JAPAN’S DEFENSE POLICY: PROACTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE (2012-2017)

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A thesis presented to the Faculty of Humanities President University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations Specialized in Diplomacy Studies

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RECOMMENDATION LETTER

This thesis entitled “Japan’s Defense Policy: Proactive Contributions to Peace Policy Implementation in South China Sea Dispute (2012-2017)” prepared and submitted by Rafiqa Meidina Arifin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in International Relations in the Faculty of Humanities has been reviewed and found to have satisfied the requirements for a thesis fit to be examined. I therefore recommend this thesis for Oral Defense.

Cikarang, May 2018

Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D
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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that this thesis, entitled “Japan’s Defense Policy: Proactive Contributions to Peace Policy Implementation in South China Sea Dispute (2012-2017)” is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an original piece of work that has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, to another university to obtain a degree.

Cikarang, May 2018

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The panel of examiners declares that the thesis entitled "Japan’s Defense Policy: Proactive Contributions to Peace Policy Implementation in South China Sea Dispute (2012-2017)" that was submitted by Rafiqa Meidina Arifin majoring in International Relations from the Faculty of Humanities was assessed and approved to have passed the Oral Examination on May 17th, 2018.
ABSTRACT

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China’s ambitious maritime expansion in South China Sea has changed the status quo in the area and has triggered the neighboring countries to increase their military expenditure towards the disputed area. This condition has been one of Japan’s concerns since it could threaten the stability in Asia-Pacific Region, since under the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), Japan has been putting more attention in pursuing peace and stability, not only within Japan itself but also regionally and internationally, and in this case, peace and stability in Asia-Pacific region including the South China Sea is one of Japan’s main concern. Under the new NSS, Japan wants to be less of a security consumer and wants to contribute more proactively and adapts the Proactive Contributions to Peace policy as the fundamental course of Japan’s diplomacy and defense policy. As a non-littoral state in South China Sea, Japan’s move is very limited and cannot engage coercively in the issue Therefore, Japan implements the Proactive Contributions to Peace policy through joint trainings, exercises, and patrols, as well as through defense cooperation with other countries.

Keywords: South China Sea, Proactive Contributions to Peace, Maritime dispute
ABSTRAK

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Kata Kunci: Laut Cina Selatan, Kontribusi Proaktif terhadap Perdamaian, Sengketa Maritim
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>A2/AD</td>
<td>Anti-Access/Area Denial</td>
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<td>ADIZ</td>
<td>China’s Air Defense Identification Zone</td>
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<td>ADMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting</td>
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<td>AIS</td>
<td>Automatic Identification System</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASBM</td>
<td>Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles</td>
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<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>The Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPR</td>
<td>Barko ng Republika ng Pilipinas</td>
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<td>CCG</td>
<td>China Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLCS</td>
<td>Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Declaration on the Conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asia Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECS</td>
<td>East China Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Host Nations Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JS</td>
<td>Japanese Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japan Self-Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquid Natural Gas</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Maritime Domain Awareness</td>
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MRRV  Multi-Role Response Vessel
MSDF  Maritime Self-Defense Force
MTDP  Medium-Term Defense Program
NDPG  National Defense Program Guidelines
NPR   National Police Reserve
NSS   The National Security Strategy
PAC   Patriot Advanced Capability
PLAN  People’s Liberation Army Navy
SCS   South China Sea
SDF   Self-Defense Forces
UN    United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USGS  United States Geological Survey
TCF   Trillion Cubic Feet
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

I.1 Background

South China Sea, (hereinafter, SCS) which is located at the southern part of China and bordering with other six countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei Darussalam, is one of the largest water area which connects a third of the world’s shipping and is very wealthy with fisheries, islands, oil and gas resources.¹

SCS is also one of the largest contested waterbodies with overlapping territorial claims.² Some countries claim their territories according to the Exclusive Economic Zone (hereinafter, EEZ) as determined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter, UNCLOS), while the others claim past through their EEZ.³

Lately, China has been reinforcing its claims in the SCS area through economic, political, military, and legal means.⁴ The waterbody has been a showcase of how China interpret its economic power into military and political power, as well as a showcase of how the future of US regional hegemony and leadership and of what is called “big power relationship” by the Chinese government.⁵

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² Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
SCS which has been the subject of disputed territory possesses more than a hundred reefs, islets, rocks, and surrounding waters. Due to its wealth and potential, SCS has been a subject of competition and been claimed by several countries, in which those countries claim over the sovereignty and jurisdictional claims which has occurred for more than three decades.

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Despite having territorial disputes in the SCS, China and the relevant claimants do not let the issue interfere with the ongoing growth of bilateral ties between them as well as China and the Association of South East Asia Nations \textit{(hereinafter, ASEAN)} relations. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS \textit{(hereinafter, DOC)} is signed by China and ASEAN in November 2002, specifying that the claimants will resolve the disputes with peaceful means through favorable negotiations and consultations.\textsuperscript{9}

However, in 2009, the tensions started to re-emerge when China became more decisive in regards to its claim over the sovereignty in the SCS area, most notably towards the Philippines and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{10} Japan as the neighbor of China and also one of the user states of SCS, sees China’s ambition in SCS as some kind of a threat and it has been one of their concerns, since China’s action could give impact to their country as well, even though SCS is not their territory. As stated in Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2017:

\\textit{“In the South China Sea, China has been further conducting unilateral actions that change the status quo and increase tensions such as large-scale and rapid land reclamation, the building of outposts for their use for military purposes, and attempts to create fait accompli. Many countries including Japan have expressed concern over such actions by China. Japan’s position is that it welcomes dialogue between China and ASEAN regarding the South China Sea issue, but the dialogue should be based on international law and on the premise that demilitarization and self-restraint will be maintained on the ground.”}\textsuperscript{11}


Looking back to the history, the longest lasting tension in Asia region is the relation between Japan and China. Ranging from their historical to territorial and maritime disputes, both countries never seemed to have positive prejudice on each other. Moreover, the tension between both countries keeps increasing as Japan starts to take part in the SCS dispute.

China-Japan relation has been haunted by the shadow of their history. In 1937, World War II started in Asia as a Sino-Japanese war, in which numerous Chinese were killed because of Japan’s expansionism. This gave China a reason to despise Japan. Moreover, China also saw the rise of Japan in the end of 19th century as an insult to them, who had always thought that the Chinese were qualified and rightful to the mantle of regional leadership. Hence, these views had been adopted by Mao Zedong and the founders of the Chinese Communist Party which then were also passed on to their successors.

Moving forward to the latest situation, with the shadow of historical background resulted with high tension between the two, Japan and China also have more issues in the last few decades which also triggered more tensions among them. One of them is the territorial dispute over eight unpopulated rocks and islands in the East China Sea with the total area of 7 square Km.

This group of islands is called the Diaoyu Islands by Chinese and the Senkaku Islands by Japanese. The islands are in the north-east of Taiwan, south-

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14 Ibid.


west of Japan’s Okinawa, and east of the China’s mainland. Currently, the islands are controlled by Japan.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Map of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.\textsuperscript{18}}
\end{figure}

China, Japan, and Taiwan are fighting over those islands because they are close to crucial shipping lanes and potential oil and gas reserves, and those islands also offer plentiful fishing grounds.\textsuperscript{19} With all of those potentials in the area, it is very important for China to claim it as their territory, in the middle of the rising


\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
rivalry between China and the US for military preeminence in the Asia-Pacific region.\(^\text{20}\)

However, the most recent dispute between the two does not stop at Senkaku/Diaoyu Island. For the past few years, China has been very eager and ambitious in expanding and reinforcing its maritime claims over SCS and Japan who is not one of the littoral states of SCS has started to make its presence in the issue.\(^\text{21}\) China is obviously not content with Japan’s intervention. Moreover, Japan’s involvement in SCS dispute gets more exciting to be followed after the new National Security Strategy with Proactive Contributions to Peace policy has been established, in which Japan would like to contribute more in international affairs, in order to achieve peaceful and stable international community, especially in Asia-Pacific region.\(^\text{22}\)

I.2 Identification of the Problem

Japan has been well-known with its pacifism which is written in its constitution in Article 9 that states:

“\textit{Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.}”\(^\text{23}\)

This article was legislated after the end of World War II, in which during the war, Japan colonized several countries in Asia Pacific, including China, and the


Article 9 is Japan’s vow to the world that they will never wage a war again and to avoid any war potential.\textsuperscript{24}

The renunciation of war written in a constitution is actually quite common after the Second World War, for instance, Italy with its Article 11 and Germany with its Article 26.\textsuperscript{25} However, what caught the attention with Japan’s Article 9 is the second clause of the article itself, in which Japan declares that it will not maintain any kind of offensive forces in land, sea, and air, but still possess their defensive force which is called Japan Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter, JSDF) to protect Japan’s homeland and deal with national security.\textsuperscript{26}

On the other hand, Japan as a non-littoral state has been trying to make its military presence in the SCS dispute by sending its largest warships which is the helicopter carrier JS Izumo in May 2017 on a three months tour through the SCS.\textsuperscript{27} The commander of the mission, the Rear Admiral Yoshihiro Goga while aboard the warship said that:

\begin{quote}
\textit{“We are not just here to show our presence, but from the outside that is what it looks like.”}\textsuperscript{28}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
As mentioned in Section I.1, within Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook, Japan states that they are concerned with China’s ambition in the SCS area. Furthermore, Japan also stated that it welcomes the dialogue with China and ASEAN regarding the issue, as long as the dialogue is still following the international law and based on demilitarization premise.⁴⁰

Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration, Japan has been trying to put more attention in pursuing peace and stability, not only in Japan itself but also regionally and internationally.⁴¹ Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is arguably one of

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Japan’s most transformative leaders.\textsuperscript{32} With Abe in office, Japan has set two key documents in December 2013, which are the new version of the National Defense Program Guidelines, as well as Japan’s first National Security Strategy as the fundamental course for defense and diplomacy policy.\textsuperscript{33}

After World War II, Japan has been declaring itself as a pacifist and peace-loving nation.\textsuperscript{34} Expressing their concerns towards China’s ambition in the SCS, and seeing the dynamic of the regional stability, Japan is trying to be more proactive in achieving a more stable and peace environment, as stated in its National Security Strategy, as follows:

"Japan has contributed to peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world. In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community."\textsuperscript{35}

Therefore, in its first National Security Strategy, Japan elaborates its peaceful orientation to the policy of “Proactive Contributions to Peace” build upon international cooperation principle, recognizing its national security purposes and scrutinizes its national interests.\textsuperscript{36} Moreover, the Strategy also recognizes the challenges faced by Japan’s national security as well as the trends of security environment in Japan’s surroundings.\textsuperscript{37} The intension of Japan through this strategy is clear, in which Japan would like to engage more in international affairs, and Japan would like to be more of a security provider and less of a security consumer.\textsuperscript{38}


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

In order to achieve its purposes and overcome the challenges, Japan believes that they also have to acknowledge several aspects as stated in its publications regarding National Security Strategy as follows:

“Finally, the Strategy presents strategic approaches to be taken for national security, with diplomatic and defense policies at their core, based on the recognition that in order to overcome the challenges and achieve its objectives, Japan needs to effectively utilize its diverse resources and promote comprehensive measures, strengthen the domestic foundation for national security and seek deeper understanding both at home and abroad, and advance efforts at various levels in a multifaceted and coordinated manner.”

As stated above, diplomatic and defense policies are the core of this Strategy, and Japan believes that the Strategy could present the strategic approaches taken for its national security. Therefore, the “Proactive Contributions to Peace” policy in the National Security Strategy of Japan is used as a perspective within Japan’s defense policy major programs in Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter, SDF) in stabilizing the Asia-Pacific Region and for the improvement of the global security environments.

In which this program within defense policy will cover the SCS dispute as part of Asia-Pacific region.

I.3 Statement of the Problem

Following the points explained in Section I.2, this thesis is a research of Japan’s ‘Proactive Contributions to Peace’ implementation towards China’s expansion in SCS as a non-littoral state. Therefore, the question to conclude the statement of the problem of this thesis is:

How did Japan implement its ‘Proactive Contributions to Peace’ policy within its defense policy in the South China Sea dispute from 2012-2017?

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I.4 Research Objectives

The objectives of this thesis are to explain and analyze the answer to the main question of the research through analytical and descriptive methods in order to get the readers familiar with the issue, particularly, in analyzing the implementation of Japan’s Proactive Contributions to Peace policy and its defense policy with regard to China’s ambition in the SCS.

I.5 Significance of the Study

This research is hoped to bring significance in International Relations study, especially to the case of SCS dispute. This research is expected to be able to:

1. Enrich the understanding of Japan’s responds towards China’s ambition in the SCS dispute.

2. Provide the explanation and elaboration of Japan’s Proactive Contributions to Peace policy and its implementation through its defense policy in the SCS dispute.

I.6 Theoretical Framework

In this research, the writer provides several theories to elaborate more about the issue and to get better understanding in the issue. First, the writer uses Neorealism theory in order to get the insight of why Japan behaves towards SCS dispute in a certain way. Then, the writer uses Threat Perception theory to analyze the existential threats that Japan faced —related with SCS— that could motivate Japan’s behavior towards the disputed area. The writer also uses Defense Policy concept to get a better understanding on what influences the formulation of a state’s defense policy.
I.6.1 Neorealism

Neorealism or Structural Realism is a theory in International Relations which was firstly constructed by Kenneth Neal Waltz through his book “Theory of International Politics” in 1979. Since Neorealism is rooted from the Realism theory, this theory also stresses on the anarchic international system, state as the actor, and focuses on ‘power’.41

Just like Realism, Neorealism also argues that in an anarchical world, in which within international community, there is no highest government or higher authority between states, so state should help themselves in order to survive, this concept is known as self-help. So, survival and self-help is one of the main focus of each states, in which later on can influence the pattern of states’ interaction within international community.42

According to the Neorealist, since the world exists in a state of anarchy, therefore it is depending on self-help. Moreover, the nature of global politics is also related with power relations, states will have to survive through gaining power with the purpose of hegemony.43 By gaining and having power, states can improve their

42 Ibid.
security, and as security improved, the other states which has less power will think twice to challenge the more powerful states because of their fear and the intimidation that they get from the power that the other states possess. The power is not limited only to hard power such as military capabilities, but it can also be in the form of soft power like economic power.\textsuperscript{44}

As the similarities between Neorealism and Realism have been elaborated above, there are also differences between those theory, what makes Neorealism different from the Realism is on the power distribution, Neorealism looks at the systemic nature of power distribution.\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, Neorealism acknowledges polarity, which has to do with the power distribution across the entire global community, whether this power is concentrated in the hands of many states which means multipolar system, two states which means bipolar system, or even only one state which means unipolar. So, Neorealism tends to focus on that distribution of power, rather than individual state power.\textsuperscript{46}

Neorealism also has implications of offensive and defensive realism.\textsuperscript{47} It differentiates the kind of power needed to be developed and the amount of it. For example, in defensive realism, might focus on minimal level of security, only to be sure that the state is secure enough from any threats.\textsuperscript{48} While offensive realism is more into dominating others in terms of power, and the state needs to have enough power in order to influence others around the world.

The writer sees that Japan’s pacifist behavior can be acknowledged using the Neorealism theory, since this theory recognizes the difference between offensive and defensive realism, in which Japan has been more into defensive security system rather than on the offensive side since the end of World War II. Moreover, this theory can also be used as a lens in order to see the changes in


\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
Japan’s behavior in regard to its direction into a more proactive state in the international affairs in order to survive in the globalization era and for the sake of regional stability, as well as Japan’s concern on China’s ambition in claiming SCS and putting the regional stability at stake.

I.6.2 Threat Perceptions

According to Robert O. Tilman, threat perception is a concept in which states perceive whether or not a certain state possess threat to the state through the measurement of its capacity, capabilities, as well as its intention. This concept can be used in analyzing the relations among state actors in the international system. State realizes the potential danger to its survival by recognizing the threat, consequently state will find the solution through policy making with the purpose of reducing the threat.49

There are five dimensions which affected the threat perception of a state, these five dimensions specify the acuteness of the threat’s level possessed by a state toward other states in the international system, since different states has different condition, one factor can become more influential than the other, vice-versa. These dimensions are, structural, geopolitical, historical, socio-cultural, and economic dimension.50

Figure 5: The flow of threat perception.51

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
As mentioned in Section I.1, Japan - China relations has not always been in a good term, which is also a result of their historical backgrounds.\textsuperscript{52} The tensions between them are also caused by the geopolitics in their claims towards the Senkaku/Diaoyu island in East China Sea.\textsuperscript{53} Moreover, Japan has been expressing its concern towards China’s actions in SCS which changes the status quo and increases the tensions in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{54}

Threat perception has a significant role in the policy making process, due to the importance of handling the threat become one of the state’s priorities. The proper policy, which correlate to their own threat perception, can be created through perceiving the threat to maintain the state’s national security.\textsuperscript{55}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 6: Triangle of threat perception.}\textsuperscript{56}
\end{center}

The triangle in Figure 6 explains the relation between values/interest, threat perception and approaches in a certain issue in the international system. The triangle

\begin{itemize}
    
    
    
    
    \item \textsuperscript{56} Banyu Perwita, A. A. (2016). \textit{Threat Perceptions} [PowerPoint].
\end{itemize}
interprets that the interest, threat perception, and approaches affect each other, in which different values/interest could be resulted with different threat policy and therefore could also lead to different approaches. Furthermore, a rising threat could lead to distinctive interests which affect the approaches, and so on. All three aspect can affect and can be affected by each other as it rotate around the issue in the international system.  

I.6.3 Defense Policy

Defense Policy is one form of state’s guidelines that can lay out a code of conduct, aiming to influence and control the actions, decisions, and other issues related with military affairs and its moves. The strategies applied are in line with the national interests in security issues. Basically, it is a program consists of ‘ends’ and ‘means’, which then formulated in order to fulfill its defense objective and the concerns of its national security.

Figure 7: General picture of defense policy concept.

60 The figure is inspired from “Defence and National Security Policy in Developing Countries: A Framework for Analysis” by Prof. Drs. AnakAgung Banyu Perwita, MA., Ph.D. The figure is modified from the original to suit the research framework.
The output of defense policy is heavily affected by threat perception, while threat perception is affected by the strategic environment that consists of external environment and internal environment. External environment refers to the factors come from outside that can influence the defense policy’s outcome of the state, for instance, historical experience, geo-strategy, and relative power capabilities. Meanwhile, the internal environment refers to the factors from inside of the state, for instance, domestic vulnerability, structural, doctrinal, and psychological. Factors above can influence the output of defense policy through threat perception.

Defense policy demands the defense white paper’s establishment in order to be recognized as state’s guideline for the actions, principles, and values of the state itself. State releases its defense white paper with the purpose of creating the guideline for the national defense policy projection, as well as to inform its action plan to other states, whether for threat or cooperation.

Figure 8: Defense policy’s components.\textsuperscript{51}

The figure explains that there are two main components within defense policy, which are force structure and military strategy. The force structure refers to military capacity that can be used for combat purposes, which covers logistics, weaponry or arsenal, and military personnel to support combat situation. Whereas military strategy refers to the approach used by the military in achieving their goals, which includes target priority, recruitment, roles and missions, and military deployment.62

1.7 Scope and Limitations of Study

This research focuses on Japan’s security policy implementation towards SCS dispute, in which Japan has started making its presence in the dispute, even though Japan is not one of the littoral states of the SCS. Therefore, this research will have several limitations:

1. This research focuses on Japan’s Proactive Contributions to Peace policy within its defense policy implementation towards SCS dispute and the implementation which will be elaborated are those which has resulted with concrete real actions.

2. This research emphasizes on Japan as the main actors based on the view that the writer is analyzing the implementation of Japan’s Proactive Contributions to Peace as part of its National Security Strategy in SCS dispute. Meanwhile, China is the secondary actor since its ambition in claiming SCS is the concern of Japan.

3. This research is limited within the time frame of 2012-2017, because the writer focuses on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration, since the Proactive Contributions to Peace policy is under the new National Security Strategy which is established after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office.

1.8 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter I - Introduction

In this chapter, the writer provides the introduction to the thesis by elaborating the background and problem identification of the study, as well as the focus of the problem. This chapter also serves as the foundation of the whole thesis.

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and further explanation in the following chapters. Therefore, the writer hopes that the readers could understand and get the preview of the topic discussed in this research by reading this chapter.

**Chapter II - The Strategic Environment of South China Sea and China’s Maritime Expansion in SCS**

In this chapter, the writer discusses about the importance and the value of SCS hence why it is being contested by many countries around it. The writer also analyzes the issue of SCS dispute and China’s actions over the past years regarding its claims, as well as its political and military aspects in claiming the territory.

**Chapter III - Japan’s Defense Policy**

The writer discusses about Japan’s defense policy overview through analyzing its National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and Mid Term Defense Planning (MTDP). The security concerns and the projection of Japan’s defense policy in the South China Sea will also be elaborated in this chapter as well as Japan’s national interests and threat perception towards South China Sea.

**Chapter IV - The Implementation of Japan’s Proactive Contributions to Peace within its Defense Policy in South China Sea Dispute**

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the writer’s analysis on the implementation of Japan’s Proactive Contributions to Peace as a perspective in its defense policy in the SCS dispute in responding towards China’s ambition which is considered as a concern and in order to achieve stability in Asia-Pacific region.

**Chapter V - Conclusion**

The writer concludes and summarize the research and serves it in this chapter.
CHAPTER II
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF SOUTH CHINA SEA AND CHINA’S MARITIME EXPANSION IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

II.1 The Strategic Environment of South China Sea

II.1.1 Geographical Condition

The South China Sea (hereinafter, SCS) is located on the strategic position for geopolitics on Indo-Pacific. SCS is bordering with several countries from East Asia and mostly from South East Asia. In East Asia, SCS is bordering with China and Republic of China (Taiwan).63 In South East Asia region, South China Sea is bordering with Republic of Indonesia, The Federation of Malaysia, Singapore, Nation of Brunei, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and Republic of the Philippines.64

Figure 9: Littoral States of South China Sea.65

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SCS has territorial coverage up to 1.4 million miles. It is dominated by waters and hundreds of small islands such as Paracels Islands, Sparty Islands, Scarborough Shoal (according to Philippine, the location around 100 miles from Philippine) or Huangyan Island (according to Mainland China, the location around 500 miles from Mainland China).

The position of the South China Sea is important for the world shipping route or international trade. By collecting the data from Automatic Identification System (hereinafter, AIS), shipping route and bilateral trade flows, every year can reach up to US$ 3.4 Billion annual shipping value crossing the SCS water for supporting international trade compared with total value from total world trade at US$ 15.9 Billion. SCS is also the main or primary shipping trade route for Asia region.

According to The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2016 (hereinafter, UNCTAD), 70% from total international trade use the transportation route from the sea to mobilize the product. From 70% of global trade, 60% passed to Asia waters through South China Sea which means SCS contributes to one-third of international trade from sea route.

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SCS also becomes the important sea route for mobilization of Liquid Natural Gas (hereinafter, LNG). In 2016, 40% from global LNG trade crossing the SCS with estimated number around 4.7 trillion cubic feet.\(^{72}\)

**II.1.2 Natural Resources**

Besides having the position as a vital international sea route, SCS also has a potential natural resource that have a political interest for littoral states surrounding this area.


\(^{72}\) Ibid.
SCS has reserve oil and natural gas underwater. The estimated number of reserve oil and natural gas in the South China Sea is 11 billion barrels of oil, and 190 trillion cubic feet (hereinafter, TCF) or around 5380 cubic kilometers (km³) of natural gas. The ambition of claimant states to take over the natural resources in the SCS because of the limited natural resources in this era. As well as the high revenue for exploration states if they can take over the natural resources.

Figure 11: South China Sea Liquefied Natural Gas Trade Flows.73

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75 Ibid.
The natural resources in the SCS included undiscovered area. According to United States Geological Survey (hereinafter, USGS) around 12 billion barrels of oil and 160 TCF of natural gas is probably available in the SCS. The number of undiscovered conventional oil and gas in the SCS is higher than in the Europe Region.77

Another natural resource in the SCS is fisheries industry. The SCS is the top five the most productive fishing zone in the world. more than 50% fishing vessels in the world operated in the South China Sea.78

Fisheries resources are important for claimant states in the SCS. Philippine has around 1.5 million of fishermen and fisheries industry account for 2.7% of national GDP. 35.3% of animal proteins coming from fish consumed in Vietnam, followed by Philippine around 42.6% consumption and Indonesia around 57.3% consumption of animal protein from fish.79

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77 Ibid.


79 Ibid.
II.1.3 The Pattern of Interactions among the Claimant States

The are several claimant states surrounding the South China Sea after world war II. Every states have their own stance about their position in the South China Sea.

Figure 13: Overlapping Claim in the South China Sea.

Figure 14: The South China Sea Territorial Island Claims.\textsuperscript{81}

The author will elaborate every stance of claimant state into partial session based on the dispute area. SCS involved several dispute areas consist of:

1. **The Spratly Island**

   The Spratly Island is the island in the South China Sea with rich natural resources such as oil and gas. The Spratly island claimed by several countries in SCS. China and Philippine are the main claimant states for this island. Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam, these countries claimed on island chain and surrounding waters.\textsuperscript{82}

2. **Scarborough Shoal**

   Scarborough Shoal is a rich fishing area in the South China Sea which is very important for fisheries industry. This area is claimed by China and Philippine. The position of Scarborough is close with Philippine than China territory. In April 2012, China began a major confrontation to claims this area. Scarborough Shoal also included on nine dash line of China.\textsuperscript{83}

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\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
3. The Paracel Island

The Paracel Island is a rich natural resources island especially in oil sector. The Paracel Island is claimed by China and Vietnam. China and Vietnam conflict started after China establishing the oil company in Vietnam’s ZEE. China and Vietnam ships are always clashing in this area.84

China become major problem for claimant state in the South China Sea. The effect from the conflict between claimant states in the South China Sea following by the increasing of defense budget between dispute countries.85

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Figure 15: Percentage of Military Spending in Million USD from 2007-2016.86

The increasing defense budget in the SCS countries is following the modernization of military sector to response the ambition of China in the SCS which increases threat. The ambition of China in the South China Sea in terms of development of military power is more developed than other dispute countries.87

II.2 China’s Maritime Expansion in South China Sea

The dispute over SCS has actually started years ago. However, the tensions in the dispute has been increasing significantly in the recent years caused by China’s

86 Ibid.
bold moves in claiming the territory. In this subchapter, the writer discusses about China’s claims in the SCS, including their historical claims over the seabed. Then the writer also discusses China’s interests in the SCS, ranging from its political interests to its economic and security interests. Finally, the writer will focus more in discussing China’s military activity in the SCS area.

**II.2.1 China’s Claims in South China Sea**

China recently has been reinforcing its claims in SCS by all means, including political, militarily, economical, and legally. China has been claiming the sovereignty of SCS area according to their historical rights:

“The activities of the Chinese people in the South China Sea date back to over 2,000 years ago. China is the first to have discovered, named, and explored and exploited Nanhai Zhudao and relevant waters, and the first to have continuously, peacefully and effectively exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction over them. China's sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao and relevant rights and interests in the South China Sea have been established in the long course of history, and are solidly grounded in history and law.”

However, China cannot address the precise period when the Chinese discovered the area and began their activities there. The official map was released in 1947 by China in justifying their jurisdiction. The area that they claim as part of their territory covers almost the entire sea, and they marked they area with an eleven dash line, which then changed into nine dash line by

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removing the Gulf of Tonkin in 1953.\textsuperscript{92} These two maps are the historical foundation used by China in claiming the SCS. Within the next two pages, the writer provides the map that China releases in 1947 and 1953.

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{china_map_1947}
\caption{China’s Map of South China Sea Islands 1947 with eleven dash line.\textsuperscript{93}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{92} Ma, A. (2016, February 26). Here’s What You Need To Know About The South China Sea Disputes. Huffington Post. Retrieved from \url{https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/south-china-sea-disputes-explained_us_56ccd9ede4b041136f18ad3d}

\textsuperscript{93} Map of the South China Sea Islands - 1947 "South China Sea map". (2013, November 27). Retrieved from \url{http://www.nansha.org.cn/maps/3/1947_South_China_Sea_Map.html}
Figure 17: Map of South China Sea with nine dash line.⁹⁴

In 1974, Chinese force occupied the Paracel Islands and seized the South Vietnamese troops, and then they also planted their flags on some islands. Not only military installation, China also built an artificial harbor and an airfield on the largest island in the Paracel Islands called Woody Island. China has been continuing its occupation in the Paracel Islands with approximately a thousand troops.\footnote{Dingli, S. (2016). China’s Maritime Disputes. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/interactives/chinas-maritime-disputes?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide#!/chinas-maritime-disputes?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide\n\n96} 


II.2.2 China’s Interests in South China Sea

II.2.2.1 Political Interest

According to China the claim toward SCS is more supported by political interest than natural resources in this region. The argument to control SCS was stated on 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter, CPC). President of China Xi Jinping stated that:

“… Construction on islands and reefs in the South China Sea has seen steady progress. The new institutions of the open economy have been steadily improved. China now leads the world in trade, outbound investment, and foreign exchange reserves.” (President Xi Jinping, 2017)

According to China, many parties from China’s sides involved in SCS such as fisheries industry, states owned companies on energy sector, and marine force that implemented by China to take over SCS.\textsuperscript{101} All parties get the benefits from China’s action in the South China Sea. Based on that, all parties support the China claims in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{102}

II.2.2.2 Economic Interest

In 2016, 40% from the total of China’s trade passing through the SCS.\textsuperscript{103} Total of China’s trades are divided into two types, exporters and importers.

The number of China’s exports and imports in the SCS is the highest exports and imports than other countries passed


\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.

through the seabed.\textsuperscript{104} The number of China Exports passed through the SCS is US$ 874 Billion and the number of China Imports passed through this sea route is US$ 598 Billion.

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart}
\caption{The Value of China’s Export and Import Through South China Sea.\textsuperscript{105}}
\end{figure}

Compared with the second place of exporters, South Korea exports which passed the SCS only are US$ 249 Billion and in the second place of importers is Hongkong with total number of US$ 230 Billion.\textsuperscript{106}

According to China, SCSS is very crucial for China’s energy supplies. 80\% of China’s energy supplies passed South China Sea. The South China Sea also labelled as the second Persian Gulf, this statement based on the calculation and research from China authority about abundant oil stored in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{107}

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\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
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According to Ministry of Japan, South China Sea has a huge oil reserved. Anyone who can take over and have sovereignty on the islands around the South China Sea will have access to huge reserve of natural resources especially oil and gas. From China’s perspective, South China Sea can produce 130 Billion Barrels of oil. Stated owned enterprise from China has invested up to US$ 20 Billion to exploration in the dispute area.

The South China Sea also become a habitat for many fish species. Every year The South China Sea can produced 16.6 tons of fish. Chinese Fishermen usually found on dispute area, the activity of Chinese fishermen supported by Chinese government through China Coast Guard.

II.2.2.3 Security Interest

According to People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) whoever can controls the Spratly area in the South China sea can get benefit from economic and military sector. The South China Sea is important for China’s National Defense Security, this area is the south gate for China territory. The South China Sea is important for China because the position of the South China Sea a buffer of Southern part of China which important for security and dominance of China in this region.

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109 Ibid.


The control of China towards the South China Sea makes China able to expand their military bases. The purpose from expanding military base is to response external threat and China’s rivals.\textsuperscript{112} China Military presence in the South China Sea is one of the ways of China to do preventive action for the future military actions against China. President of China, Xi Jinping said that

“We are strongly committed to safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and security, and defining our territorial integrity.”\textsuperscript{113}

\section*{II.2.3 China’s Military Actions in South China Sea}

\subsection*{II.2.3.1 Military Activity}

China’s military activity in the SCS started decades ago, and has intensified especially under President Xi Jinping’s administration, in which China is even more confident in building its presence in the forms of infrastructure, capacity, military, and artificial islands.\textsuperscript{114} In military form, China has been conducting the maritime surveillance and sea patrols, for instance, China Coast Guard (hereinafter, CCG) under the State Oceanic Administration and formed in 2013 conduct the “sovereignty patrol” as what they usually called.\textsuperscript{115} These patrols aimed for safeguarding and enforcing their law over

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their own territory, and they strongly believe that SCS is part of their territory.116

“China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and the adjacent waters. China’s sovereignty and relevant rights in the South China Sea, formed in the long historical course, are upheld by successive Chinese governments, reaffirmed by China's domestic laws on many occasions, and protected under international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

With regard to the issues of territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, China will not accept any solution imposed on it or any unilateral resort to a third-party dispute settlement.”117

As seen from its statement, China clearly believes that SCS is part of its territory, hence why China has never had any doubt in enforcing its military capabilities, such as the sea patrols as mentioned above.

“The enlargement and modernization of the China Coast Guard (CCG) forces will improve China’s ability to enforce its maritime claims. The CCG is increasing its total force level at a rapid pace. Over the last five years, China has added more than 100 ocean-going patrol ships to the CCG to increase its capacity to conduct extended offshore operations and to replace old units. In the next decade, a new force of civilian law enforcement ships will afford China the capability to patrol more robustly its claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.”118

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With territorial disputes occurring in SCS, China’s navy has been involved in several incidents happened in the area. The major maritime law enforcement incidents happened in SCS from 2012 until 2017 that involved China will be elaborated chronologically below according to the data collected from China Power team of Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).119

In 2012, there three major incidents that occurred in February, March, and April which involved China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. In February, China’s patrol vessel confronted a Vietnamese fishing vessel for reaching the Paracel Islands which resulted with official protest from the Vietnamese government. In March, near the Paracel Islands, a Chinese coast guard arrested 21 Vietnamese fishermen as well as their two fishing vessels. While in April, China Marine Surveillance vessels prevented the arrest of Chinese fishermen by the Philippines BRP Gregorio del Pilar naval vessels near the Scarborough Shoal. This incident resulted with standoff for ten weeks and it ended with China took the control of the Scarborough Shoal by claiming that the area is China’s territory and rebuked the Philippines claims.120

In 2013, there are three major incidents as well happened in March, May, and July. Just like a year before, in March 2013, a Chinese patrol vessel involved in an incident with a Vietnamese vessel, in which the Chinese vessel fired flares into the air according to China, while according to the Vietnamese fishermen, the flares were aimed at their fishing

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120 Ibid.
vessel which caused fire in their ship. In May, near the Spartly Islands, Philippine ships were reportedly harassed by Chinese vessels. While in July, the similar encounter between a Chinese patrol vessel and Vietnamese fishing vessels happened again near the Paracel Islands.\textsuperscript{121}

In 2014, there are a quite significant increase in the number of incidents into seven major incidents occurred in January, March, May, August, and November. In January, there are two major incidents happened between Chinese vessels against Vietnamese vessels and between Chinese vessels against the Philippine vessels, resulted with official protests released by both Vietnamese government and the Philippine government towards China. The similar incidents also happened in March between the three countries above as well, in which both Vietnam and the Philippine also released another official protest towards China. In May, China sent off its \textit{Haiyang Shiyou 981} oil rig near the Paracel Islands and was confronted by Vietnam, then China sent off around 120 - 140 coast guard, naval, and fishing vessels in order to defend its oil rig. The confrontation ended in July after China finally removed its oil rig. While in August and November, the Chinese patrol vessels challenged the Vietnamese fishing vessels again with the same outcome as before, which is an official protest from the Vietnamese government towards China in the incidents occurred in August, while the outcome of the incident happened in November is a ramming by

Chinese vessel which caused a bad damage in the Vietnamese fishing vessel.\textsuperscript{122}

\textbf{In 2015}, there eight major incidents happened in January, April, June, July, September, and November. In January and April, there are three major incidents occurred between China and the Philippine which involved Chinese patrol vessels and Philippine fishing vessels near the Scarborough Shoal which resulted with official protests from both parties. While the remaining five incidents occurred in June, July, September, and November were the encounters between Chinese patrol vessels and Vietnamese fishing vessels, in which the Chinese vessel confronted Vietnamese fishermen as well just like the major incidents happened before.\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{In 2016}, the major incident in SCS between China and other claimants increased into eleven incidents which occurred in February, March, May, June, July, and October. Five out of eleven incidents were the encounters between China and the Philippine, in which two incidents happened in February near Half Moon Shoal and Jackson Atoll, and three occurred in March near Scarborough Shoal. The other three out of eleven incidents were the encounters between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels in March, July, and October, which also the confrontation from the Chinese patrol vessels towards Vietnamese fishing vessels.

Most recently in 2017, the number of incidents in SCS which involved China decreased quite significantly into two


\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
incidents only. First one is in March in which China and the Philippines involved in an encounter where a Filipino fishing trawler was fired by a Chinese speedboat near the Spratly Islands, however, no one was injured in the incident, according to the Philippines’ government. The next incident happened in June between China and Vietnam, where two CCGs confronted two Vietnamese fishing boat, then damaged the fishing boat and released the catch.124

**II.2.3.2 Infrastructure Development**

Not only in Military form, China also develops its capability in the infrastructure in order to support its military buildup and for other purposes. There are currently seven successful feature that China has occupied which will be elaborated below.125

1. **Johnson Reef**

![Figure 19: Johnson Reef after the reclamation in 2015 (left), the artificial island in 2017 (right).](https://amti.csis.org/johnson-reef/)

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125 Ibid.

Johnson Reef located at the northwest of the Spratly Islands, is one of the location of the artificial island was built by China. In early 2014, there were only a small concrete platform with communication features, piers, and fortress. However in 2015, there were major improvements in which 100,000 square meters of surface was built, connected the widest points of the platform.\textsuperscript{127} As shown in the picture above, by 2017, the military facilities, a helipad, a cement factory, a wharf, as well as a harbor have been built on the man-made island.\textsuperscript{128}

2. Hughes Reef

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\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{Hughes_Reef_2017.jpg}
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\textit{Figure 20: Hughes Reef after the reclamation in 2015 (left), and the artificial island in 2017 (right).}\textsuperscript{129}

Hughesen Reef located at the Spratly Islands is approximately 0.076 square kilometer after being reclaimed by China. The harbor in the artificial island is about 292,000


square meters with a port of around 35,350 square meters.\textsuperscript{130} The man-made island also has an anti-aircraft tower.\textsuperscript{131}

3. **Cuarteron Reef**

Cuarteron Reef which is approximately has 0.231 square kilometers reclamation land with 125 meters access channel, is still under construction, however, the man-made island seems to have multi-story buildings, radar towers, docks, sea walls, and gun emplacements.\textsuperscript{132}

4. **Gaven Reefs**

Gaven Reefs located north of Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands is approximately 0.136 square kilometers has a channel access with 122 meters width and an approximately 66,402 square kilometers port area.\textsuperscript{133} The artificial island has several military facilities built on it, such as reinforces seawalls and anti air guns. The man-made island also has a cement plant. The focus of the artificial island construction is for having an anti aircraft tower, yet there seemed to be another large multi-story building is built as well as radar tower, gun emplacements, docks, and seawall being constructed on site.\textsuperscript{134}


\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.


5. Fiery Cross Reef

![Fiery Cross Reef before (left) and after reclamation (right) in 2014 and 2015.]

The Fiery Cross Reef is approximately 2.74 square kilometers and located in the Spratly Islands as well, which is further west of Johnson Reef. China built an airstrip up to 3000 meters which is still under construction up to now and this artificial island also has a harbor which is around 630,000 square meters.136

6. Subi Reef

Subi Reef located in the north of Spratly Islands, is approximately 3.95 square kilometers with access channel which is around 230 meters.137 China built runway with 60 meters width and 2,200 meters length in this area. The purpose of the runway is to give the similar support as the ones in the Fiery Cross Reef. The area also has the purpose of hosting the


combat capable air facility in order to support China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (hereinafter, ADIZ).\textsuperscript{138}

7. Mischief Reef

\textbf{Figure 22: Mischief Reef before (left) and after (right) the reclamation in 2012 and 2015.}\textsuperscript{139}

China reclaimed approximately 5,500 square kilometers reclamation over the Mischief Reef. Reportedly, China is building up a satellite communication antenna, as well as naval base in the man-made island.\textsuperscript{140}

\textbf{II.2.3.3 Development of Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) and the Establishment of Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)}

To support the existence of China in South China Sea, China authority established and developed Anti-Access/Area Denial (hereinafter, A2/AD) with general purpose is counter intervention system towards China. A2/AD require advance technology and military equipment to supporting military


operations, A2/AD also require advance tracking system and ability to do Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (hereinafter, ISR). \(^{141}\)

The establishment of Air Defense Identification Zone (hereinafter, ADIZ) raised several from international community about China’s next action. Defense Ministry of PRC stated that:

“China will establish other air defense identification zones at an appropriate time after completing preparations.”\(^{142}\)

The establishment of ADIZ in the future, will put China one step ahead than countries in the South China Sea. At the same China strengthen their position and declare themselves as superior country in South China Sea than claimant states in dispute area. After China declare about ADIZ in specific area in the South China Sea, China needs monitoring capability to support ADIZ, at that time A2/AD can fulfill the China’s needs.\(^{143}\)

Infrastructure A2/AD to support the China’s ambition in the South China Sea little bit difficult to fulfill the requirement if China only depends on the natural condition of the South China Sea. China need to develop the infrastructure in artificial in the surrounding of Spratly Islands.\(^{144}\) China infrastructure development began from the development of runway with total


up to 3000 meters in the Fiery Cross Reef. This runway can support China’s surveillance system and China’s Bombers Plane. China also has done with 18 space launches to support intelligence and surveillance purpose on China’s intelligence network. In the other side, China’s also has invested on anti-ship ballistic missiles (*hereinafter*, ASBM). The purpose from the significant development of China is to maintain China’s security interest in Chinese Territory.
CHAPTER III
JAPAN’S DEFENSE POLICY

III.1 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY 2014 and beyond

Under Japan’s current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, Japan would like to contribute more in pursuing peace and stability, not only within Japan itself but also regionally and internationally. In order to achieve world peace, Japan believes that world peace could be achieved by cooperation between states. As stated in Japan’s Defense White Paper:

“The security environment surrounding Japan is increasingly severe, and we are now in an era where threats could easily spread beyond national borders, and no country can maintain its own security only by itself any longer.”

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is arguably one of Japan’s most transformative leaders. With Abe in office, Japan has set two key documents in December 2013, which are the new version of the National Defense Program Guidelines, as well as Japan’s first National Security Strategy as the fundamental course for defense and diplomacy policy. After World War II, Japan has been declaring itself as a pacifist and peace-loving nation.

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148 Ibid.

cause of Japan’s pacifism, and one of the main concern of Japan is to seize peace and stability. As stated below:

“Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation.”\(^\text{150}\)

With the dynamics of strategic environment around Japan, the government of Japan believes that it is necessary to set the guidelines for its defense program, as stated in the objective of Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (hereinafter, NDPG) as below:

“In light of the current security environment surrounding Japan, the Government of Japan sets out the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond” as new guidelines for Japan’s national defense, based on “Defense Capability Build-up in FY2013” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 25, 2013) and the “National Security Strategy” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013).”\(^\text{151}\)

Within Japan’s National Security Policy, the National Security Strategy (hereinafter, NSS) serves as the basic of policies related with the security of Japan as a State, and it is based on Japan’s national interest on security. Then, the establishment of NDPG on the other hand is based on the NSS. Both NDPG and NSS are formulated to be applied for at least a decade or more, while for the short term period, Japan constructed the Medium Term Defense Program (hereinafter, MTDP) in order to specify the maximum budget and the central components of defense equipment for five-year period, to achieve the goals of defense capabilities in the NDPG.\(^\text{152}\)


III.2 Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2014 - FY 2018)

As explained in Section III.1 Japan’s MTDP is constructed for a five-year period in order to specify the programs and defense’s central components to achieve the defense buildup and goal in Japan’s NSS and NDPG.\footnote{Mainichi Team. (2018, January 6). Proposal to convert MSDF’s Izumo into aircraft carrier surfaces at Defense Ministry. The Mainichi. Retrieved from https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180106/p2a/00m/0ma/014000c}

![Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP, and Annual Budget](image)


In performing the MTDP, Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter, SDF) will build, operate, and maintain the defense force which should be based on six basic guidelines, and will have three major programs regarding the capabilities of Japan’s SDF.
Figure 24: Six Basic Guidelines of the MTDP.\(^{155}\)

Therefore, Japan’s defense program within its MTDP will be following the six basic guidelines as shown above and Japan’s basic defense policy also based on “Proactive Contributions to Peace” policy with international cooperation principle.\(^{156}\) Moreover, within its MTDP, Japan also mentions that they will have three major programs in achieving its goal, which are; Effective Deterrence and Response to Various Situations; Stabilization of the

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Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments; and Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability.\textsuperscript{157}

III.2.1 Proactive Contributions to Peace Programs

Japan’s national security interests are now focused on regional peace and stability, especially in Asia-Pacific region, based on international cooperation (see Section III.1).\textsuperscript{158} Therefore in one of its MTDP’s three major program, Japan has one program which focuses on achieving its national security interests which is to stabilize the Asia-Pacific region. This goal will be achieved in the “\textit{Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments}” program with the basic of “Proactive Contributions to Peace” policy.\textsuperscript{159}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Fig12-2-3.png}
\caption{Programs for the Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments.\textsuperscript{160}}
\end{figure}


With the perspective of “Proactive Contributions to Peace” policy, Japan will intensify its cooperation with other countries through both bilateral and multilateral relations and engage more in international peace cooperation activity as well as perform several activities which includes training and exercises. The elements below will be part of Japan’s efforts in performing its “Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments” program.

III.3 Japan’s Defense Policy Components

III.3.1 Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)

Japan Self-Defense Force is a military instrument of Japan established after the end of World War II. The first established of Japan Military is National Police Reserve (hereinafter, NPR). In 1952, NPR renamed to Security Force and next year changed again into the Japanese Self-Defense Forces under 1954 Self-Defense Forces Law. Since established 1950’s JSDF also has limited involvement in international level.161

Japan Self-Defense divided into three main units consist of:

1. The Ground Self-Defense Forces

Figure 26: The Ground Self-Defense Forces of Japan.162


The Ground Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter, GSDF) have active 151,640 active personnel and 8,470 reserve personnel.\textsuperscript{163} the GSDF supported with sixteen active brigades:\textsuperscript{164}

- Composite : 2 Brigades
- Air bone : 1 Brigade
- Artillery : 1 Brigade
- Low-level air defense : 2 Brigades
- Training : 4 Brigades
- Heliborne : 1 Brigade
- Engineer : 5 Brigades

Additional GSDF’s group consist of:

- Artillery : 2 Groups
- Low-Level air defense : 4 Groups
- Anti-tank helicopter squadrons

The number of GSDF brigades consist of around 3000-4000 troops each brigade.

2. The Maritime Self-Defense Forces

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (hereinafter, MSDF) the most experience and have capability to running the core from JSDF. The MSDF supported by
the geographical condition of Japan, dominant by island. The Japan MSDF have crucial role in terms of securing Japan national interest and Japan natural resources at the
sea.\textsuperscript{165}


In terms of the number of personnel, Japan’s MSDF is the smallest branch than others. Japan’s MSDF strengthened around 45,500 sailors and included reserve personnel 1,100 sailors also The Japan’s MSDF consist of five regional commands.\textsuperscript{166}

Japan’s MSDF strengthened by four escort flotillas. Each flotilla consists of several component consist of:\textsuperscript{167}

1. Destroyers or Frigates : 6 Units
2. Amphibious Ship : 1 Unit
3. Anti-mine Ship : 1 Unit
4. Patrol Crafts : 1 Unit
5. Destroyers Flagship : 1 Unit
6. Air Defense Destroyers : 2 Units
7. Anti-Submarine warfare escort : 5 Units

The total number of Japan’s MSDF components are 148 vessels consist of:\textsuperscript{168}

1. Destroyers: 52 Units
2. Submarines: 16 Units
3. Minesweepers: 30 Units

Also from Naval air unit for surveillance duty contain 195 aircraft such as:


\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
1. P-3Cs

Figure 27: P-3Cs Unit of Japan’s MSDF.\textsuperscript{169}

2. UH-60Js

Figure 28: UH-60Js Unit of Japan’s MSDF.\textsuperscript{170}

3. The Air Self-Defense Forces

Figure 29: The Ground Self-Defense Forces of Japan.\textsuperscript{171}


The Air Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter, ASDF) is Japan’s air force team. The ASDF have a mission to provide early surveillance and quick response on Japan’s air defense.\textsuperscript{172}

The ASDF have around 47,128 personnel with several supporting component consist of:\textsuperscript{173}

1. Aircraft Warning : 8 Groups
2. Warning Squadrons : 20 Squadrons
3. Air Borne Warning Squadron : 1 Squadron
4. Fighter Squadrons : 12 Squadrons
5. Air Reconnaissance Squadron : 1 Squadron
6. Air Transport Squadrons : 3 Squadrons
7. Air Refueling/Transport : 1 Squadron
8. Surface to Air Guided Missile : 6 Groups

\textbf{Figure 30: Patriot Advanced Capability 3 System of Japan Under Air Self-Defense Forces.}\textsuperscript{174}


\textsuperscript{173} Ibid

In total ASDF have 350 aircrafts included 260 fighter aircraft. The ASDF strengthened by Patriot surface to Air Guide Missile from United States of America. The Patriot system in ASDF integrated with the Patriot Advanced Capability (hereinafter, PAC) 3 system.¹⁷⁵

III.3.2 Budget Allocation

Budget allocations is important part on Japan’s defense policy. Every year Japan try to increase their defense budget in term of response the geopolitics condition the East Asia. The increasing number of Japan Military budget still keep on 1% of Japan’s GDP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Budget (¥ Trillion)</td>
<td>¥4.65</td>
<td>¥4.68</td>
<td>¥4.78</td>
<td>¥4.82</td>
<td>¥4.86</td>
<td>¥4.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% From GDP</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 31: Japan's Defense Budget and Share of GDP 2012-2017 (¥ Trillion).*¹⁷⁶

The number of Japan’s defense budget increased every single year. One of the reason the increasing of Japan’s Defense is to response China’s Ambition in East Asia and South China Sea.¹⁷⁷

The Increased number of Japan’s Defense Budget is to providing deterrence and fast response action for all types of security situations. Japan also proactively contributing on stability in Asia-Pacific region. Japan develop several military equipment, increasing the number of joint training and develop the number of personnel.¹⁷⁸

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¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.
"I will secure defense spending to protect our nation, to protect Japanese people’s life efficiently, considering issues such as the security environment in Asia-Pacific region, of course including financial situation”
Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe

III.3.3 Japan - US Defense Alliance

The Japan-US Security regulations stated on the Japan-US Security Treaty is the effort Japan on their national security. The Japan-US Security Treaty is the foundation of Japan’s National Security. The Japan-US Alliance work on bilateral cooperation to maintain security stability not only for Japan but also to maintain security stability on Asia-Pacific region and the world in general.¹⁸⁰

The foundation of US bilateral arrangement with Japan is under the US Policy regarding strategy rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific region. The US running this policy by maintaining by enhancing partnership with US alliance including Japan. The increasing of security tension surrounding Japan region is very crucial for strengthening Japan-US Alliance to create balancing and effective response surrounding Japan’s region.¹⁸¹

Japan-US Alliance consist of several cooperation such as:¹⁸²

1. **Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-US. Alliance**

The purpose of this cooperation to maintain Japan’s National Security by strengthening the contribution US to Japan and Asia Pacific region. To support this cooperation from Japan


¹⁸² Ibid.
Side, Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S Defense Cooperation. At the same time Japan will expand their joint training and exercise.\textsuperscript{183}

2. \textbf{Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a broad range of field}

The stationing of Japan-US Alliance will contribute on peace and global stability also in Asia-Pacific region. The US-Japan Alliance also will contribute on anti-piracy, terrorism, maritime and etc.

At the same time, Japan will strengthening Japan-US Alliance in another sector such as intelligence, security information, technology. The purpose of this cooperation to create a strong and effective relations between Japan-US alliance.\textsuperscript{184}

3. \textbf{The Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan}

Japan will support the stationing of US personnel such supporting on Host Nations Support \textit{(hereinafter, HNS)}.

During stationing of US forces, Japan will integrate US forces in Japan and decreasing the effect with local citizen during deterrence effect by US forces.

Especially in the Okinawa Island, Okinawa is the important location for Japan’s National Security. Japan will effort to decrease the effect from stationing US forces in this region. Okinawa is significantly important for support to the deterrence of the Japan-US Alliance.\textsuperscript{185}


\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
III.4 Japan’s Interests in South China Sea

Japan’s position in the South China Sea (hereinafter, SCS) is a non-littoral state which means that Japan is also a non-claimant state in SCS. However, Japan have been actively contributing in pursuing stability in the SCS disputes. Japan’s NSS stated that Japan’s will contribute proactively in order to achieve peace and stability. Japan also mention in their diplomatic Bluebook 2017 that China’s ambition in the SCS is their concern.186 Even though Japan is not one of the littoral states of SCS, Japan still has national interests towards the SCS.

![Figure 32: Japan’s Interest in the South China Sea](image)

Japan’s interests in the SCS are divided into three concerns consist of:

1. **Political Interests**

   The awareness of Japan regarding the security condition in SCS is the way of Japan to contribute in peace in this region. The China’s ambition in SCS by conducting on territorial dispute with several Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereinafter, ASEAN)

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187 Ibid.
countries.\textsuperscript{188} To running Japan’s proactive contribution to peace also bargain position with China’s ambitions in the SCS, Japan can take advantage by coalition with ASEAN countries which against with China ambition in the SCS. The CSC issues can be a platform for Japan to reach ASEAN nations to against China.\textsuperscript{189}

\begin{quote}
\textit{“Southeast Asian countries have been increasing their importance and presence in the international community. Japan has further strengthened relations with these countries, based on friendly relations over many years.”}\textsuperscript{190}
\end{quote}

2. Economic

The Position of SCS is crucial for Sea Lanes of Trade (\textit{hereinafter}, SLOC). In term of traders who using the SCS, Japan is third position as a largest trader using the SCS as their commercial route under China and US.\textsuperscript{191}

\begin{quote}
\textit{“For Japan, the issues surrounding the South China Sea are important matters of concern, because most of its resources and energy depend upon sea transport and it places importance on freedom of navigation, and overflight and securing safe sea lanes.”}\textsuperscript{192}
\end{quote}

The economic interest of Japan in the SCS is based on the national energy reserve, most of Japan’s Liquified Natural Gas (\textit{hereinafter}, LNG) cross the SCS. If something happened in this sea route it will be direct effect to national energy of Japan. Also the


\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.


Japan’s interest in reserved under water natural resources in the SCS such as oil and gas that Japan has their companies in the SCS.  

3. Security

From Japan’s perspective the security stability in SCS is interrelated with the East China Sea (hereinafter, ECS). Japan’s has a conflict with China in the ECS regarding Senkaku Island. The China’s territorial dispute between China and several ASEAN countries in the SCS is important to Japan to work cooperate with ASEAN countries to joint cooperation towards China’s ambitions in SCS. The contribution in the SCS will help Japan position to their conflict with China regarding Senkaku Island.  

“Since ASEAN is situated in a geopolitically important location and constitutes important sea lanes, and its stability and prosperity relates to those of not only the East Asian region but also the international community…”  

The Security of ASEAN is important for Japan not only for increasing their position in the ECS but also the close relation between Japan and ASEAN countries in terms of political and economic sectors. Therefore, as stated above, even though Japan is not the littoral state of SCS, but Japan is still the user states of the waterbody and the dispute can affect Japan in several sectors especially economically, and Japan also has its own national interests towards the SCS as elaborated above, which are in pollical, economic, and security sectors.

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CHAPTER IV
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JAPAN’S PROACTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE WITHIN ITS DEFENSE POLICY IN SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE

IV.1 Japan’s Threat Perception over China’s Ambition in South China Sea Dispute

According to Robert O. Tilman, threat perception is a concept in which states perceive whether or not a certain state possess threat to the state through the measurement of its capacity, capabilities, as well as its intention.197

Japan’s response China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea (hereinafter, SCS) as an act that violates international law. Japan response towards and mentions this issue in Japan’s Defense White Paper 2017

“China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities quantitatively and qualitatively in sea areas and in airspace, including the East and South China Seas. China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, such as attempts at changing the status quo by coercion. These Chinese activities [assertive actions] represent serious security concerns of the region encompassing Japan, and of the international community.”198

According to Tilman, threat perceptions are influenced by several dimensions, which are, structural dimension, geopolitical dimension, historical dimension, socio-cultural dimension, and economic dimension.199

IV.1.1 Structural Dimensions

The structural dimension refers to the response of state’s bureaucracy towards the upcoming threat. After receiving a threat from external factor, decision maker and policy maker will analyze the threat and the output will be the protection of their own national interest.\(^{200}\)

Within Japan’s bureaucracy under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration in 2012, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (hereinafter, LDP) is the ruling party within its parliament with 294 of the 480 seats up for grabs which then make LDP held the commanding lead. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who is the leader of the party at the election stated that their goal is to stop China from making these challenges, but we do not intend to allow an overall worsening in relations.\(^{201}\)

In structural dimension, threat perceptions come up when the state’s bureaucracy response towards an issue and perceive it as a threat. In Japan, the ruling party within its parliament which makes this party the majority in the decision makers among Japan’s government. In responding towards China’s actions in SCS, Japan has stated a clear response regarding China’s action in SCS as a red status.\(^{202}\)

One of the example that Japan’s perceive China as a threat in the structural dimension is when the LDP has stated that response into this issues by putting the photo from the air about the development of construction in China’s island and the reclamation of Subi Reef and


Johnson South Reef in SCS in Japan’s Defense White Paper 2015.\textsuperscript{203} This action explained the active Japan’s contribution regarding the China’s ambition in SCS.\textsuperscript{204}

IV.1.2 Historical Dimension

Historical dimension refers to the past experiences of policymaker, institution and state in constructing a framework towards his views on the country that pose a threat. The historical experience can give a big impact to the future policy making of a state towards another states if in the past there is no a strong peace agreement.\textsuperscript{205}

In Japan-China relations the tensions started since the war in Qing Empire era from China and Empire of Japan, or as called as the first Sino-Japan war in 1894-1895.\textsuperscript{206} Furthermore, the tension keeps increasing in the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937, which was the beginning of World War II in Asia.\textsuperscript{207}

Following a bloody victory in Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese turned their attention towards Nanking known as the Rape of Nanking or Nanking Massacre was also occurred, in which between 20,000 and 80,000 women were sexually assaulted.\textsuperscript{208} Nanking, then the capital of Nationalist China, was left in ruins, and it would take decades for the city and its citizens to recover from the


savage attacks. At that time, huge number of soldiers and civilians were killed.

These events in the past have been haunting Japan-China relations. Moreover, in December 26th, 2013, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine that honours Japan's war dead, including some convicted war criminals. The Yasukuni Shrine is regarded by China, North Korea and South Korea as a symbol of Japan's imperial military past. This visit resulted with regrets coming from the three countries towards Japan.

Even though Japan was the one invaded the neighboring countries and not most likely being the victim of its imperialism in the World War II era, but these historical dimensions is also becoming the threat for Japan, since the other countries, especially China with the events at Nanking, can be dangerous for Japan. Moreover, the tension between China and Japan continue until another territorial dispute over the East China Sea and now the SCS dispute.

IV.1.3 Geopolitical Dimension

According to Tilman, Geopolitical dimension refers to the definition of threat based on the geographical position. Geopolitical dimension means that the threat can be influence by the physical distance of a country from a threat. A state can react and response as threat to another state if conflict happens close to their sovereignty territory.

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Geopolitics dimension between Japan and China is about the territory expansion from China’s side. The core conflict between Japan and China in SCS close with the conflict of both countries in the ECS about the Senkaku Island from Japan’s perspective or Diaoyu Island from China’s perspective. China’s activities such as unilateral action from sea and air happens close with Japan territory. At the same time the capability of China need to be aware for Japan and need to be anticipated with balancing power.

IV. 1.4 Socio-Cultural Dimension

The Socio-cultural dimension refers to the influence of demographics condition of a states such as culture, religion and ethnic. According to David J. Myers, the threat can be minimized if the state and demographics has similar voice. But it will be a threat if the state has different voice with demographic.

The perceptions toward the China’s ambition not only represent by official of Japan but also represent by the public opinion. In Japan there are two types Japan’s citizen perspective towards China’s behavior. Japan’s citizen perspective divided into no matter and Against with China’s ambition. The results are 7% from no matter side and 68% against and argue China’s ambition as greatest threat to Japan.

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214 Ibid


85% of Japan’s citizen concern regarding their territorial dispute with China in the ECS and the SCS under the Philippine. Moreover, public opinion polls conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office shows the changes in Japanese perceptions of its giant neighbor. The poll results suggest a growing perception of China as a threat during the 2000s. The first turning point was Prime Minister Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit in 2005. According to the same poll in 2006, 42.8% of Japanese respondents said they see China as a military threat. So, it is also pretty clear that the public eye in Japan sees China as a threat, especially in military sector.

### IV.1.5 Economic Dimension

The economic dimension refers to the influence of financial activity between nations. Other examples are the relations of investor, instability of trade between nations and the tension between states in

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219 Ibid.

international level. Financial activity will affect to a state if there is something problem between the relations between country and country, indirectly will affect to national income of a states.221

Japan’s national interest in SCS consist of third position of Japan as a largest trader using the SCS as their commercial route under China and US.222

“For Japan, the issues surrounding the South China Sea are important matters of concern, because most of its resources and energy depend upon sea transport and it places importance on freedom of navigation, and overflight and securing safe sea lanes.”223

China’s ambitions in SCS create threats condition towards Japan’s interest in SCS. Furthermore, China’s actions in banning several activities in the SCS such as fishing, establishment oil companies and expand patrol also has become another example of the reason behind Japan’s threat perception over China especially in SCS.224

IV.2 The Implementation of Proactive Contributions to Peace in South China Sea

Proactive Contributions to Peace policy is first mentioned in Japan’s National Security Strategy (hereinafter, NSS) and the new version of National Defense Program Guidelines (hereinafter, NDPG) established in December 2013. Proactive Contributions to Peace policy is part of Japan’s new security policy and serves as its new approach in responding towards

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security issues in international affairs. Japan has been trying to put more attention in pursuing peace and stability, not only in Japan itself but also regionally and internationally, especially under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration.\textsuperscript{225} Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is arguably one of Japan’s most transformative leaders.\textsuperscript{226} With Abe in office, Japan has set the two key documents aforementioned, which are the new version of the National Defense Program Guidelines, as well as Japan’s first National Security Strategy as the fundamental course for defense and diplomacy policy.\textsuperscript{227}

After World War II, Japan has been declaring itself as a pacifist and peace-loving nation.\textsuperscript{228} Therefore, Japan has been renouncing itself from war and has been focusing on defensive power only.

\textquote{Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, Article 9 of which prescribes the renunciation of war, the prohibition of war potential, and the denial of the right of belligerency of the state.}\textsuperscript{229}

As explained in the school of Neorealism, there are two kinds of realism, which are offensive realism and defensive realism. Japan in this case is an example of a state with defensive realism. Japan does not develop any offensive power after the end of World War II, yet they keep developing their defensive power. As elaborated before in Chapter III, Japan only has a Self-


\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{229} Ibid.
Defense Forces and their military activity is very limited to defensive purposes only.

However, having threat perceptions towards China—particularly discussed in this research, is in the SCS dispute—, make Japan really considers China’s actions as a threat and even call it as a serious security concern within its 2017 Defense White Book and Japan also thinks that China’s coercive behavior in the SCS can be dangerous for the regional peace and stability.230

Therefore, with this threat perceptions towards China’s action, and having the national security interests towards pursuing peace and stability, especially in Asia-Pacific region, Japan feels the need to be more proactive and to cooperate with other countries as well in order to achieve its goal in peace and stability. As stated in its 2014 and 2013 Defense White Book:

“Japan will work to realize its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region from Japan’s stance as a Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation. Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community.”231

“Japan has contributed to peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world. In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community.”232

Therefore, in its first National Security Strategy, Japan elaborates its peaceful orientation to the policy of “Proactive Contributions to Peace” build upon international cooperation principle, recognizing its national security


purposes and scrutinizes its national interests. Moreover, the Strategy also recognizes the challenges faced by Japan’s national security as well as the trends of security environment in Japan’s surroundings. The intension that Japan has in this strategy is clear, in which Japan would like to engage more in international affairs, and Japan would like to be more of a security provider and less of a security consumer.

China’s ambition over SCS is one of Japan’s concern as stated in Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2017, and is considered as a threat toward regional stability in Asia-Pacific Region, and the Implementation of Proactive Contributions to Peace policy is one of Japan’s way in participates directly in achieving the peace and stability in Asia-Pacific region. As explained in the school Neorealism as well, in an anarchic international system, each state has to survive and help themselves. The writer thinks that this is correlated with Japan’s reaction, in which Japan thinks that they cannot just be a security consumer only, but they also have to be more proactive in achieving the security for their own selves.

Within this research, the writer focuses on the implementation of Japan’s Proactive Contributions to Peace policy within its defense policy, which is stated in its Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2014 - FY 2018), which is the second program called “Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments”. Within this program, Japan focuses on several points which are; (1) holding training and exercises; (2) promoting defense cooperation and exchanges; (3) promoting

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234 Ibid.


capacity building assistance; (4) ensuring maritime security; (5) implementing international peace cooperation activities; and (6) cooperating to promote arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation.238

Following the focus of this research in discussing about Japan’s Proactive Contributions to Peace policy implementation within its defense policy in SCS, the writer provides the implementations which has concrete real actions. Moreover, the writer divides the implementations of Proactive Contributions to Peace policy in Japan’s defense policy into two category, which are unilaterally and bilaterally with other State who also shares the same concerns as Japan towards China’s ambition in SCS and with the claimant states as well.

Furthermore, the implementations of Proactive Contributions to Peace policy elaborated within this research is limited to the actions within 2012-2017 time frame and within defense policy only, and which also has concrete real actions of joint training and defense cooperations in SCS disputes.

IV.2.1 Japan’s Unilateral Implementations of Proactive Contributions to Peace in South China Sea

Japan has been expressing its concern towards China’s ambition in SCS.239 However, to promote talks about the disputes in SCS, Japan as a non-littoral state arguably does not have diplomatic leverage, and not influential enough to politically and strongly involved in encouraging other claimants to change their policies according to Japan’s favor. Not to mention the very limited engagement from Japan military due to its political and operational restrictions.240 Therefore,


Japan’s involvement in the SCS dispute can be implemented through around two dimensions only, such as; actively participate in bilateral and multilateral dialogues; and strengthening its security ties with ASEAN claimants.241

It is important for Japan that there is a freedom of navigation in SCS, because this seabed is vital to Japan’s energy supply and trade (see Chapter III.4).242 Due to its pacifism, Japan has been holding back its involvement and engagement in SCS. However, with its new national security interests in achieving regional stability and peace, Japan has been trying to be more involved.243 Supported by its new Proactive Contributions to Peace policy, Tokyo has been proactively engaged and making its presence in SCS.

Japan has been eager in taking its part in multilateral gatherings and showing its concerns over SCS. Furthermore, Japan has also been trying to emphasize how important it is to secure the freedom of navigation according to the rule of law as well as supporting the ASEAN’s endeavor to resolve the issue. As demonstrated in Japan-ASEAN strategic partnerships’ priorities in 2011 Bali Declaration,244 as well as its participation in joining multilateral dialogue, such as, Shangri-La dialogue, ASEAN-centered security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus, and the East Asia Summit (EAS).245


Even though Japan has been very limited in military engagement, however, recently Japan has been showing its military presence in SCS. As part of its defense program, in June 2017, Japan sent one of its largest warships JS Izumo, the helicopter-carrier in the SCS and conducted a military exercise near Singapore.\(^{246}\) However, this program is considered as multilateral program, since it is conducted through cooperation with ASEAN countries, hence this particular case will be elaborated more in Section IV.2.2.3.

IV.2.2 Japan’s Bilateral Implementations of Proactive Contributions to Peace in South China Sea

IV.2.2.1 Defense Cooperations with USA

Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (hereinafter, MSDF) and the U.S. Navy held a joint exercise in the SCS which marks its first bilateral exercise with USA in the SCS area. In a Press Conference, Japan’s Defense Minister Nakatani said that it is one of Japan’s efforts in promoting bilateral cooperation on joint exercises in order to contribute to regional stability.

“Japan has thus far proactively engaged in activities that contribute to regional stability, including capacity building assistance for countries in the periphery of the South China Sea, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as joint exercises between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea. The MOD will continue to promote bilateral and multilateral joint exercises and training, among other activities.”\(^{247}\) said Japan’s Defense Minister Nakatani on a Press Conference.


The joint exercise with US Navy began on October 28th 2015 and lasted for nearly two weeks, and the joint exercise focused on communication training exercise and on the transportation of crew members. In the same Press Conference, Japanese Defense Minister also mentioned that previously, Japan had joined another US led maritime humanitarian exercise in the SCS. However, this maritime humanitarian exercise is formerly a joint exercise between US and the Philippines, which then Japan also took part and joined the joint exercise. The trilateral joint exercise took place near Subic Bay off the coast of the Philippines.

The exercise came as tensions between China and the Philippines tensions remain high in the Spratly Islands in SCS dispute. Recently in 2017, Japan’s JS Izumo helicopter carrier and US Navy’s USS Ronald Reagan super-carrier conducted a three-days joint exercise in SCS. The joint exercise aimed to test information sharing systems.

IV.2.2.2 Defense Cooperations with the Philippines

Japan conducted joint trainings with Philippines in order to counter the China’s ambitions in SCS. The exercise was held within the cooperation of Japanese MSDF with Philippines’s Navy and US Navy.


In 2016, Japan was involved in a Balikatan exercise. Balikatan is a multilateral exercise which included US, Australian and Philippine. This exercise took place on Luzon, Panay and Palawan. During multilateral exercise, Japan sent three ships as observers. Japan was not particularly joining the exercise on Balikatan, but the role of Japan in this exercise was as observer.252

Furthermore in 2015, joint naval exercise was held in SCS by Japan and Philippines. During the exercise Japan sent Japanese Ship (hereinafter, JS) Harusame and JS Amigri. JS Harusame and JS Amigri is part of on Japanese MSDF Destroyers Class. In Philippines side, Philippines sent Barko ng Republika ng Pilipinas (hereinafter, BPR) a Ramon Alcaraz Frigate Class. The purpose from this exercise is to


develop the capability of communications strategy in terms of responding the unplanned attack at the sea.\textsuperscript{254}

After the Philippines President visited Japan in 2015. Reconnaissance Plane of Japan visited the Palawan. The purpose of this visit was to take five days training with Philippines Navy in terms of developing naval fleet skills, Search and Rescue and disaster relief response.\textsuperscript{255}

In 2014, seven Japan’s ships visited Philippines and in 2013, two Japan’s ships visited Philippines and in 2012 four Japan’s ship visited the Philippines. Therefore, Japan has been holding regular visit and exercise with Philippines Navy in terms of developing skill and capability.\textsuperscript{256}

To support regular patrol in SCS, Japan needs the addition of P-1 airplane and Japan Self-Defense Forces (\textit{hereinafter}, JSDF) needs emergency facilities during patrol in SCS, the problem can be done by proposing force visiting agreement with Philippines.\textsuperscript{257}


\textsuperscript{255} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid.

Figure 35: Agreement Between Japan and Philippines in term of Transfer Exercise Aircraft to Philippines.258

The Ministry of Defense (hereinafter, MOD) of Japan also has advanced the training with Philippines by sending TC-90 aircraft to the Philippines after holding the agreement during Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in 2016. In 2017, Japan has done the transfer of two TC-90, while the rest will be delivered in 2018.259

The capability of TC-90 is to increase the Philippines Navy capability in terms of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operation, transport and increasing Maritime Domain Awareness (hereinafter, MDA). The function of TC-90 is to expand the capability of Philippines Navy conducting on sovereignty patrol of Philippines territory and maritime security in Philippines waters.260

“We must admit that much still has to be done to boost our military capability equipment in order

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to meet a number of persistent maritime security challenges. These challenges range from territorial disputes with China and other Southeast Asian Nations over the ownership of resource-rich islands in the West Philippines Sea, to piracy, movement of armed insurgents in the Sulu Sea, and other transnational crimes.”

To support this exercise, Japan gave a training to two Naval Air Group of Philippines as well as pilot training, held on Tokushima and Six Philippines Navy, while for Crew of TC-90 the training was held on Sendai.

![Figure 36: BRP Tubbataha Ship of Philippines from Japan](image)

In 2016 Japan sent the first Multi-Role Response Vessel (hereinafter, MRRV) to the Philippine Coast Guard (hereinafter, PCG). After receiving from Japan, MRRV was named by Philippine with BRP Tubbataha. The function of BRP Tubbataha is to develop the capability of PCG on search and rescue, law enforcement and maritime security. The

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263 Ibid.
specification of BRP Tubbataha from Japan can reach speed up to 25 knots and 1500 nautical miles.\textsuperscript{264}

\textbf{IV.2.2.3 Defense Cooperation with Vietnam}

Japan and Vietnam conducted their first SCS drill on illegal fishing in June 2017. The joint exercise involved Vietnam’s maritime law enforcement and Japan’s Coast Guard focusing on putting an end to illegal fishing in the SCS. This exercise is a very important milestone in both countries’ defense cooperation, especially in SCS.\textsuperscript{265} Vietnam is also one of the most aggressive claimants of SCS, but unlike Japan’s relations with the Philippines, the relation between Japan and Vietnam is not very intense.

The exercise took place in Vietnamese Danang central port city and this exercise is an invitation from Vietnamese government. A Japan’s 3,100 ton patrol vessel called Echigo was involved in this exercise and has the capability of carrying not heavy helicopter, and also involved a cutter that Japan gave to Vietnam.\textsuperscript{266}

Earlier, Japan and Vietnam had conducted several smaller exercises focusing on search and rescue operations. Furthermore, Japan has also provided six patrol boats as part of Japan’s effort in providing the capacity building assistance to other states. In September 2016, Japan’s Minister of Defense stated that Japanese MSDF will continue to help other states in order to deepen its contributions to in the SCS:


\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.
“Japan on its part will increase its engagement in the South China Sea through, for example, Maritime Self Defense Force joint training cruises with the U.S. Navy, bilateral and multilateral exercises with regional navies, as well as providing capacity building assistance to coastal nations.”

IV.2.4 Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program

In achieving the stability and peace in Asia-Pacific region, Japan also cooperate with ASEAN in order to achieve its goal, in which Japan proactively approach and cooperate with ASEAN in order to promote freedom of navigation and build mutual understanding on international maritime law. Within this program, Japan took ASEAN military guest onboard JS Izumo on its first “Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program” in the SCS near Singapore in June


Vientiane Vision expresses Japan’s defense cooperation with ASEAN guiding principles, it is Japan’s own initiatives which were announced in the second Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting in November 16th, 2016 in Vientiane, Laos PDR. This vision projects the full picture of Japan’s defense cooperation with ASEAN in a transparent manner.\footnote{Ibid.}

“Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program” involved each ASEAN member state and ASEAN Secretariats representatives, through this program Japan provided seminars and training programs onboard JS Izumo, in order to construct mutual understanding on maritime security and to share each other’s understanding on international maritime law.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

South China Sea as one of the largest contested waterbodies in the world has been a subject of overlapping territorial claims. Some of the claimant states claim their territories according to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as determined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the other claimant states claim their territory past through their EEZ. China as one of the claimant states in the South China Sea has been reinforcing its claims in the South China Sea area through economic, political, military, and legal means. China has been building up its military basis and develop infrastructure as well as artificial island in order to support its claim over the maritime domain.

The tensions in South China Sea started to get higher since 2009, in which China has been more active in claiming the waterbodies as part of its territory through their nine-dash line map and historical basis. Triggered by China’s ambition over its maritime expansion in South China Sea, other claimant states also increases their military expenditure and engagement in the area which changes the status quo.

Japan has been having threat perceptions towards China especially in South China Sea. The threat perceptions that Japan has towards China is influenced by five dimensions, according to Robert O. Tilman, which are structural dimensions, historical dimensions, geopolitical dimensions, socio-cultural dimensions, and economic dimensions. And by having threat perceptions towards China, make Japan really considers China’s actions as a threat and even call it as a serious security concern within its 2017 Defense White Book and Japan also thinks that China’s coercive behavior in the SCS can be dangerous for the regional peace and stability.

Meanwhile, after World War II, Japan has been declaring itself as a pacifist and peace-loving nation. Therefore, Japan has been renouncing itself from war and has been focusing on defensive power only. As explained in the school of Neorealism, there are two kinds of realism, which are offensive realism and
defensive realism. Japan in this case is an example of a state with defensive realism. Japan does not develop any offensive power after the end of World War II, yet they keep developing their defensive power, as known, Japan only has a Self-Defense Forces and their military activity is very limited to defensive purposes only.

Seeing the instability in the South China Sea region and having threat perceptions towards China, Japan has been expressing its concern towards China’s ambition over the South China Sea. Following the new National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Program Guideline, Japan has been putting more attention in pursuing peace and stability especially in Asia-Pacific region, including the South China Sea, since Japan’s national security interests is now heading to proactively pursue peace and stability not only within Japan’s territory but also regionally and internationally. Therefore, rather than being just a security consumer, Japan want to contribute more proactively in achieving its goal in peace and stability.

Japan elaborates its peaceful orientation to the policy of “Proactive Contributions to Peace” build upon international cooperation principle, recognizing its national security purposes and scrutinizes its national interests. Moreover, the Strategy also recognizes the challenges faced by Japan’s national security as well as the trends of security environment in Japan’s surroundings. The intension of Japan through this strategy is clear, in which Japan would like to engage more in international affairs, and Japan would like to be more of a security provider and less of a security consumer.

Therefore, Japan would like to involve in the South China Sea dispute. However, to promote talks about the disputes in SCS, Japan as a non-littoral state arguably does not have diplomatic leverage, and not influential enough to politically and strongly involved in encouraging other claimants to change their policies according to Japan’s favor. Not to mention the extremely limited engagement from Japan’s military due to its political and operational restrictions.

Tokyo’s involvement in the SCS dispute can be implemented through around two dimensions only, such as; actively participate in bilateral and multilateral dialogues; and strengthening its security ties with ASEAN claimants. Even though Japan has been very limited in military engagement, however, recently
Japan has been showing its military presence in SCS through joint exercises, trainings, and patrols, as well as through defense cooperation with other countries.

The fact that Japan now is actively engaged in SCS and proactively contributes in pursuing peace and stability especially in Asia-Pacific region, is showing the probability that Japan will engage more militarily and also applying its rights in implementing its rights on Collective Self-Defense with another country, given the fact that even now, Japan is willing to help the Philippines in enhancing its military capabilities in responding towards China’s ambition in the SCS dispute.

The writer suggests that the future research could be in this part, according to the analysis that it is likely that Japan will be even more proactive than now and will engage even more militarily in pursuing its security interests. Given the fact that Japan is a pacifist country and the existence of Article 9 that has been limiting the activities of its Self-Defense Forces, yet Japan now has slowly making progress in being more active and engage more.
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