continue to press for denuclearization”.

60 Ibid.
The Korean Peninsula is located in the middle of one of the most important nodes in the global economic system, where several of the world’s most powerful economies; China, Japan and ROK met. U.S. Interest in Korean Peninsula is not just about the human rights, but also a large part of the U.S.’ economic security depends on continued commercial health and stability in East Asia. The rising tension which can lead to armed conflict on Korean Peninsula can disturb the economic on the region as a whole and also U.S.

U.S. support for Korean reunification is firm. U.S. interest is reflected in a united Korea that is free, democratic and led by ROK. When Korea is inevitably reunified, the major U.S. policy interests will also include ensuring a peaceful and stable region, preventing the emergence of new security threats, and supporting Korea as it creates a unified, democratic, market-oriented society and economy that benefits all the Korean people.

When reunification under ROK happens, then U.S. will have much to contribute to Korea’s reconstruction process. U.S. will also prioritize the demolition of DPRK’s military machine and eliminate the nuclear weapons. Not just that, a unified Korea will need a security guarantor, a role that U.S. wants to play as.

If the nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction capabilities possessed by DPRK were eliminated as the result of reunification then a peaceful and stable regional order will established. Such transition would be clearly being in U.S. interests.

II.3.4 China

In its China 2013 DWP, China made it clear that the objective goals and mission of China’s defense policy is to defend the national security, sovereignty, and territories to guarantee the peaceful development of the nation, and to maintain world peace and regional stability.\(^{62}\) China has moved fast in developing

nuclear weapons and missiles and modernizing naval and air force capabilities to achieve “victory in local wars under conditions of informatization”, based on its active defense strategy.

“Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and supporting the country’s peaceful development. This is the goal of China’s efforts in strengthening its national defense and the sacred mission of its armed forces”.

Since the end of the Korean War, the custody of the balance of the power in Korean Peninsula has become China’s priorities to keep its regional stability. China strongly opposed the rise of DPRK as a nuclear power to preserve the status quo. China actually is not that concerned about DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear weapons but instead, China worried about the growing level of insecurity of the neighboring countries raised by DPRK’s nuclear acquisition. China worried that Japan, ROK and even Taiwan, wanted to acquire nuclear weapons of their own as the source of prevention.

The nuclear program by DPRK can also push U.S. and ROK to pursue a military intervention against DPRK and make the unification of Korea happened under the control of ROK. Then eventually, U.S. military presence might increase in China’s backyard. Since the Korean Peninsula was divided, the DPRK has played an important role as a buffer state between China and the ROK where U.S. troops are currently stationed. The increase of U.S. military troops near China could increase tensions between China and U.S. and its allies, given China’s growing perception a strategic containment fostered by US as part of the “pivot to Asia” launched by the Obama Administration in 2011.

Economically, if the unified Korea under ROK happened and DPRK collapsed, it would trigger a severe humanitarian crisis. This would be a serious


63 Ibid.
64 The Obama Administration’s Pivot to Asia Retrieved January 12, 2017 from the Foreign Policy Initiative website: http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/obama-administrations-pivot-asia.
challenge to the Chinese leadership, undermining its role in a delicate phase of transition that is currently characterizing President Xi’s rule.

II.3.5 Japan

“Strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan’s peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan, and defeating such threats and minimizing damage if by chance such threats should reach Japan. Improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation.”

Based on Japan DWP, Japan’s interest in Korean Peninsula is to ensure the peace and security of its country. DPRK’s nuclear development has become a threat to international community including Japan. China’s military build-up also threatens Japan, on of U.S. closest allies.

In December 2013, Japan released the “National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program” and presented the concept of a “dynamic joint defense force.” The dynamic joint defense force refers to a concept that is designed to respond to major security threats. China’s military build-up and DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs. Based on this concept, Japan intensifies its preparedness and military capabilities around the islands in the southern part of the Japanese Archipelago. Japan strengthens not only the U.S.-Japan alliance but also cooperation with the ROK.

Japan’s foreign policy goals toward the peninsula have remained consistent: maintaining stability and preventing another Korean war to occur.

---

ROK took after Japan’s pre-war development model, namely state-directed export-oriented economy.67

In Japan’s past history, a unified Korea did not pose serious security threat. Japan is not worried about a unified Korea. Instead, Japan concern about the emergence of China-DPRK alliance. But if the Korea unification were about to happened under ROK, Japan will get benefit on it. First, Japan’s fear of DPRK’s nuclear development and stock of chemical and biological weapons will disappear. Then, the peace on the peninsula will be achieved and will help Japan deal with the territorial dispute with China better. Finally, the unified and non-nuclear Korea will bring more wealth and opportunities for Japan through greater trade and investment with safer Korea.

II.3.6 Russia

“Strengthening the country's defense, ensuring the inviolability of the Russian Federation's constitutional order, sovereignty, independence, and national and territorial integrity; strengthening national accord, political and social stability, developing democratic institutions, and refining the mechanisms for cooperation between the state and civil society”.68

Russia’s interest is to ensure the security of the country from the tension in Korean Peninsula. Historically, Russia has been involved in the Korean Peninsula tensions because of having common border with Korea. The increasing tensions in Korean Peninsula have been substantial for Russia because Russia needs to protect the peace and the stability near Russia’s Far East boundaries. Because of the geopolitical interest, Russia will be interested in Korea’s unification from the side which Russia can get benefit for.

The power center on the Far East of Russia’s borders will be dissolved and will enforce the situation of Northeast Asia in general. If the unification of Korea

---


were about to be happened under the influence under ROK or DPRK, with powerful human potential and strong economy, the geographical situation can become important aspects to describe the changing situation in the region. The irrefutable and good relation between Russia and DPRK from the past and the present also support the idea that Russia and DPRK might have same goals in the future. Economically, Russia can also get a reliable partner for cooperation with the Siberian and Far East regions.

Another important Russian concern is to avoid armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. If there were military conflict between U.S. and DPRK, then the streams of refugees from DPRK might reach Russian Far East. Aside from the refugees, the radio-active clouds from nuclear power plants destroyed in the fighting and the radiation also threatened the security of Russia.

The future military conflict can bring about devastating effect for Russia especially in the Russian Far East where the economic and demographic situation in that area is still difficult. The military conflict can end the hope for the implementation of energy and transport projects to develop the region’s economy. Military conflict or threat can also endanger the population of that region which already experiencing a demographic crisis.

Another Russian concern is to avoid foreign access to naval bases in DPRK and to DPRK territorial waters. If DPRK were to come under unfriendly control, it would pose a threat to Russian military and commercial sea routes to and from Vladivostok.
II.4 Pattern of Interaction of the Actors Involved

The figure above shows the pattern of interaction among actors involved in Korean Peninsula tension. The tension that occurred among ROK and DPRK as well as the extra-regional actors happened due to the action which is done by DPRK by developing more and using nuclear weapons in the region in response to ROK-U.S. military cooperation.

The Korean peninsula is directly affected by these power struggles. Conflict, competition, and cooperation is intricately interwoven and unfolding in a complex manner. It is implausible to limit the issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula as a domestic conflict problem only between ROK and DPRK. The relationship between ROK and DPRK is conflict. Each country keeps being in a military tension and responding to each other actions by increasing military capabilities.

In encountering DPRK’s nuclear development in Korean Peninsula, ROK engage U.S. in military cooperation. ROK and Japan are U.S.’ closest allies, that is why the relationship between ROK-US-Japan is cooperation. U.S. involvement
in Korean Peninsula is also because the involvement of China there, helping DPRK with military aid. Other than China, Russia is also an ally of DPRK since Korean War. Because of that, the relationship between DPRK-China-Russia is cooperation.

The relation of U.S. and China’s presence in the Korean Peninsula tension is competition. China tried to prevent more of U.S.’ influences in the region. ROK is the home to U.S. military troops, and if DPRK collapse, U.S. troops can come closer to China which is beneficial for U.S. in its strategic rebalance to Asia.

II.4.1 DPRK

The military tensions in the Korean Peninsula rise because of the case of the sinking patrol vessel of the ROK Navy named Cheonan in March 2010 and the shellfire at the Yeonpyong Island of ROK in November 2010\textsuperscript{69} done by DPRK. The warship went down off an island near the disputed inter-Korean western maritime border.

An investigation into the disaster involving ROK and international experts found that a DPRK torpedo sank the ship. DPRK does not accept this and offered at the time to conduct its own investigation, but that offer was turned down.

Since then, ties between the two nations, which remain technically at war have remained icy. There has also been no movement since 2009 on six-nation talks aimed at ending DPRK’s nuclear ambitions. Tensions in Korean Peninsula are also currently high because annual U.S.-ROK joint military drills are under way. The exercises always anger DPRK.

As a result, DPRK became more aggressive in developing nuclear and also had conducted five successful nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and in January and September 2016. September 2016’s test has indicated a device with an

explosive yield of between 10 and 30 kilotonnes - which, if confirmed, would make it the DPRK's strongest nuclear test ever.\textsuperscript{70}

II.4.2 ROK

In the 1980s, ROK turned away from a cycle of authoritarian regimes to democracy. Its economy, powered by investment in high-tech industries, sped ahead of DPRK. ROK leadership, under liberal Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, followed the "Sunshine Policy," offering economic and humanitarian aid to DPRK in an effort to warm inter-Korean relations and bridge the widening economic gap, aimed at possible future reunification. In an attempt to stave off the dire consequences of sudden regime change in the DPRK, ROK has become the DPRK's biggest foreign investor. But following the election of a conservative president, Lee Myung-bak, in December 2007, ROK has taken a harder line toward DPRK, tying aid to DPRK's compliance in the denuclearization process. The tensions in Korean Peninsula keeps increasing as the relation between ROK and DPRK worsen because of DPRK's nuclear threat towards ROK. The power transition is raising conflict and tension between the ROK and DPRK and even increasing the possibility of military confrontation.

II.4.3 U.S.

The U.S. is a close ally of ROK and Japan and therefore maintains bilateral security agreements with both. The U.S. has suppressed DPRK to give up the development of nuclear weapons program and also the nuclear weapons. In return for DPRK to give up its nuclear development, U.S. will give aid, diplomatic benefits, and normalization of the relations. U.S. had also been in military cooperation with ROK by deploying thousands of military troops in the region. U.S. and ROK had agreed in Mutual Defense Treaty since October 1, 70

Both countries agreed to provide mutual aids if one or both of them faced attacks and also to allow U.S. military troops to be stationed in ROK.

Recently, U.S. and ROK are also cooperating in developing and the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The deployment of THAAD system was done in order to enhance the regional security from DPRK’s nuclear threat although China strongly opposed the program and refer it as a threat towards the national security of China.

**II.4.4 China**

China has become DPRK’s closest ally since supporting the North in the Korean War. More recently, China has played a central role in negotiations with DPRK, acting as a mediator between U.S. and the DPRK and resisting support for harsh multilateral sanctions that could lead to a refugee crisis. After the DPRK’s nuclear weapon test in October 2006, China started to reconsidered the characteristic of its relations with DPRK, which applying both to suppress or to persuade. But as DPRK’s biggest bilateral trading partner and a major donor, China’s influence over DPRK is bigger than any other countries. China also played the primary role in a multilateral framework that discussed about DPRK denuclearization named Six-Party Talks.

China also considers the Korean Peninsula’s stability as its main interest. China’s support for DPRK act as the tools to guarantee that DPRK will still be in friendly term with China and can becomes the strategic buffer zone between China and ROK, the place where around 29,000 U.S. troops and marines were deployed. The flood of hundred thousands of DPRK refugees to China also become a huge worry for China but China’s first concern is to avoid the calamity on its border because the fall of DPRK will destroy China’s strategic buffer and U.S. military presence will come closer to China which is very beneficial for U.S. in its rebalance strategy in Asia.

---

II.4.5 Russia

After Japan withdrew from the Korean peninsula at the end of World War II, Russian troops occupied the North and later backed DPRK during the Korean War. Russia was an important ally for DPRK during the Cold War, providing not only aid but also the weapons technology necessary for DPRK to develop its Scud-based missile systems. Although the strength of the two countries' alliance faded with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been hesitant to back harsh sanctions against DPRK. Russia has thousands of DPRK workers in the eastern part of the country, and is interested in having a route through DPRK to ship natural gas to ROK.72

II.4.6 Japan

Korean resentment persists over Japan's harsh occupation of the peninsula in the first half of the twentieth century, worsening in recent years as Japan experiences a newfound sense of national pride. Both Koreas share concern over Japan’s growing military, as well as its seeming lack of remorse for Korean repression before the end of World War II. But DPRK has done little to ingratiate itself with Japan, kidnapping several Japanese during the 1970s and 1980s and forcing them to serve as cultural trainers for North Korean spies.73 DPRK’s development of missiles capable of reaching Japan has only strengthened Japan’s argument that it must amend its pacifist constitution, potentially leading to an East Asian nuclear arms race.

Japan and ROK are natural partners, both engaging in a middle-power strategy and also closest allies of U.S. Japan and ROK both face the challenges, opportunities, and the impact on the future of the regional order in East Asia as the effect of the rise of China in the region. To face these challenges, it is very important for both countries to cooperate share the assessment on the impacts of

the rise of China. Japan and ROK as the middle power, and given that no middle power can play a strategic role alone, the cooperation between Japan and ROK is needed to maintain the stability in the region, in this case, Korean Peninsula.
CHAPTER III

THE DEFENSE POLICY OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA

III.1 Fundamental Issues of ROK’s Defense Policy

In January 6, 2015, The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense (MND) issued its 2014 DWP. The 2014 DWP is the first DWP that is published under President Park Geun-hye administration.74

The Paper highlights the threat of DPRK’s military development to ROK’s security on the Korean Peninsula. DPRK’s military development of conducting massive number of conventional and nuclear weapons can endanger the stability of Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and even the world.

The Paper also mentioned about the establishment of ROK’s Defense Reform Basic Plan (2014-2030) by ROK Armed Forces, which reflects recent security environment. The purpose of the reform policy is to prepare the military structure to face future wars and also the efficiency of the defense management operational. The Agency for Defense Development (ADD) is also doing research in defense sector by pursuing the development of science and technology.75 The Paper also contains details on barracks culture reform, which is the capability to respond to DPRK’s military development.

75 ADD is the only South Korean national agency for research and development in defense technology established in August 1970.
III.1.1 ROK’s Defense Policy Concerns

The recent international order is still dominated by U.S., but the regional powers are on the rise. There are many factors of challenge that can change the international order. Local conflicts are still happening and so it can increase the security in the region. DPRK’s nuclear threat is not the only concern in the Paper. There are still many other concerns such as deepening Asia’s Paradox, cooperation and competition between U.S. and China, and increasing influences and arms race in the region.

III.1.1.1 DPRK Nuclear Development

The ROK Ministry of National Defense wrote in its 2014 Defense White Paper published that DPRK has reached a considerable level with its nuclear weapon miniaturization capabilities. The DPRK nuclear and military development has been acknowledged globally but this marks the first time it has been mentioned in a White Paper.

DPRK has obtained considerable technical capability to mount warheads on ballistic missiles. DPRK has obtained the capability to do nuclear miniaturization which is the ability to make lighter nuclear warheads. By doing miniaturization, the nuclear weapons can be launched using missiles instead of being dropped from aircraft which is very beneficial for DPRK’s strategy.

In the 2012 White Paper, it is stated that DPRK’s two long-range missiles launch in April 2009 and 2012 using the Taepodong-2 launcher had failed\textsuperscript{76} but in 2014 White Paper, it is stated that DPRK is believed to have the new five long-range missile launcher that can threaten the mainland US. The revision in 2014 also did not forget to mention about the launch of the Unha-3 rocket in Dec. 2012, which successfully placed a satellite in space orbit.

The size of the DPRK military was estimated at 1.2 million troops. The total was up by around 10,000 from previous estimates, primarily due to increases

in air force strength. The estimated size of the army decreased from 639,000 to 630,000 troops.\(^{77}\)

The White Paper also declared that “the North Korean regime and military are South Korea’s enemies” as long the armed provocations and threats continue. The phrasing has appeared consistently in all three White Papers since 2010.\(^{78}\)

In the ROK 2010 Defense White Paper, it is stated that “As long as such threats continue, the main agents of the provocative acts, which are the North Korean regime and its military, will remain enemies of the South”\(^{79}\).

In the ROK 2012 Defense White Paper, it is also stated that “As long as these threats persist, the North Korean regime and its armed forces, which are the entities who pose these threats, are our enemies”\(^{80}\).

And in the ROK 2014 Defense White Paper, it is stated that “As long as these threats persist, the North Korean regime and its armed forces, which are the entities who pose these threats, will remain as our enemies”\(^{81}\).

III.1.1.2 Deepening Asia’s Paradox

The deepening economic cooperation and interdependency in Northeast Asia is not met with the level of advancement in security cooperation. Northeast Asia has become the center of global economy. The economies of China, Japan, and ROK combined represent about 23% of the global output.\(^{82}\) The economic cooperation is deepening as the regional interdependency increase. The security uncertainties in Korean Peninsula are also increasing because of DPRK’s nuclear development, historical perception, and territorial rights. ROK minister of defense, Han Min Goo (2014) stated that:

---


\(^{78}\) Ibid.


\(^{82}\) Ibid. Page 14.
The threat to security on the Korean Peninsula has never been greater. North Korea is committed to maintaining and training massive numbers of conventional forces while simultaneously advancing its asymmetric forces and weapons of mass destruction that shake the stability of the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia and the world. Historical and territorial conflicts and a growing arms race have intensified among the countries of Northeast Asia. Transnational and non-military threats, including terrorism, both at home and abroad, cyber-attacks, infectious diseases and massive natural disasters are ever increasing.”

III.1.1.3 Cooperation and Competition between the US and China

The direction of the U.S.-China relationship is expected to be the key variable in the security order in Northeast Asia for a while. The “Rise of China” and the “Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region” strategy of the U.S. will make their strategic cooperation and competition the most necessary factor to ensure the stability of the security in the region. The US and China will in general maintain strategic cooperative relations, sharing the goal of stability and peace in Northeast Asia. However, in the case that there are any collisions of core national interests between them, conflicts could deepen. It is stated in ROK Defense White Paper that,

“As the dual relationship of strategic cooperation and competition between the U.S. and China continues while Japan and Russia join the race toward increasing their national interests and influence in the region, instability and uncertainty are likely to intensify”.

U.S., China and neighboring countries like Japan and Russia increase their influence by bolstering military power, strengthening alliances and cooperative relations, and taking the initiative in multilateral talks. As a result, an arms race in the Korean Peninsula is expected to grow further.

III.1.1.4 Increasing Influence and Arms Race in the Region

While the U.S. maintains its military superiority in Northeast Asia, China, Japan and Russia have vied to build up their own military strengths, centering on

84 Ibid. Page 15.
naval and air forces. In particular, competition among the nations in the region over outer space has grown fierce.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Troops (Approx.)</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,492,000</td>
<td>2,333,000</td>
<td>845,000</td>
<td>247,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Weapon Systems</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 aircraft carriers, 72 submarines, 2,224 fighters and bombers</td>
<td>1 aircraft carrier, 70 submarines, 1,859 fighters and bombers</td>
<td>1 aircraft carrier, 64 submarines, 1,320 fighters and bombers</td>
<td>6 Aegis ships, 18 submarines, 340 fighters and bombers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defense Budget (2013)</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USD 600.4 Bn.</td>
<td>USD 112.2 Bn.</td>
<td>USD 68.2 Bn.</td>
<td>USD 51 Bn.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Buildup</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of 60% of its naval and air forces in Asia Pacific in progress, strengthening of missile defense system within the region</td>
<td>New strategic missiles, nuclear attack submarines, and aircraft carrier, strengthening of space capabilities</td>
<td>Nuclear capability enhancement, development of stealth fighters and new missiles, creating the Arctic Joint Strategic Command, strengthening of space capabilities</td>
<td>Introduction of F-35, early warning aircraft, and long-endurance UAVs, additional introduction of Aegis ships, development of new frigates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Military Strengths of the Four Major Powers Surrounding the Korean Peninsula

(Source: ROK 2014 Defense White Paper, Page 15)
**United States.** The U.S. seeks a solution to carry out its “Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region” strategy successfully while reducing its defense budget. It has reduced the size of its military, mainly the ground forces, while enhancing its long-distance power projection ability, in the course of strengthening its military forces in the Asia-Pacific region and cooperation with its alliances and partners. The U.S. will work toward strengthening security cooperation with its regional alliances by 2023 and partners to carry out the “Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region” strategy. With Japan, the U.S. is in pursuit of revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. It is also increasing its alliance cooperation with the ROK in various areas to increase combined defense capabilities.

**Japan.** In December 2013, Japan released the “National Defense Program Guidelines” and the “Mid-Term Defense Program” and presented the concept of a “dynamic joint defense force.” The dynamic joint defense force refers to a concept that is designed to respond to major security threats: China’s military build-up and DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs. Based on this concept, Japan intensifies its preparedness and military capabilities around the islands in the southern part of the Japanese Archipelago. Japan strengthens not only the U.S.-Japan alliance but also cooperation with the ROK, Australia and India.

**China.** China’s defense spending has ranked two, next to the US since 2009 as the second largest defense expenditure. It has also modified its military system and organization while continuously pursuing to eradicate corruption to establish discipline in the military. China has moved fast in developing nuclear weapons and missiles and modernizing naval and air force capabilities to achieve “victory in local wars under conditions of informatization,” based on its active defense strategy.

---

85 The guideline contains the defense policy for the next 10 years. It outlines security threat evaluation, defense policy, a basic concept of defense strengths, the focus and goal of increasing defense strength, etc.

86 The program contains the defense strength enhancement plan for the next five years. It outlines reorganizing of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces and the goal of enhancement of military strength.
Russia. Russia claims to advocate an “active defense strategy” in which it defends its sovereignty and seeks national interests based on “strong military power” in accordance with the National Security Strategy to 2020 and the Military Doctrine. It is also in pursuit of defense reform under the flag of “building a strong Russia”.

III.2 State Management of National Defense

III.2.1 National Security Law

The National Security Law was enacted on December 1, 1948, just three and a half months after the establishment of the ROK. After the World War II, the politics in Korea was divided in to two sides of different ideologies from the Cold War, thus created the “one nation-two states” on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean War in 1950 until 1953 made the South Koreans to applied the anti-communist beliefs and thus generate the legislation of National Security Law.

The stated purpose of the National Security Law is to prevent anti-state acts from threatening the security of ROK. "Anti-State groups" are defined in the law as "domestic or foreign organizations or groups whose intentions are to

---

87 This is a policy paper issued in 2009 and includes an extensive security structure encompassing politics, economy, and society. It outlines “the strengthening of Russia’s stature as a global power” as the objective of Russia’s national security, while proposing means for Russia’s entry into the top five largest global economies, as well as its stable economic development against the backdrop of a multi-polar international order.

88 This is a strategic doctrine regarding national defense issued in 2010. The doctrine identifies the eastern expansion of NATO, the establishment of the U.S. missile defense system, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the most serious military challenges. The newest doctrine also includes an overseas troop deployment clause aimed at protecting Russian nationals living abroad, and countermeasures for low-intensity conflicts which define nuclear weapons as a means of war deterrence. It further emphasizes the increase of advanced conventional weapons.


conduct or assist infiltration of the Government or to cause national disturbances.”

III.2.2 Ministry of National Defense

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is a minister department within the government of ROK and responsible for the ROK military development. It was established on 15 August 1948 and located at Yongsan-dong, Yongsan District, Seoul. The ROK MND composed the fundamental framework for the national defense reform for the regeneration of the defense management system, the improvement of the military structure, and the endorsement of military culture in order to execute national defense reform effectively under the approval from the President.

The ROK MND implemented and formularized national defense reform plan as a five year plan to carry out the primary framework of ROK national defense reform. The framework of national defense reform should describe the result of mid-term and final period analysis and the assessment of the security environment such as the cooperation and alliance of U.S-ROK, the changes between ROK-DPRK military relations, and the achievement done by national defense reform during the five years period.

91 Ibid.
III.2.3 Military Organization and Forces

III.2.3.1 Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) executes joint and combined operations through operational command and supervision over combat operation units, and through command and supervision over joint units. Currently the JCS operates under one Vice Chairman with four chief directorates and four offices with a plan to newly establish a fifth office, the Office of Analysis and Experimentation, as of January 1, 2015.

The JCS reinforces its task performance system toward the direction of close mutual support and integration among the Army, Navy and Air Force by strengthening their jointness. In order to cultivate the warfighting capabilities required for the ROK military to take the lead in combined operations in to prepare for the wartime operational control (OPCON) improvement in the future, the JCS will develop an organization in charge of coordinating with the USFK and strengthen the relevant organizations.

---

94 The authority of a commander over subordinate units when performing operational duties.
95 Full authority legally exercised by the commander through rank and position over subordinate units to execute the commander’s duties.
III.2.3.2 Organization and Forces of the Three Services

The Army consists of the Army HQ, two Field Army Commands, the Second Operations Command, Capital Defense Command, Special Warfare Command, Army Aviation Operations Command, Missile Command, and other supporting units.

![Figure 9 ROK Army Organization Structure](Source: ROK 2014 Defense White Paper)

The First ROK Army (FROKA) and Third ROK Army (TROKA) execute defense in their respective forward area of responsibility (AOR) all the way up to the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), and the Second Operations Command conducts missions for maintaining the stability of the rear area and war sustainment capability. The Capital Defense Command executes missions to maintain the functions of the capital such as protecting major facilities and municipal infrastructure. Other commands carry out missions pertaining to special warfare, aviation operations, logistics support and education and training.

---

The Army focuses on reinforcing the daytime and nighttime close combat capabilities of units at and below the battalion level in order to equip them with the capability to execute joint operations while maximizing the efficiency of its existing forces.

The Navy consists of the Navy HQ, Naval Operations Command, Marine Corps HQ/ North-West Islands Defense Command (NWIDC), and other supporting units.

The Naval Operations Command give instruction to overall naval operations and executes anti-surface operations\textsuperscript{98}, anti-submarine operations\textsuperscript{99}, mine and counter mine operations, amphibious operations\textsuperscript{100}, etc. The Fleet Commands execute front combatants such as destroyers, frigates, patrol vessels, and Patrol Killer Mediums (PKMs), and perform defense job in the sea area under their duty. The Marine Corps HQ executes wartime amphibious operations as its

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure10.png}
\caption{ROK Navy Organization Structure}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{98} Operations to secure and maintain maritime control, to destroy or exterminate the enemy’s surface forces by using surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft.

\textsuperscript{99} Operations to ensure the unrestrained use of the sea by destroying or exterminating enemy submarines.

\textsuperscript{100} Operations to block or neutralize the enemy’s naval forces by using mines, or to deny the use of mines by the enemy.
main mission and the NWIDC\textsuperscript{101} carries out peacetime security and defense missions in and around the Northwest Islands. Other commands carry out logistics support and education and training missions.

The Navy, as an axis of the joint forces, aims for the integrated employment of the multi-dimensional forces throughout underwater, surface, and air to respond effectively and appropriately to existing and potential threats. For this objective, it plans to acquire next-generation submarines, Aegis-class destroyers, next-generation destroyers, next-generation frigates, next-generation patrol killers, maritime patrol aircraft, maritime operational helicopters, etc. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps will be developed into a force capable of performing diverse missions such as defending strategic islands or conducting multi-dimensional, high-speed amphibious operations.\textsuperscript{102}

**The Air Force** consists of the Air Force Headquarters, Air Force Operations Command, and other operation and supporting units.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 11 ROK Air Force Organization Structure}
(Source: ROK 2014 Defense White Paper)
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{101} Established on June 15, 2011 under the Marine Corps HQ to counter North Korean threats towards the five islands that make up the Northwest Islands (Baengnyeongdo, Daecheongdo, Socheongdo, Yeonpyeongdo and Udo Islands). The Marine Corps Commandant concurrently serves as the NWIDC Commandeer.

\textsuperscript{102} Multi-dimensional high-speed amphibious operations of ROK Marine Corps were supported by the development of amphibious variant of Surion transport helicopter, which will help enhance the range of operation and mobility for the ROK Marine Corps.
The Air Force Operations Command (AFOC) controls air operations, and executes counter air operations (CAOs), air interdiction (AI) operations, close air support (CAS) operations and others. The Southern and Northern Combat Commands under the AFOC defend the airspace of responsibility under the control of the operations command. The Air Defense Missile Command executes full-spectrum air defense missions against the enemy’s aircraft, missiles, and any other air attacks. The Air Defense and Control Command has been reorganized from the Air Defense and Control Wing as of June 2013 and carry out defense missions such as air control within the ROK theater, air surveillance, aircraft identification, and air operation support.

The Air Force works to possess precision strike capabilities and long-range operational capabilities by establishing a reconnaissance and intelligence collection system and a space surveillance system, and introducing aerial refueling tankers.

III.2.3.3 The USFK and Augmentation Forces

The United States Forces Korea (USFK) consists of the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), the U.S. Naval Forces, Korea (NAVFOR-K), U.S. Air Forces, Korea (USAFK), U.S. Marine Forces, Korea (MARFOR-K), and Special Operations Command, Korea (SOCKOR). The USFK Commander concurrently serves as the Commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) and the Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC).

---

103 Operations to secure air superiority by destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s aerospace forces and air defense systems.
104 Operations to limit the enemy’s reinforcement, resupply and maneuverability by interdicting, disrupting, delaying and destroying the enemy’s military potential before it can be used effectively on the ROK Army and Navy.
105 Operations to guarantee the survivability of friendly forces and the successful execution of military objectives by supporting the friendly forces’ offensive, counter-offensive or defensive operations through attacks on the enemy forces that are engaging the friendly forces in close proximity.
106 General Brooks is the Commander of United States Forces Korea, United Nations Command, and Combined Forces Command.
The U.S. augmentation forces that will be deployed to support the defense of the ROK during wartime consist of approximately 690,000 troops from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, approximately 160 vessels, and approximately 2,000 aircraft.\textsuperscript{107} Depending on how a crisis situation develops, the U.S. augmentation forces will be deployed based on the Flexible Deterrence Option (FDO)\textsuperscript{108} or the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).\textsuperscript{109} If the crisis level rises on the Korean Peninsula, the FDO takes effect to deter war and mitigate the crisis situation during which designated forces are deployed accordingly. If the attempt to deter war fails, all combat and supporting units will be augmented as pre-planned by the TPFDD to execute ROK-U.S. combined operational plans.

\textsuperscript{108} Flexible Deterrence Option is a political, economic, diplomatic and military crisis action procedure in the CFC Crisis Action Standard Operating Procedures (CASOP) that has to be executed promptly to deter war before the warning of an outbreak of war.
\textsuperscript{109} Force deployment list and data of the U.S. augmentation forces for executing ROK-U.S. combined operation plans.
III.3 Component of the Defense

III.3.1 Armed Forces

The Republic of Korea Armed Forces is the armed forces of ROK. ROK Armed Forces was created in 1948. ROK Armed Forces possessed the total of personnel strength of 3,600,000 in 2014 (630,000 active and 2,970,000 reserved) become one of the largest standing armed forces in the world. The ROK military forces are responsible for maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states.

The ROK Armed Forces consists of the ROK Army, ROK Navy and ROK Marine Corps, and ROK Air Force. In addition, reserve elements consist of ROK Reserve Forces and ROK Civil Defense Corps.

The ROK Army (ROKA) is largest of the ROK military branches, by having 495,000 personnel as of 2014. The ROK Army is divided into three categories which are the First Army (FROKA), Third Army (TROKA) and Second Operational Command. Each category has its own headquarters, units (except for the Second Operational Command) and divisions.

ROK Navy, is the naval security military branch of the ROK Armed Forces. The ROK Navy is responsible for conducting naval operations and amphibious landing operations. The ROK Navy includes the Republic of Korea Marine Corps, which is a seemingly self-supporting organization. The ROK Navy was established in 1945, making it the oldest branch of ROK Armed Forces.
The Republic of Korea Marine Corps is the marine corps of ROK. Though theoretically it is under the direction of the ROK Chief of Naval Operations, the ROK Marine Corps operates as a distinct arm of the ROK Armed Forces, unlike the marine corps of most other countries, which generally operate as part of a navy. The ROKMC was founded as a suppression operations force against communist partisans just prior to the start of the Korean War.\footnote{\textit{Marine Corps - South Korea.} Retrieved January 20, 2017 from website: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/marine-corps.htm}

The ROK Air Force (ROKAF) is a branch of ROK Armed Forces which is in charge to preserve the capabilities of modern air force to defend itself from maintains a modern air force in order to defend itself from different kinds of threats, including the DPRK armed forces.

The Republic of Korea Reserve is the alternative or standby forces of ROK military, consists of 4,500,000 strong alternative military personnel.\footnote{\textit{Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense.} (2014). \textit{2014 Defense White Paper.} Page 91.} The soldiers who have completed their military service in ROK Armed Forces will automatically be placed to Reserve Force. The Reserve Forces is divided into two categories which are the Homeland Reserve Forces and Mobilization Reserve Forces. The Homeland Reserve Forces is a home type guard force. The Mobilization Reserve Force will formed about 5 divisions to be deployed to the warzone to take care of support and to ensure the stability of the region during the wartime. During the wartime, the Homeland Reserve Force will protect the mainland from any kinds of possible attacks from the enemy.

\textbf{III.3.2 Budget}

The defense budget for 2014 was 35 trillion, 705.6 billion won, and 10 trillion, 509.6 billion won of this was the force improvement budget, which increased 3.3\% from 2013\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}. Due to the perpetual military threat posed by DPRK, the strengthening of military power by neighboring countries in Northeast Asia and changes in the military environment, the need to increase the ROK defense budget is growing. However, the ratio of the defense budget to the ROK’s
gross domestic product (GDP), as well as to the entire government budget, is decreasing. As of 2014, the defense budget accounted for 2.38% of GDP and 14.4% of the government budget.\textsuperscript{118}

The 2014 Defense Budget focused on the establishment of a robust defense posture, the reinforcement of future-oriented defense capabilities and the improvement of working environments for service members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 2013 (Billion won)</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 2014 (Billion won)</th>
<th>Changes (FY 2014-FY 2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Defense Budget</td>
<td>34,497.0</td>
<td>35,705.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force Operating Costs</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>24,322.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Troop Operating Costs</td>
<td>14,284.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations and Management Costs</td>
<td>10,037.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force Improvement Budget</td>
<td>10,174.9</td>
<td>10,509.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Amount of FY 2014 Defense Budget and its Allocation
(Source: ROK 2014 Defense White Paper)

The force operating costs, which amounted to 25 trillion, 196 billion won, or 70% of the total defense budget, increased 3.6% compared to 2013.

The force improvement budget amounted to 10 trillion, 509.6 billion won, which is a 3.3% increase compared to 2013. An amount of 1 trillion, 177.1 billion won was allocated to some projects, including a long-range air-to-surface missile system for the early establishment of the Kill Chain and Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), which are intended to counter DPRK’s asymmetric threats such as nuclear and missile threats.

Also, an amount of 1 trillion, 99.5 billion won was allocated to some projects, including a GOP advanced security system, to counter DPRK’s local provocations. A total of 7 trillion, 345.8 billion won was allocated to projects for acquiring next-generation MLRS, frigates, and fighters (F-X) in order to establish a self-reliant defense posture. As such, investments are made consistently to build up elite military forces and ensure preparation against both existing and potential threats.119

III.3.3 Weaponry System

![Figure 13 Forces of the Army](Source: ROK 2014 Defense White Paper)

The ROK Army’s military capabilities can be seen by having approximately 495,000 troops, 2,400 tanks, 2,700 armored vehicles, 5,800 cannons/MLRS, 60 guided weapons, and 600 helicopters as of 2014.120 Main battle tank types include: 880 M48 Patton series and its upgrades such as M48A3K, M48A5, and M48A5K, 33 Soviet T-80U and 2 T-80UK as well as 1,524 K1A1 and K1 tanks, which bear a 120 mm smoothbore gun and are of local manufacture. The ROK Army also has the inventories of Russian-built AFVs, including BMP-3 IFVs and T-80U MBTs, given by the Russian government to pay off the financial debt owed to ROK.

---

120 Ibid.
The ROK Navy consists of approximately 70,000 troops (including the troops of the Marine Corps approximately 29,000), 10 surface combatants, 10 amphibious ships, 10 mine warfare vessels, 20 auxiliary vessels, 10 submarines, and 50 helicopters as of 2014.\textsuperscript{121} ROK Navy also has about 20 fixed-wings and 50 rotary-wings as of 2015.

The ROK Air Force consists of approximately 65,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft, 60 C4ISR aircraft, 50 transport aircraft, 160 trainers, and 40 helicopters as of 2014.\textsuperscript{122}

III.3.4 Foreign Relations and Defense Cooperation

Defense Cooperation with U.S.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
Both the ROK and the U.S. are building a full-spectrum combined defense system with defining the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as the priority goal in an effort to be prepared against the threats of various provocations from DPRK. The ROK military has strengthened deterrence and response capabilities by developing the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS)—a joint strategy between the ROK and the U.S.—in the face of WMD threats from DPRK, including nuclear weapons and missiles. ROK and U.S. will also pursue a more stable wartime operational control (OPCON) transition; taking into account the ROK military’s readiness to take the lead in the combined defense system as well as the security environment. At the ROK-U.S. Joint Statement in 2016, Obama said that,

“In recent years, we’ve worked together to strengthen our alliance, and to ensure our readiness against any threat. For instance, our missile defense cooperation – THAAD – is a purely defensive system to deter and defend against North Korean threats. And today, I want to reaffirm that our commitment to the defense and security of South Korea, including extended deterrence, is unwavering.”

The ROK and the U.S. have made continued efforts to strengthen the military alliance and have expanded the level and scope of cooperation to resolve regional and global security issues.

Defense Cooperation with Japan

The ROK and Japan share the basic values of liberal democracy and a market economy, and cooperate for the peace and prosperity of not only the Northeast Asia region, but also the world. ROK and Japan have periodically held defense minister-level meetings since 1994. In the 14th meeting in 2009, the two countries concluded the Letter of Intent on Defense Exchanges between the

Republic of Korea and Japan. In the 15th meeting in 2011, the two countries agreed to enhance cooperation to respond to the DPRK provocations and for humanitarian disaster relief. In the Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD) held in October 2014, the Vice Defense Ministers of the ROK and Japan met to exchange opinions on defense exchanges and cooperation between the ROK and Japan and agreed to keep making attempts for the stable development of the ROK-Japan relationship.125 It is stated in Japan Defense White Paper that,

“The Republic of Korea (ROK) is the most important neighboring country of Japan, and is extremely vital to Japan in geopolitical terms… Both Japan and the ROK are confronted with wideranging and complex security challenges including not only the North Korean nuclear and missile issues, but also counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, large-scale natural disasters, antipiracy measures, maritime security and so on”.126

In addition, the two countries are widening their understanding of each other through defense policy talks, defense exchanges and cooperation talks, and security policy consultative meetings. Academic exchanges are also made periodically.

Defense Cooperation with China

The ROK and China have developed their relationship in various areas, such as politics, economy, society, and culture, since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992.127 In particular, ever since the relationship was upgraded to a “strategic cooperative partnership” in May 2008, defense exchanges and cooperation between the ROK and China have been more active.

In July 2014, the two countries held a ROK-China summit in Seoul and laid out a way ahead to establish a “mature strategic cooperative partnership” through their joint statement. By maintaining the stable development of military relations between the two countries, they have decided to enhance to the stability and peace of the region based on mutual understanding and trust. In July of the same year, the two countries discussed a specific action plan regarding the issues agreed upon during the summit through the fourth Defense Strategic Dialogue held in Beijing. As a result, an MOU was concluded to install a direct phone line between the defense ministries of both countries, and mutual exchange visits of young officers from the ROK and China were carried out. During the ROK-China summit held in Beijing in November 2014, they agreed to pursue joint efforts for the denuclearization of DPRK. President Xi Jinping (2014) stated that,

“The China-ROK relations are at a new starting point of great development. The two sides should share the development opportunities, face challenges together and comprehensively deepen cooperation, so as to make the two countries partners seeking common development, striving for regional peace, jointly promoting Asia’s vitalization and enhancing world prosperity.”

Additionally, in 2014, ROK-China relations are being improved by expanding exchanges in various areas, such as the repatriation of Chinese soldiers’ remains, the first visiting performance of the Korean National Military Symphony to China, meetings between JCS strategic branches, exchange visits between ROK-China military athletic squads, and exchanges by military research and education institutes.

Defense Cooperation with Russia

Since the beginning of diplomatic relations in 1990, the relationship between the ROK and Russia\textsuperscript{130} has improved in a wide array of areas such as politics, economy, energy, science and technology.\textsuperscript{131}

After the ROK-Russia Defense Strategic Dialogue in March 2012, both countries shared an understanding on the need for expanding military cooperation, and continue discussions to conclude a military cooperation agreement that can systematically support it.

In the ROK-Russia summit in 2013, both countries came to an understanding that active coordination to pursue defense technology cooperation is necessary, with the perception that bilateral defense technology cooperation is an important mission to support the relationship between the two countries. As ROK President Park Geun-hye (2013) stated that,

"We established diplomatic relations in 1990. Since then, trade between our nations has grown 110-fold. Despite this level of economic growth, we have not reached our full potential and we still have areas for future growth. We have not sufficiently developed the opportunities for cooperation between our nations. This is due to factors such as the North Korean nuclear problem and other issues stemming from the Korean peninsula. Together with Russia, I would like to look into how we can take our bilateral relations to a new level".\textsuperscript{132}

To enhance trust between the two countries, the ROK and Russia are expanding exchanges of senior-level personnel. In particular, the visit of the ROK Vice Minister of National Defense to Russia in October 2013 was the first


military senior-level visit in four years, and was an opportunity to reinforce strategic communications regarding military cooperation.133

III.4 ROK’s National Security Strategy and Defense Policy

III.4.1 ROK’s National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy is a national action plan covering the comprehensive and systematic use of available resources and means to ensure national security. The National Vision of the Park Geun-hye administration is to open a “New Era of Hope”134 in which the happiness of the people and national development are put in a virtuous circle. To achieve the vision in the field of national security, the administration has established the National Security Strategy. The ROK MND is centralizing its efforts on attaining the National Security Strategy by proactively responding to ever-changing security environments and supporting national policies by maintaining a solid security posture.

III.4.1.1 National Vision and the National Security Objectives

The National Vision of the ROK government is a “New Era of Hope” in which the happiness of each individual becomes the bedrock of the development of the nation. This era of hope is pursued in tandem with national development in a virtuous cycle. To realize this vision, the government has established four principles of the administration: economic revival, the happiness of the people, cultural enrichment, and the establishment of a foundation for peaceful unification.

134 President Park Geun-hye in her inaugural speech said the new administration will usher in a new era of hope whereby “the happiness of each citizen becomes the bedrock of nation’s strength which in turn is shared by and benefits all Koreans.”
The establishment of a foundation for peaceful unification is a priority that embraces the entire domain of security including national defense, unification and diplomacy. To this end, the government has specified the National Security Objectives:

“Safeguarding the territory and sovereignty of the ROK and ensuring the safety of the people, establishing sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula and preparing for an era of unification, and promoting cooperation in Northeast Asia and contributing to world peace and development”.

First, the government will concentrate its efforts on protecting the nation’s territory and sovereignty and people’s lives and properties from multifaceted and complex threats such as armed provocations by DPRK as well as current and future threats and transnational threats.

Second, the government seeks to realize sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula and prepare for the era of unification by building trust between the two Koreas. Above all, the government will make the utmost efforts to closely cooperate with neighboring countries and the international community to induce DPRK to abandon its nuclear program and take the right path. The ROK is, furthermore, committed to achieving the normalization and stable development of inter-Korean relations and aims to bring unification to the Korean Peninsula by building its determination, support and readiness for unification, from inside and outside the ROK.

Third, the ROK government seeks to bolster national security by promoting cooperation in Northeast Asia and contributing to world peace and development. The ROK first seeks to build trust among the nations of the Northeast Asian region through dialogue and cooperation, and transform the dynamics of conflict into a framework for cooperation. By extending the energies

---

136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
of coexistence and reconciliation accumulated in Northeast Asia, the government will induce cooperation with Eurasian nations and advance toward peace, stability and shared prosperity in the wider region that encompasses Asia and Europe.\textsuperscript{138}

III.4.1.2 Tenets of the National Security Strategy

In order to achieve its National Security Objectives, the ROK government has set the tenets of the National Security Strategy: "Establishing a solid security posture, pursuing the trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula, and promoting trust-based diplomacy".\textsuperscript{139}

These are implementation strategies for defense, unification and diplomacy to establish a foundation for peaceful unification.

First, strong national security is the basis for the very existence of the nation, improved inter-Korean relations, and lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The government of ROK will also further strengthen a thorough response posture to deter provocations by DPRK and sternly retaliate in response to any provocation by DPRK. The government will also be equipped with the capability to effectively respond to DPRK nuclear capabilities and missile threats. In order to enhance security capabilities, the government will expand security cooperation by strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation through the expanding of the ROK-U.S. cooperation and alliance and strategic cooperation with neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{140}

Second, the trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula is a way to actively foster peace. On a basis of trust, the ROK government will seek to encourage DPRK to change, promote the normalization and development of inter-Korean relations, and achieve lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The government will seek to lay the groundwork for the gradual development of

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
inter-Korean relations and peaceful unification by building trust incrementally. The government will seek to implement policies regarding DPRK and unification together with the people on a basis of public consensus and support. And the government will strengthen cooperation with the international community to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue, establish peace on the Korean Peninsula, and create an environment conducive to unification. In the meantime, it seeks to resolve conflicts in society and forge consensus amongst the public on issues related to DPRK and unification.\footnote{Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. (2014). \textit{2014 Defense White Paper}. Page 36-38.}

Third, the ROK government seeks to make full use of trust-based diplomacy to resolve the so-called “Asia’s Paradox” in which the level of political and security cooperation lags far behind the deepening economic interdependency. The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) is a key policy for the realization of trust-based diplomacy in Northeast Asia. Through this initiative, the ROK government seeks to establish a practice of multilateral cooperation in the region starting with softer issues on which countries can easily engage in cooperation, such as climate change, terrorism, drug trafficking and the environment, and broaden the scope of cooperation to include more controversial issues. The government will seek to build greater consensus on the need for DPRK to change, and further strengthen cooperation with the international community to induce DPRK to renounce nuclear development and promote human rights. In the process, the government will explain to various countries about the legitimacy and necessity of unification to build consensus and further consolidate support from the international community for unification. As a middle power, the government will also strive to earn greater trust in the international community by fully assuming its responsibilities and role in the international arena, and seek to promote an attractive image of the nation.\footnote{Ibid.}
III.4.2 ROK’s Defense Policy

The ROK MND has set “Advanced Elite Military” as its vision in order to create the National Security Objectives and National Defense Objectives in rapidly shifting security environments, outlining seven key Tenets of the National Defense Policy towards its attainment. Furthermore, the MND has set “Defense with a Robust Foundation, Defense Preparing for the Future” as the defense management objectives. To this end, the MND has specified four priorities in defense management:143

“Building a full-spectrum national defense posture, strengthening future-oriented defense capability, developing the ROK-U.S. Alliance and strengthening external defense cooperation, and creating a happy and advanced defense environment”.144

III.4.2.1 National Defense Objectives

The National Defense Objectives are:

“Protecting the country from external military threats and invasions, supporting peaceful unification, and contributing to regional stability and world peace”.145

“First, protecting the country from external military threats and invasions means being prepared to meet the present military threats from DPRK and at the same time being prepared to meet other potential threats to ROK peace and security”.146

DPRK poses a severe threat to the security of ROK by conducting, developing, and increasing nuclear possessions, nuclear development programs, missile, and also other weapons of mass destruction, and by constantly committing armed provocation actions such as the attacks on Cheonan, ROK Patrol ship and by shell firing on Yeonpyeongdo Island.147

---

144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
“Second, supporting peaceful unification means contributing to a peaceful unification by deterring war, alleviating military tensions, and establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

The ROK MND will contribute to create the peaceful unification of Korea by preventing war from happening, decreasing the military tensions, mainly in Korean Peninsula, to established peace and stable Korean Peninsula.

“Third, contributing to regional stability and world peace means contributing to the stability of Northeast Asia and world peace by advancing our friendly and cooperative relationships with neighboring countries on the basis of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, and through active participation in international peacekeeping operations.”

The ROK MND will ensure not just the stability and the peace of Northeast Asia region, but also the world by enhancing and developing the cooperation with other neighboring countries and also to enhance US-ROK cooperation by actively involved in international peacekeeping programs.

III.4.2.2 National Defense Vision

The ROK military has to build the capability and posture to achieve the National Vision, National Security Objectives, and National Defense Objectives by responding effectively to various security threats amidst changing security environments. In that regard, the MND has adopted “Advanced Elite Military” as its mid- to long-term National Defense Vision.

“The term “advanced” refers to a military for the people in which all troops have upright values and mindsets; a military culture trusted by the people is in place; and a creative and effective defense operations system with excellent defense capabilities has taken root, making it an exemplary model in the world. The term “elite” refers to a military in which strong and brave troops are armed with the most optimal weapons and equipment; trained as they fight; and ready to exert the best, unified combat power. The combined term “advanced elite military” means a military that is elite, advanced and has the posture and capability to fight against the enemy and win.”

149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
III.4.2.3  Tenets of the National Defense Policy

The ROK military has identified and is pursuing the following seven key Tenets of the National Defense Policy as its consistent policy direction toward achieving the National Defense Vision:

“(1) Establishing a robust defense posture; (2) Strengthening future-oriented self-defense capability; (3) Developing the ROK-U.S. military alliance and reinforcing defense diplomacy and cooperation; (4) Providing military measures and readiness in accordance with the changing inter-Korean relationship; (5) Bolstering innovative defense management and promoting defense industry; (6) Creating a proud and rewarding environment for military service; and (7) Implementing defense policies focusing on respect for the people” ¹⁵²

To accomplish such tenets, the ROK military will actively move ahead with “Creative Defense,” a new paradigm in which defense strength is generated by incorporating creativeness, science and technology into national defense management. ¹⁵³

The ROK Ministry of National Defense strategy to encounter DPRK’s military development is to develop an advanced elite military with a robust foundation. “Creative Defense” means utilizing the use of the Research and Development to keep developing new military technology to defend against DPRK’s nuclear threat. A creative and effective defense operations with more enhanced military capabilities can be reach by equipping the most optimal weapons and equipment to the standing military troops.

The ROK Ministry of National Defense effort to realize the combination of “Advanced Elite Military” and “Creative Defense” can be seen in the increasing defense budget to improving new technologies to increase military capabilities, especially by military modernization to strengthen the standing troops and the development of Korean 3-axis system to respond DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula.

¹⁵³ Ibid.
CHAPTER IV

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ROK’S DEFENSE POLICY IN RESPONSE TO DPRK’S MILITARY DEVELOPMENT IN KOREAN PENINSULA

“(1) Establishing a robust defense posture; (2) Strengthening future-oriented self-defense capability; (3) Developing the ROK-U.S. military alliance and reinforcing defense diplomacy and cooperation; (4) Providing military measures and readiness in accordance with the changing inter-Korean relationship; (5) Bolstering innovative defense management and promoting defense industry; (6) Creating a proud and rewarding environment for military service; and (7) Implementing defense policies focusing on respect for the people”.

The statement of ROK Defense White Paper above is the tenets of ROK national defense policy to achieve national defense vision. DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula is a threat not just to ROK’s security but also the regional stability and world security. ROK’s strategies to safeguarding the country and territory and establishing peace on Korean Peninsula are executed by implementing “Creative Defense” and “Advanced Elite Military” to response DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula.

IV.1 Major Increase Defense Budget due to the Situation in Korean Peninsula

The implementation of ROK 2014 Defense White Paper can be seen significantly on the increasing defense budget projected in the mid-term defense program budget breakdown for the year 2015-2019. To response DPRK’s military development in Korean Peninsula, ROK applied the “Creative Defense” as its

strategy to respond DPRK’s nuclear threat. To realize this strategy, ROK also need to increase the military capabilities to defend against DPRK’s nuclear threat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Project Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Budget (won, trillion)</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Increase Rate)</td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
<td>(7.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Operating Costs</td>
<td></td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Increase Rate)</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
<td>(6.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70.6)</td>
<td>(69.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Improvement Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Increase Rate)</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>(11.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29.4)</td>
<td>(30.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Mid-term Defense Program Budget Breakdown (2015-2019)
(Source: ROK 2014 Defense White Paper)

The amount of defense budget allocated for 2015-2019 Mid-term Defense program in ROK 2014 Defense White Paper is KRW 222.9 trillion. The total increase rate of force operating costs budget is 5.6%, an increase 10.6% for force improvement budget, and an increase of 7.2% on the total of defense budget on 2015-2019 mid-term defense program.

The defense budget has been increasing from year to year because of the situation in Korean Peninsula, especially regarding DPRK nuclear and missile threat in the region. Because of the military threat possessed by DPRK in the region, the neighboring countries also strengthening their military power, and then the needs for ROK to also increase its military power becomes ROK priority. President Park Geun-hye (2016) stated that,
“North Korea is warning of additional provocations and this may bring danger of war to the Korean peninsula and various types of provocations and terrorist attacks can happen.”

As a result, the ROK defense budget is growing. The budget allocation has focused on strengthening the military capabilities of ROK military to combat DPRK threat of aggression and local provocations. The budget allocated on force operating costs has focused on switching to an elite troop structure, improving the welfare of service members, established a complete military readiness posture, and removing welfare blind spots.

Regarding troops reduction plan in accordance with the plan to switch to an elite troop structure, the defense budget also allocated in increasing military equipment reinforced in battalion and below-level combat units for the remaining troops in order to guarantee the survivability of the remaining troops deployed. It is also needed to strengthen the operation and security facilities to enhance the readiness to face enemy areas.

The force operating costs also allocated to enhance the combat gear for reserve forces and to improve the training conditions so that the reserve forces can experience the combat power equivalent to the active duty forces. The budget also allocated on the improvement to enhance the welfare and morale of service members by increasing the monthly salary for enlisted members, expanding cultural facilities in military barracks, enhancing the military medical support system, and improving the conditions of barracks and living conditions for service members.

The defense budget allocation on force improvement focused on strengthening ROK military combat power to face DPRK threat of an aggression.

---


and local provocations, execute the ROK’s military defense reform, establish a self-reliant defense posture, and enhancing the National Defense Research and Development (R&D). The budget also allocated for the development of Kill Chain and KAMD and also for deploying counter-battery detection radar for the preparation against enemy’s aggression in the future.\footnote{Yonhap News. (2015, September 9). S. Korea boosts budget for early set-up of Kill Chain, KAMD to counter North’s threats. Retrieved January 21, 2017 from Yonhap News website: http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/09/09/61/0301000000AEN2015090909700315F.html.} ROK military’s surveillance, reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities will be enhanced also to improve the maneuver and precision strike capabilities while acquiring the essential forces required to enhance the combat power of the field units. To strengthen ROK Navy, amphibious operations will be needed as well to strengthen the capabilities of the naval to protect sea lines of communication (SLOC). The air power also needed to be strengthened to achieve air superiority and acquire long-distance operational capabilities.

The force improvement budget also allocated on the investment on defense science and technology capabilities corresponding to the level of advanced countries and also to enhance the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) into a world-class research institute. The private sector’s participation in national defense R&D will be encouraged, support for businesses in the defense industry will be reinforced, and the defense industry will be promoted.\footnote{Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. (2014). 2014 Defense White Paper. Page 85.}

IV.2 Build Strong ROK Army

IV.2.1 Troops Reduction Plan

The military tension on Korean Peninsula has been increasing. The DPRK’s nuclear threat faced by ROK made ROK Ministry of Defense had implemented the Troops Reduction Plan. The Troops Reduction Plan was done until 2022, with the target of 522,000 standing army. This plan was done in the
ROK Army especially in the non-combatant areas like combat service support. The troops reduction plan also go in line with the enhancement of the quality of the remaining standing troops by doing military modernization to make sure that they can survive in the future war.\textsuperscript{159}

The troop reduction plan is connected with the use of civilian resources plan as the substitute for the reduced troops to work in noncombatant areas so that the remaining troops will be deployed specifically in combat missions. By doing troops reduction plan, the defense budget can be allocated on increasing the salary of the enlisted army so that it can improve the welfare of service members and make them to be more motivated in defending the country.\textsuperscript{160}

By doing troops reduction plan, the budget for the troops will be allocated to increase the military equipment reinforced in combat units for the remaining troops. The standing troops reduction plan does not mean that the military capabilities of ROK military will also decrease. The role of the troops reduced will be placed by the use of civilians resources. This plan did not decrease the capability of ROK military to encounter DPRK’s military development but instead, this plan was done enhance the quality of the remained standing troops by allocating the defense budget more to increase the quality of remained troops.\textsuperscript{161}

The size of troops deployed would be decreased from 2014 to target time 2022. The standing troops reduction were done in order to increase the ratios of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and then an elite troop structure would be established. This troops reduction plan is done to make an elite military with more advanced structure and with information and technology orientation.\textsuperscript{162}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
The pictures above represent the comparison between the amount of the standing troops stated in of ROK 2014 Defense White Paper and 2016 Defense White Paper. The total of standing troops has decreased from 630,000 in 2014 to 625,000 in 2016. The troops reduction were done only in the ROK Army troops which are 495,000 in 2014 to 490,000 in 2016.\textsuperscript{163}

IV.2.2 The use of civilian resources in combat service support

In connection with the troop reduction plan, ROK Ministry of Defense also planned to utilize the use of civilian resources in combat service support such as logistics and installation and welfare efficiently so the limited army service

\textsuperscript{163} Based on the data the authors got from ROK 2014 Defense White Paper and 2016 Defense White Paper.
resources can be focused and deployed on combat missions. The plan for the use of civilian resources in defense were prepared for every five years and aimed to save 200 billion won from the defense budget in noncombatant areas.

“The Basic Plan for the Use of Civilian Resources in Defense (2014-2018) aims to save 200 billion won of the defense budget in noncombatant areas by utilizing personnel, capital and civilian management techniques in a synchronized manner, and reinvest the saved amount in other national defense areas efficiently”\textsuperscript{164}

By using the civilian resources for defense sector in noncombatant areas, the quality of national defense service can be improved by the increase of equipment operation rate and the improvement of the quality of food prepared during military service.

In 2012, the effort to reduce active-duty personnel in noncombatant sector were done by contracted out the service support activities provided by civilian companies. The civilian companies were used to support activities such as laundry, waste-collection, and repair services.\textsuperscript{165}

Using the civilian resources is an effort to use the limited defense budget efficiently. MND also started to apply the civilian technologies and creativities of the private sector that have been utilized by the Energy Service Companies (ESCO) and WASCO projects. All service support activities in noncombatant areas were hoped could be entrusted to the private sectors in 2017.\textsuperscript{166}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Detailed Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outsourcing to Private Sector</td>
<td>Increase in outsourced maintenance, introduction of vehicle leasing, outsourcing of repair service, laundry and waste collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applying Management Techniques</td>
<td>Extended application of the prime vendor system, extended operation of the military executive agency system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
IV.3 Military Troops Deployment in Korean Peninsula

In respond to DPRK’s military development, the military capabilities of ROK military in Korean Peninsula in 2016 has increased compared to ROK military weapons deployed in 2014. The ROK military are constantly developing the military capabilities to secure itself from the increasing threat from DPRK.

IV.3.1 ROK Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Armored Vehicles</th>
<th>Cannon/MLRS</th>
<th>Guided Weapons</th>
<th>Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount 2014</td>
<td>495,000</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Approx.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount 2016</td>
<td>490,000</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Approx.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 ROK Army Military Capacities


The ROK Army carries out the mission of protecting important facilities and urban infrastructure in order to maintain the function of the capital city of Seoul. ROK Army also capable to do other missions such as special warfare, air operations, personnel and logistics support, and training. In 2016, the ROK Army has been equipped with surveillance and reconnaissance power, K2 tanks, K-21 infantry fighting vehicles, attack helicopters, etc., capable of performing
aggressive combat operations, while utilizing existing power as efficiently as possible.\textsuperscript{167}

Due to the troops reduction plan, the ROK Army troops has decreased from 495,000 in 2014 to 490,000 in 2016. But to maintain the survival of the remaining troops, the amount of Canon/MLRS has been increased, from 5,800 to 5,900.\textsuperscript{168}

\section*{IV.3.2 ROK Navy}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Surface Combatant s</th>
<th>Amphibious Ships</th>
<th>Mine Warfare Vessels</th>
<th>Auxiliary Vessels</th>
<th>Submarines</th>
<th>Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount in 2014 (Approx.)</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount in 2016 (Approx.)</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
                      & Troops & Surface Combatant s & Amphibious Ships & Mine Warfare Vessels & Auxiliary Vessels & Submarines & Helicopters \\
\hline
Amount in 2014 (Approx.) & 70,000 & 110 & 10 & 10 & 20 & 10 & 50 \\
Amount in 2016 (Approx.)  & 70,000 & 110 & 10 & 10 & 20 & 10 & 70 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

In 2016, the ROK Navy has secured submarines (KSS-III), Aegis class ships, destroyers (KDDX), frigates (FFX), cruise ships, maritime patrol aircraft and maritime patrol helicopters.\textsuperscript{169} The ROK Navy has evolved into a power structure capable of performing various missions, such as \textquotedblleft three-dimensional high-speed landing operations.\textquotedblright\textsuperscript{170} There are no troops reduction plan done in the ROK Navy. The amount of helicopters has increased from 50 to 70.

\begin{flushright}
\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
\end{flushright}
IV.3.3 ROK Air Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>C4ISR Aircraft</th>
<th>Transport Aircraft</th>
<th>Trainers</th>
<th>Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount in 2014 (Approx.)</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount in 2016 (Approx.)</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 ROK Air Force Military Capacities

In 2016, the ROK Air Force has secured superior air superiority by securing F-X and Korean-style fighter aircraft (KF-X), and will enhance its ability to perform remote operations by introducing large-sized transport aircraft and tankers. There is no troops reduction done in ROK Air Force. The amount of combat aircraft has increased from 400 to 410. The amount of trainers has also increased by 20. The amount of C4ISR has decreased from 60 to 30, helicopters from 40 to 30.

IV.3.4 USFK and reinforcements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>Attack Helicopters</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Armored Vehicles</th>
<th>Cannons/MLRS</th>
<th>Patriot Missiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount in 2014 (Approx.)</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10/40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount in 2016 (Approx.)</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10/40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 ROK USFK Military Capacities

There is no change between the amount of USFK military capabilities deployed in Korean Peninsula between 2014 and 2016 but the number of U.S. reinforcements to support the defense of the ROK at the time of the incident are 690,000 troops, including 160 ships, and 2,000 aircraft. In accordance with the development of the crisis, the U.S. reinforcements will be divided into two categories: "Flexible Deterrence Option (FDO)" and "Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD)". According to Article 2 of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, if the Korean Peninsula is in crisis, a rapid restraint system will be implemented to suppress the war and mitigate the crisis, and the designated power will be put in place. If the war develops, the U.S.-ROK plan will be implemented in accordance with the combat units to increase the support units.

IV.4 Military Modernization

IV.4.1 Strengthening Military Capabilities

The ROK Ministry of Defense is strengthening the military capabilities of ROK to establish a firm security posture to respond diversified threats, mainly the growing DPRK nuclear threat. The ROK military has established a power building plan to implement the defense policy based on strategic environment assessment and threat analysis. The ROK MND is increasing its power by selecting and concentrating to effectively respond to DPRK's various military threats within its available resources.

In terms of battlefield functions, the battlefield recognition power is gradually established for military reconnaissance satellites, multi-purpose

---

172 Economic, diplomatic and military actions which must be taken in order to deter warfare during crisis process.
175 Available troops and civilians resources.
satellites, various unmanned aerial surveillance aircraft, and signal information
collection systems to establish surveillance and reconnaissance and early warning
systems on the Korean Peninsula and surrounding areas, and improve the ability
to visualize battlefields through simulation.¹⁷⁶

Telecommunication power is improved through interoperability of sector-
by-sector and sector-specific command and control systems and high-speed, high-
capacity digital-based communication system to secure real-time battlefield
situation. The military also enhanced the operational environment of ground-
based power by securing K-series tanks and self-propelled weapons, 230 mm
multi-range, Korean-type maneuvering helicopters, and long-range missiles to
improve offensive combat operations and expand mobility areas.¹⁷⁷

The offshore power will secure the submarine (KSS-III), maritime patrol
aircraft, landing helicopter, etc. in order to have marine control capability and
three-dimensional landing operation performance around the Korean Peninsula.
The air power is secured step by step by securing FX and Korean fighter aircraft
(KF-X) to improve the aerial operations performance and securing the air
refueling machine and the precision guided weapon. Protected power will
gradually improve aircraft and ballistic missile defense capabilities,
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear (CBRN) defense capabilities, and will also bolster the protection
capabilities of individuals, facilities and equipment to ensure early war
survivability.¹⁷⁸

2015 Military Project. Among the defense budget of KRW 37,555 trillion in
2015, the improvement in defense capability was KRW 11.14 trillion, an increase
of 4.8% from 2014¹⁷⁹, and the major power enhancement project that was
implemented in 2015 is shown in the table.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.
¹⁷⁸ Ibid.
¹⁷⁹ Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon System</th>
<th>Ongoing Projects</th>
<th>New Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Battlefield Recognizer/Command Control | - High-altitude reconnaissance aerial soldier vehicle  
- Thermal monitoring equipment (TOD-III) | - High-altitude reconnaissance aerial division vehicle  
- Tactical Information Communication Network (TICN)  
- Korean joint tactical data link |
| Fire power | - K2 tank  
- K-9 self-propelled gun | - New 7.62 mm machine gun  
- Minefields passage planting equipment |
| Offshore power | - Gwanggaeto-class III destroyer  
- Jangbogo-class III submarine (Batch I) | - Submarine rescue ship (ASR-II)  
- New marine surveillance radar |
| Public power | - F-X  
- Tank | - Base flight training helicopter |

Table 9 Major Power Strengthening Project in 2015
(Source: ROK 2016 Defense White Paper)

2016 Military Project. Among defense budget of KRW 38.84 trillion in 2016, the improvement in defense capability was KRW 11.68 trillion, an increase of 6.18% from 2015.\(^\text{180}\) The main power enhancement project to be carried out in 2016 is shown in the table.

IV.4.2 Korean 3-axis system construction

In order to effectively suppress and respond to DPRK nuclear and missile threats, ROK military is building a Korean 3-axis system to secure its own suppression and response capability. The Kill Chain is being built to strike...
DPRK’s missile, mobile launcher and mover, command and control system, and related fixed facilities. A kill chain is a series of attack systems that detect enemy missile threats in real time, identify target locations, and then launch strike to destroy the enemy missile threats.181

In order to monitor signs, identify, and strike capability for DPRK, it is necessary to acquire additional missiles such as ground-to-ground missiles, long-range air-to-ground missiles, mid-range mid-range air missiles, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) laser guided bombs, improved tactical surface-to-surface missile capabilities.182

ROK military is also developing Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) that can intercept the missile launched from DPRK and flying to ROK before the missile reaches the ground. KAMD has been built up to date with the overlapping missile defensive system focusing on the lower ground defense in consideration of the battlefield environment on the Korean Peninsula.183

KAMD consists of the early warning system, the command control system, and the intercept system. When a missile is launched, it will be detected by the ballistic early warning radar and or Aegis ship radar. Once the information is analyzed at the Operations Control Center and delivered to the optimal interceptor, the turrets ordered to intercept and track the missiles with its own radar to perform the intercept mission.184

Currently, KAMD has equipped with the ability to detect and defend against core facilities and major airports of the metropolitan area by empowering the Titan Early Warning radar, Aegis destroyer, and Patriot missiles.185

182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
ROK military will continue to improve the performance and reliability of missile response capabilities by identifying the development needs of KAMD until 2020 and strengthening interoperability between the U.S. and the missile defense system. In addition to Kill-chains and KAMD, if DPRK launch the nuclear weapon, it will operate a missile power capable of simultaneous, massive and precise strikes and a special operation unit to directly target the headquarters. The operation name is Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) and currently is being developed.\textsuperscript{186}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{kmpr.png}
\caption{Kill Chain, KAMD, and KMPR to Encounter DPRK}
\end{figure}

IV.5 ROK-US Military Cooperation

IV.5.1 THAAD Deployment in ROK

The deployment of THAAD in the Korean Peninsula had been proposed by the U.S. since 2014. After DPRK’s four nuclear test in January 2016, the Park Geun-hye administration decide to made public the decision to deploy THAAD in July 7th, 2016. The ROK and U.S. decided to deploy the U.S.-ROK THAAD system as a self-defense measure to ensure the security of the ROK and the people from the growing DPRK nuclear and missile threats and to protect the military strength of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. According to the U.S.-ROK joint statement (2016),

“\textit{The purpose of THAAD is to act as a defensive measure to ensure the security of ROK and its people, and to protect Alliance military forces from North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats”}.\footnote{Ibid.}

The THAAD system is a ballistic missile defensive system that directly destroys at an altitude of 40 to 150 km when a semi-intermediate range ballistic missile with a range of less than 3,000 km descends towards an area and then is lowered.\textsuperscript{189}

![Figure 21 THAAD Missile Capability](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AQXCHWo1-yM)

One THAAD system is equipped with a turret control station, one shooting control radar, 6 launchers, and 48 interceptor missiles. Since the THAAD system is capable of intercepting DPRK nuclear weapons and missiles at high altitudes of more than 40 km, it can be used as a medium-range anti-aircraft missile (M-SAM), long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM) and end-stage multi-layer defense system.\textsuperscript{190}

ROK will proceed with procedures such as the consultation process, design and facility construction to increase the successful rate of interception and to be able to defend much wider area. U.S. and ROK will make every effort to


complete the THAAD system deployment and to start operational operations in 2017. According a U.S.-ROK joint statement in 2016, it is also stated that,

“When the THAAD system is deployed to the Korean Peninsula, it will be focused solely on North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not be directed towards any third party nations. The THAAD deployment will contribute to a layered missile defense that will enhance the Alliance's existing missile defense capabilities against North Korean missile threats”.

The THAAD system has been rated as the most successful among the existing missile defense systems, including all 11 missile defense tests conducted in the U.S. since 2005. Eight out of eleven missiles, including short-range missiles such as Scud and three missiles, are interceptive tests for semi-intermediate range missiles. Since THAAD is capable of intercepting DPRK's nuclear missiles at high altitudes of more than 40 km, it is possible to use the long-range surface-to-air missiles (L-SAMs), it is possible to increase the interception success rate significantly by building the end-stage multi-layer defense system, so that it would able to defend much wider area (2/3 to 3/4 of the South region).


CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The security environment of Korean Peninsula, in general, was centered on the worsening inter-Korean Relations most of the past years. The rising tension on Korean Peninsula has been marked by the case of the sinking Cheonan, a ROK patrol ship, and the shell firing case of ROK’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. These DPRK’s attack towards ROK have led the focus of ROK’s military from how to manage a full-scale war with DPRK to respond localized military actions done by DPRK’s military armed forces, especially regarding DPRK’s nuclear development.

The tension in Korean Peninsula has increased because of DPRK’s nuclear and missile development. DPRK’s nuclear threat made ROK highlights the enhancement of military capabilities to face DPRK’s nuclear threat as its priority. ROK has been addressing DPRK as an enemy of ROK in ROK Defense White Paper year 2010, 2012, and 2014 but ROK 2014 Defense White Paper is the first White Paper that highlighted DPRK’s nuclear threat.

In response to DPRK’s military development, the ROK applied “Creative Defense,” a new paradigm in which defense strength is generated by incorporating creativeness, science and technology into national defense management. The ROK Ministry of National Defense strategy to encounter DPRK’s military development is to develop an advanced elite military with a robust foundation.

The ROK Ministry of National Defense effort to realize the combination of “Advanced Elite Military” and “Creative Defense” in 2014 until 2016 can be seen in the major increase defense budget, the plan of building strong ROK Army, the enhancement of the military troops deployment in Korean Peninsula, the military modernization, and strengthen the ROK-U.S. Military Cooperation.
The increasing tension in Korean Peninsula made ROK Ministry of Defense increase its military power by increasing the defense budget allocated on force operating costs and force improvement budgets. To maximize the utilization of the limited troops resource, ROK Ministry of Defense executed the troop reduction plan. The standing troops reduction were made in order to increase the ratios of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), while the role of reduced standing troops will be placed by the use of civilians resources.

In 2016, the military modernization also done by equipping with surveillance and reconnaissance power, K2 tanks, K-21 infantry fighting vehicles, attack helicopters for ROK Army. ROK Navy has also secured submarines (KSS-III), Aegis class ships, destroyers (KDDX), frigates (FFX), cruise ships, maritime patrol aircraft and maritime patrol helicopters. In 2016, the ROK Air Force has also secured superior air superiority by securing F-X and Korean-style fighter aircraft (KF-X), and will enhance its ability to perform remote operations by introducing large-sized transport aircraft and tankers.

In order to effectively suppress and respond to DPRK nuclear and missile threats, ROK military is building a Korean 3-axis system to secure its own suppression and response capability. Korean 3-axis system is the triple combo of Kill Chain, KAMD, and KMPR systems. ROK also building strong military cooperation with US to developed THAAD systems which can act as the umbrella of ROK area from DPRK’s missiles.

Following the explanation of the previous chapters, it can be stated clearly that the implementation of ROK’s defense policy is effective in responding to DPRK’s nuclear threat. As an act of defense from DPRK’s nuclear threat, looking at the analysis of ROK’s military capabilities in the previous chapters, it is capable to defend against DPRK’s military capabilities. The ROK military has effectively implement its 2014 Defense White Paper “Creative Defense” strategy by developing Kill Chain, KAMD, and KMPR systems and also ROK-U.S. THAAD systems as an act of defense against DPRK’s nuclear launch to ROK.
REFERENCES


