The Implementation of People’s Republic of China’s Military Approaches to Protect the National Interest in Indian Ocean

2010-2015

By

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ID No. 016201300145

A thesis presented to the
Faculty of Humanities President University
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Concentration of Defense Studies

2018
THESIS ADVISER

RECOMMENDATION LETTER

This thesis entitled "The Implementation of People's Republic of China's Military Approaches to Protect the National Interest in Indian Ocean (2010-2015)" prepared and submitted by Sultan Beybar Mastura in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in International Relations in the School of Humanities has been reviewed and found to have satisfied the requirements for a thesis fit to be examined. I therefore recommend this thesis for Oral Defense.

Cikarang, 30 April 2018

Recommended and Acknowledge by,

Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D
Thesis Adviser
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that this thesis entitled “The Implementation of People’s Republic of China’s Military Approaches to Protect the National Interest in Indian Ocean (2010-2015)” is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an original piece of work that has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, to another university to obtain a degree.

Cikarang, Indonesia, 30 April 2018

Sultan Beybar Mastura
ABSTRACT

Sultan Beybar Mastura, International Relations 2013, President University

Thesis Title: The Implementation of People’s Republic of China’s Military Instrument to Protect the National Interest in Indian Ocean 2010-2015

This research focus on the analysis of the Implementation of China Defense Policy in its military instrument in order to secure China National Interest in Indian Ocean which is the China Grand Strategic of String of Pearls. Since Indian Ocean has rich mineral, great fisheries and offshore petroleum and also connected the borders of Middle East, Africa, Australia, and Asia.

In order to analyze the Implementation of China Defense Policy in its military instrument in order to secure China National Interest in Indian, writer put more focus on China Defense Policy official documents from 2010 -2015 and analyzing the effort of China in maintaining their existence in Indian Ocean.

Further, China has secured their interest in Indian Ocean in which being supported with China Defense Policy that resulted China implementation in military instrument that includes Joint Military Training and Supplying Military Equipment, Port Investment and Building, and Open-Seas Patrol in Indian Ocean.

Key Words: Indian Ocean, String of Pearl, China’s Defense Policy
ABSTRAK

Sultan Beybar Mastura, International Relations 2013, President University

Thesis Title: The Implementation of People’s Republic of China’s Military Instrument to Protect the National Interest in Indian Ocean 2010-2015

Penelitian ini berfokus pada analisis Implementasi Kebijakan Pertahanan China dalam instrumen militernya untuk mengamankan Kepentingan Nasional China di Samudera Hindia yang merupakan Strategi China “Strings Of Pearls”. karena Samudera Hindia kaya akan mineral, perikanan besar dan minyak lepas pantai dan juga menghubungkan perbatasan Timur Tengah, Afrika, Australia, dan Asia.


Lebih jauh lagi, China telah mengamankan kepentingan mereka di Samudra Hindia yang didukung dengan Kebijakan Pertahanan China yang menghasilkan implementasi dalam instrumen militer yang mencakup Pelatihan Militer Bersama dan Pemasokan Peralatan Militer, Investasi dan Bangunan Pelabuhan, dan Patroli Laut Terbuka di Samudra Hindia.

Kata Kunci: Samudra Hindia, String of Pearls, Kebijakan Pertahanan China
The Panel of Examinees declare that the thesis entitled “The Implementation of People’s Republic of China’s Military Approaches to Protect the National Interest in Indian Ocean (2010-2015)” that was submitted by Sultan Beybar Mastura majoring in International Relations from the Faculty of Humanities was assessed and approved to have passed the Oral Examinations on (May 17th, 2018).

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Chair - Panel of Examiner

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Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D
Thesis Adviser
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<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASBM</td>
<td>Anti-ship Ballistic Missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCM</td>
<td>Anti-ship Cruise Missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNOOC</td>
<td>China National Offshore Oil Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPEC</td>
<td>China-Pakistan Economic Corridor</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<td>DWP</td>
<td>Defense White Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<td>ETIM</td>
<td>East Turkestan Islamic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOR</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>Maritime Silk Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONI</td>
<td>The Office of Naval Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People Liberation Army Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lines of Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>UV</td>
<td>Unmanned Vehicles</td>
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

1.1 Background of Study

China has been undergoing a rapid economic growth and has made Chinatransformed as a country that successfully imports energy in the form of oil in a quite large amount. In terms of the national development, China also faced problems in an increased need for energy, especially regarding the oil revenues, since nearly 60% of the domestic industry of China is the manufacturing industry and oil is an essential ingredient to maintain the continuity of China’s development. ¹ China itself does not have sufficient and enough resources to support their development and economic growth. In order to meet the needs of energy oil in china, china itself is supplied by three companies that exist in the country, namely CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation), Sinopec, and CNOOC. Due to the presence of this problem, which does not have sufficient oil reserves, China itself has numerous pressures which supported the increase of population, economy and technology will urge a country to seek resources outside its territory.²

Therefore, in order to meet the needs of the energy supply of domestic oil that is increasing every day, china has embraced the security for energy resources by securing lines of oil or oil shipping routes in the Region of Indian Ocean. Indian Ocean is considered strategic by the Chinese both geographically, economically and also politically.

Energy security for China is not just about strategic policy within searching for energy sources, but also ensuring the safety of the energy transport lines. It is one of the top priorities for China’s government to ensure that there is free navigation along the sea transportation line

of the world or Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) Extending from the South China sea to the Middle East. The safety of the transport of energy supply in the critical ocean region is one of the main priorities of China's foreign policy.³

In China's Energy Policy 2012, it is mentioned that it is important for China “to ensure the security of international energy transport routes and avoid geopolitical conflicts that affect the world’s energy supply.”⁴ A standout amongst the most vital and important trade courses and routes on the planet is the Indian Sea. The security interests of China's trade routes in South Asia have implications for the growing influence and role of China in the region bordering the Indian Ocean. According to Shrikant Kondapalli, professor of Jawaharlal Nehru University, China was building in small countries around the Indian Ocean for oil. About 80% of China’s oil resources are originating from Africa and Middle East, all of which are transported across the Indian Ocean.⁵ Paul Smith from War College of U.S. Naval has argued that the Indian Ocean became a very strategic arena in the 21st century. China sees the Indian Ocean as the key to its geopolitical awakening, particularly in the areas that are the connecting lane for sources of energy originating from the Middle East and Africa. If United States (US) was making Asia Pacific the axis of its

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⁵ M. Devichand. (2010)“Is Chittagong one of China’s String of Pearls.” BBC News (daring), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8687917.stm>,

current foreign policy, then China was making the Indian Ocean region a new axis in its foreign policy.\footnote{J.B. Miller, (2014) “China Making A Play at Bangladesh.” http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanmiller/2014/01/03/china-making-a-play-at-bangladesh}

![Figure 2.1 The Indian Ocean](image)

In Figure 1.1 it is shown that the region of Indian Ocean is a vital and important part of the international society, as it the ocean that connects the Middle-East and Africa, to the Asia-Pacific region. Known as the third largest ocean on Earth, its area includes several very important routes that have maintained transactions and trade between and amongst global economic powers. This significance really comes to light when one realizes that 40% of the world's seaward oil creation originates from the Indian ocean need to go through the region of Indian Ocean.\footnote{http://theworldoceans.com/indian.html}

Controlling the areas of the Indian Ocean would mean controlling that 40% of world's seaward oil production, which would economically benefit whoever manages to gain the benefit in the volatile region. Because of the facts above and also because the routes is too important for china therefore China performed security action across the region through a strategic “string of
“String of Pearls” which is a term given by a team of experts from the consulting firm Booz Allen which based in the United States to describe comprehensive strategy in the order of securing the oil import routes for China from countries of the Middle East and also the manifestation of the rising influence of geopolitics through efforts to increase access to ports (as seen at figure 1.2) and air support, to develop diplomatic relations specifically, and modernization of military force.\(^8\)

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Figure 1.2 China’s String of Pearls

One of China’s action to securing the region of Indian Ocean begun in 2007, when China’s President at the time Hu Jintao visited Seychelles, and signed agreements in bilateral cooperation between the two countries.\(^9\)

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\(^8\)Mutia Z. (2012). “Geopolitik China di Asia tengah, Korea, Afrika dan strategi string of pearls.” [Link](http://mutiazakiafisip10.web.unair.ac.id/artikel_detail)

delegations, led by Liang Guanglie (China’s Defense Minister) got themselves in Seychelles in holding talks to create a better military cooperation between the two, including granting a surveillance aircraft to be used for anti-piracy by the Seychelles government.\textsuperscript{10} China and Seychelles are reported to be holding talks in regards the possibility of China’s negotiation to establish a military base in the island-country of Seychelles, though China has only been claiming it to be a military supply base, in order to put one foothold in the Indian Ocean Region.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{Figure 1.3 Seychelles}

In Figure 1.3, it is shown that Seychelles is located by the red pointer. By the location of the country, a military base in the country will give a large benefit of access to the region; especially if the China would build possess it.

\textsuperscript{10}www.ypsnhk.com/pressmaterials/China%20Maritime%202012.pdf
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
By the size of territory, Seychelles is a mere small country in the Indian Ocean, with only having 115 islands and population below hundred thousand. But the strategic location of the islands itself poses a vital value for China, who is seeking to have its footprints in the region, with the additional logistics and access from the Eastern gulf, to connect to the mainland China itself. China has been reported to negotiate with several states in the region, in talks for bilateral agreements in investment, shipping and port taxes, and even military bases in the region.

China has never professed this strategy (String of Pearls) nor has it been articulated by Chinese strategists. This was largely an American concept to encapsulate the appreciated Chinese developments which appeared to be designed for undermining American pre-eminence in the region. Chinese initiatives which gave rise to this theory were intended to diversify the routes for transportation of energy. And in 2013 The Maritime Silk Road initiative was first proposed.

Tentative of Maritime Silk Road was proposed by the current Chinese President Xi Jinping, in an address towards the Parliament of Indonesia in October 2013. President Xi Jinping proposed to build a good relation between China-ASEAN community and also proposed to guide to construct the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to promote cooperation in the maritime fields. In his speech in front of the Parliament of Indonesia, President Xi Jinping additionally proposed to create the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with a specific end goal to fund foundation of Infrastructure development and advance provincial interconnectivity and economic integration. The National Development and Reform Commission, in consultation with The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, has along these lines declared an Activity Get ready for the Initiative of Belt and Road Activity after the approval by the State Council on March 28, 2015.

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1.2 Identification of Problem

China does not have adequate assets and resources to help the advancement and financial development. In order to meet the needs of energy oil in China to support the development and economic growth, China itself is supplied by three companies that exist in the country, namely CNPC (China National Petroleum Cooperation), Sinopec, and CNOOC. But because of the presence of this problem, which does not have sufficient oil reserves, China itself has letters pressure in which the increase of population, economy and technology will urge a country to seek resources outside its territory.\(^\text{16}\)

Reportedly, China is attempting to create strategic and economic presence in the region, by targeting specific locations described as choke points, to increase their influence over the

region, and as a first in securing their foothold in the Southern Asia, to realize their vision of the String of Pearls.17

1.3 Research Question
How did China implement its military approaches to protect its national interest in Indian Ocean Region (2010-2015)?

1.4 Research Objectives
To analyze How China implement its military approaches to protect its national interest in the Indian Ocean.

1.5 Significance of Study
The key points in this paper that will be presented in to the readers are;

This thesis is aiming to define the implementation of China’s military instruments in order to protect its national interest in the region of Indian Ocean. Therefore, this will provide any kind of policies that will support this military instruments implementation.

The writer aims to contribute to the progress of international relations as a study today. And to the progress of the analysis of of the China’s military instruments to protect its national interest in the Indian Ocean.

1.6 Theoretical Framework
1.6.1 Geostrategy
Geostrategy is part of the geopolitics which is kind of foreign policy that prioritizes the factors of geographical location of the region, because of geostrategy are to inform, limit, or otherwise affect the political planning and militer. As with all strategies, geostrategy related to equate means to an end, which in this case is the resources of a country (whether they are limited or wide) with geopolitical goals (locally, regionally, or globally).18

In the case of China in Indian Ocean, the geostrategy can be explained by the term of “string of pearls” and “Maritime Silk routes” that serve as the grand stratagic of China in Indian Ocean. String of pearls is a term that describe the strategy undertaken in the whole China Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) which stretches from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication) is a maritime service between the ports used for trade, logistics and navy. String of Pearls the ocean lanes connecting the arabian gulf, going through the Indian ocean, the Malacca Strait, towards the South China Ocean.

While the “Maritime Silk Road” or MSR is the concept draws from China’s Han Dynasty era (206 BC-220 AD) when key land and sea trading routes carried Chinese silk to Europe. The MSR is intended to increase economic connectivity and accelerate economic development across the countries in the region under consideration. Accordingly, it intends building of transport networks to connect major ports in the region. The Chinese have also prioritized a host of issues for accelerating cooperation in diverse areas between the various countries along the MSR like economic development strategies, improvement of transport connections and associated infrastructure, facilitation of smooth and unimpeded flow of international trade, and the integration of financial systems and increased people-to-people contact.

1.6.2 National Interest
The concept of national interest suggests that national interests are the foundation that determines the behavior of a country’s policy. The policy behaviour that based on national interests will tend to lead to efforts pursuit of power or power. The realists argue that power is something that can be used to maintain and develop the control of a state against another. Charles O. Lerche and Abdul

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20“Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament”, ASEAN China Centre, 03 October 2013, http://www.asean-china-center.org/
Said was trying to add the capability of the country according to the visible components (tangible) and invisible (intangible).\(^{21}\)

Some elements of power are visible (tangible) such as population, territory, natural resources, industrial capacity, and military power. While some elements of power that invisiblesuch as leadership, organizational efficiency or bureaucracy, unity of the people, overseas support and dependency. In addition, Frederick Schuman found in an international system that does not have a common government, each country must seek salvation by relying on its own strength and see the power of the surrounding neighbors to be aware of.\(^{22}\)

### 1.6.3 Defense Policy

Defense Policy which created by a country is a policy in which a country create for protect themselves and their own interests. Defense Policy also have close linkages with the global environment. Planning on defense policy is the response of a country towards various international phenomenons that affects it directly or indirectly to the national defense and security as well their interests. Instead, the defense policy of a country will also have an influence on the balance of power. Defense policy is naturally linked to how a country to defend itself and its national interest in an international system.\(^{23}\)

Defense policy is formulated in a different way by each country. And it really depends on how the country defines the change inside the country and also the surrounding environment near the country. Changes in circumstances the environment also affects the pattern of a country's defense policy.\(^{24}\) As Part of defense policy, military approaches can be helpful to review the fulfillment of defense policy targets which as said above, is how a country defend itself and the national interest in the international system.\(^{25}\) For example China held a military cooperation with Seychelles which is a better military cooperation between the two, including granting a surveillance aircraft to be used for anti-piracy by the Seychelles government. China and


\(^{24}\)Ibid.

Seychelles are reported holding talks in regards the possibility of China’s negotiation to establish a military base in the island-country of Seychelles, though China has only been claiming it to be a military supply base, in order to put one foothold in the Indian Ocean Region.²⁶

Hence, the use of these theory in order to analyze the case of China implement its military approaches to protect its national interest in Indian Ocean Region (2010-2015) can be explained by the figure below:

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 1.5 : Connection between theories**

1.7 **Scope and Limitations of Study**

This study will only be focusing on the occurrences around the development of China’s existence in the region of Indian Ocean and the analyzing of China’s interest and the implementation of its military approaches in Indian Ocean.

1.8 **Research Methodology**

This research will be conducted using the Qualitative Method in which here this method is used to describe the data in the form of oral and written, so that researchers can understand more deeply about the phenomenon that related with the case.²⁷

The data and references will be conducted through Library Research method, using available literatures on the library to support the analysis of the thesis. Other forms of references

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(i.e. articles, journals, videos, recordings, figures) that are available to be used to support the ideas of the thesis will also be noted upon.

1.9 Thesis Structure

1.9.1 Chapter I - Introduction
The background of study will serve to lay out the foundations of thinking in the process of this research, and hopefully will give the initial guide for the readers to develop the theories and concepts, to analyze the case further in the future. The basic ideas will also be included, and limits and methods of the research that will be conducted.

1.9.2 Chapter II – PRC National Interest in Indian Ocean
This chapter will try to understand about China’s Interest in Indian Ocean region that will led to China’s military implementation to this region.

1.9.3 Chapter III – PRC Defense Policy
This chapter will serve to give the better understanding of China’s defense policy

1.9.4 Chapter IV – Case Study : The Analysis of The Implementation of China Military Approaches in Indian Ocean
This chapter will give the thorough information of the occurrences, that is to be analyzed later in the thesis, and why is it relevant to be used as the case study for the matter. The Military instruments implementation of China in the Indian Ocean region will be used as the basic guide for the research.

1.9.5 Chapter V – Conclusion
This is the final chapter of the thesis. This chapter will serve as the final summaries of the research, along with the possible recommendation towards the issue that may follow.

\[28\] Ibid.
CHAPTER II

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INDIAN OCEAN

2.1 The strategic importance of Indian Ocean to PRC

China has been unremittingly spreading its footsteps in the region of Indian Ocean in the past decade by embraced port development projects, overseeing and running ports, increasing port access for all naval platform, getting military installation such as military base and directing maritime activities with the countries in the region.29

In China’s Defense White Paper 2012, China has highlighted the main strategic task along with their modernization and their mission of peaceful development, which to build a stronger national defense. This was also aligned to their plan of enhancing their armed forces to be more powerful in order to meet their urgency of security interests. China has been aware that since the beginnings of the new century, namely the 2010s and above, the new challenges have occurred in China’s surrounding. Their military forces, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been carrying out China’s historical missions to be secure in the new century; this included their plans to broaden their national security and military strategy.30

China has been aware to the conditions in their surroundings and has been trying to intensify their military preparation, included their coastal air patrols and how to handle numerous crises and emergencies. China also has a great dependency towards the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) for its energy needs as also for a vast amount of its trade. In fact, at times, it has wrestled with its 'Malacca Dilemma' since more than 80% of its crude oil and almost 30% of its natural gas imports come through the Malacca Straits. The importance of the IOR in Chinese strategy cannot be therefore understated and will dominate Chinese maritime thinking.31

31ibid
Figure 2.1 shows the strategy of String of Pearls in the region of Indian Ocean is the path or China Sea route established for the benefit of its oil shipments. The Indian Ocean is one important part of the ocean in the world. In *China's Energy Policy 2012*, it was stated that it is important for China:

"to Ensure the security of international energy transport routes and avoid geopolitical conflicts that Affect the world’s energy supply."

China’s trade lane security interests in South Asia have implications for increasing the influence and role of China in the region of Indian Ocean. In their 2015 White Paper, China has officially stated their security awareness, particularly regarding their maritime rights and interests. This also aligned with the existence of US’ rebalance policies in the maritime zones around Asia. China has been aware to the existence of external threats that are coming from the offshore.

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32https://southfront.org/chinas-string-of-pearls-project/
33http://www.fkpmaritim.org/india-dan-samuderaindia/
territories, namely the Indian Ocean and another ocean around China and where their national interests located, such as South-China Sea disputes.\textsuperscript{35}

![Image](https://example.com/image.png)

\textbf{Figure 2.2 China’s Import Transit Routes & Maritime Choke Points} \textsuperscript{36}

China’s oil importshave shown that it depends largely on supplies from the Middle East, South and Central America, West Africa and the former USSR as the chart below shows. The chart below shows the inter area movement of oil to China in 2014. A large part, to the extent of about 75 – 80\% imports of China’s Oil, transit through the waters of the Indian Ocean while another large chunk of about 10 – 15 \% transit the Pacific Ocean.\textsuperscript{37}

China through with President Xi has announced their Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative. In September 2013, President Xi Jinping, during his visit to Central Asia and Southeast Asia announced the joint building of a Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk

The official report lays out the essential objectives of the “One Belt One Road” Initiative: “It is aimed at promoting orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of markets; encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to achieve economic policy coordination and carry out broader and more in-depth regional cooperation of higher standards; and jointly creating an open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all.” since then China has established an Asian infrastructure investment bank and has set 40 billion dollars for the initiative.

Figure 2.3 the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

This sea area is also considered vital for the existence of many countries in the world, and this is an important transport links in the sea area. The Region of Indian Ocean is also seen to have a strategic perspective in relation to maritime trade through this ocean and has a strong role in terms of security and stability of the waters, mainly related to energy security, because the percentage of the enormous supply of fuel oil and gas of Asia shipped through the Indian

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38 'Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative', http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm,
39 "The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” Fung Business Intelligence Centre
41 http://www.china.org.cn/world/node_7219434
Indian Ocean is very important for China, and basically China interests in Indian Ocean is divided into three parts, namely, political, economic and Military.

2.2 The Economic Interests of China in Indian Ocean

China has created the economic interests of the region of Indian Ocean throughout the last decade. Especially when President Xi Jinping during his speech to the Indonesian Parliament in October 2013 in which he speaks about the Initiative of 21st Century Maritime Silk road. The Geographic coverage of 21st Century Maritime Silk Road includes The Indian Ocean region.

The Indian Ocean has become one among the foremost vital security interests for China, that additionally because of the actual fact that the ocean has wealthy mineral, nice fisheries and nearly 40% of the offshore crude oil is created within the Region of Indian Ocean. This ocean has also connected the borders of Middle East, Africa, Australia, and Asia.

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43 https://amti.csis.org/atlas/
44 “Xi in call for building of new ‘maritime silk road’[1]-chinadaily.com.cn”
“In 2015, China issued The Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which suggests promoting policy coordination, connectivity of infrastructure and facilities, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds, adhering to the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration in propelling the Belt and Road construction.”

Most of the world's petroleum trade across the Indian Ocean. Before the ships can sail in the open sea, they must cross the narrow lanes, or the point of choking, such as the Suez Canal between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the Strait of Hormuz separates the Persian Gulf from the Arabian Sea and the Strait of Malacca linking the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea in Pacific. These maritime corridors pose security challenges ranging from piracy to a border dispute for Region Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which with a combined gross national products worth U.S. $ 6.5 trillion and a population of 2.6 billion people is a major player in the global economy. The third largest ocean in the world stretching from the border states in the resource-rich East and Africa.

China's economic development keeps on expanding essentially since 2009 caused the nation a net merchant of energy as oil sufficiently substantial. During the time spent for development, China went up against with issues in the expansion in energy request, particularly oil, in light of the fact that almost 60% of the local business is energy concentrated assembling Industries. China does not have adequate assets to help the Country’s advancement and financial development. With a specific end goal to keep up stable financial development, China needs oil in huge amounts as a wellspring of energy. Nations that fare to the necessities of China's energy comes mostly from the Africa and the Middle East.

Actively, China developed its influence using 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative especially in economic in Asia, especially the Indian Ocean. To secure its economic interests and puts his influence, china cooperates with several countries around the Indian Ocean. China’s President Xi Jinping has officially announced;

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47 http://apdf-magazine.com/id/stabilitas-di-samudra-hindia/
49 Hetri Prima Anggara, “STRATEGI INDIA MENGHADAPI HEГEMONI TIONGKOK DI KAWASAN ASIA SELATAN 2005-2014.”
“21st Century Maritime Silk Road or One Belt and One Road initiative, which is of particular significance to the IOR. The initiative’s twin components – the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, formed a development strategy that focuses on economic integration and cooperation among countries primarily in Eurasia...”. 50

With a series of investment and cooperation of China gradually reduce regional dependence on the leadership of India in South Asia. China is the largest trading partner of Bangladesh. China were about to invest in the textile sector, energy, and infrastructure. For Bangladesh, China is a partner that can be a balance influence of India. Bangladesh received a loan of US $ 211 million from China that used to improve telecommunication facilities and build the road as far as 900 km from Chittagong-Kunming.51

Bangladesh in 2011 decided to buy 44 armored vehicles worth US $ 200 million from China. China also assists in the development of deep-sea port in Chittagong. China needs energy from the Gulf countries and Africa, making the Maldives as a strategic point. China-Maldives relations improved greatly after the opening of the Chinese Embassy in Male on November 8, 2011. To help boost the economy of the Maldives, China doubling tourist arrivals by opening a direct flight from China to Male International Airport. Besides that, China also showed interest in port development investment between islands in the Maldives. Another example is that in 2017, the operational control of Hambatota port that located in Sri Lanka, was handed to Chinese-led joint venture.

There is also the development of a deep-water port at Sittwe, Myanmar; Naval base development in Gwandar, Pakistan; pipelines pass through Islamabad and Kashgar towards the Karakoram highway in Xinjiang province; intelligence facilities on the islands around the Bay of Bengal and the port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka; and others.52 That was coupled with diplomacy, economic and infrastructure development in order to advance development and common

50http://english.caixin.com/2014-12-10/100761304.html
interests. During the reign of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao there is a discussion about 'economic based diplomacy'. The directive pointing that 'using politics to boost economics and using economics to politics so as to boost and attain mutually beneficial relations with foreign countries'. Wen Jiabao also indicate that trade, investment and foreign aid became part of the Chinese diplomatic weapon. Purse Diplomacy is one of terminology in economic diplomacy. Purse diplomacy is done to gain the interest of China to the countries in the world so as to enhance China's image in the countries of the world through trade, investment and foreign aid.

2.3. The Political interests of China in Indian Ocean

The geographical position of China is located in the Asia Pacific region, namely East Asia. China is a country whose economy relies on sea lanes of trade, and mobility by sea easier in moving heavy loads. For that China seeks to improve its maritime strength and aim to spread their influence in the region. Therefore, the political interests of China Based on the theory of geopolitics to secure the interests of china in the Indian Ocean. Geopolitics rests on social geography (geographic law), concerning the situation, condition, or constellation geography and everything that is considered relevant to the geological characteristics of a country. Each state runs its policy to take advantage of the geographical conditions in determining policies, goals and means to achieve its national interests called geo-strategic theory.

According to China’s national interest; to deal with military threats in land, air and sea, China has to safeguard their security to secure their overseas interests, by all means, in the Indian Ocean region, as one of their main security interests. In order to achieve the security interests that mentioned above, China has planned to pursue collaboration in terms of cooperative and sustainable security and to support their peaceful development aims. China has mentioned in their 2015 Defense White Paper that;

“Efforts will be undertaken to promote policy coordination, deepen common understanding, enhance mutual political trust, and build bilateral and multilateral cooperative

mechanisms and to jointly participate in ocean governance, in order to provide the institutional framework for ocean cooperation."\(^{55}\)

To that end, China conduct diplomacy with countries in the Indian Ocean coastal regions (South Asia) in order to foster their political interest in the Indian Ocean. China's diplomacy interests have strategically planned to finance the funding and investment in the construction of the port and the construction or improvement of port infrastructure in countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka. In the terms of Political interests, China has held some political cooperation with some states that located in the Indian Ocean, namely:

2.3.1 Chinese cooperation with Some States in South Asia and Indian Ocean

China is a country that has a primary interest in the supply of oil and maintain the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. To achieve the objectives of the strategy String of Pearls, then China establish cooperation in various fields with the countries located area of strategy String of Pearls with efforts to build infrastructure and provide help at every point-point state (Pearls) in the path of the oil in the region Indian Ocean.

2.3.1.1 Gwadar Port Development by China in Pakistan

Since the cooperation of Pakistan with China began in 2002, a lot of progress has been experienced by Pakistan including Gwadar port development progress that is assisted by China. Pakistan and China had consented to a far-reaching arrangement on March 16th, 2002 at Beijing which undertaking the errand of improvement of Gwadar significant seaport of comprehensive measures for China.\(^{56}\) The primary period of development at Gwadar Port started in 2002, and was finished in 2006, preceding introduction in 2007. The work on the main period of this task, which is being worked by Chinese Harbor Building Association, is by and by at full swing. The second period of development is as of now in progress as a major aspect of arranged changes under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and other auxiliary ventures.

China additionally gave a US$200 million advance to Pakistan for the development of the 653-kilometer Makran Beach front Highway (National Highway 10 or N10). This highway links Gwadar Port with Karachi other cities along the coast line. Furthermore, under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a number of roads are being built which will link the Port to rest of


\(^{56}\)https://www.uniassignment.com/essay-samples/history/gwadar-port-handed-over-to-china-history-essay.php
Pakistan as well as with China. Both sides also intend to build railway track from Gwadar up to China’s borders. Importantly, China has already taken the administrative control of Gwadar Port for a period 40 year.

The venture will undoubtedly be a crucial point and significant towards the economic development of the region. Other than that, the cooperation is not only will give economic development benefit to Pakistan alone but China also get the benefit of its own which will give China entrance into the area of South Asia and even the Middle East, and all of it was driven by the interests of China to acquire oil energy sources.  

![Figure 2.5 Gwadar Port](https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/headline/russia-allowed-to-use-pakistans-gwadar-port-under-cpec/)

The Gwardar Port itself is located in Pakistan’s south-western province of Baluchistan. It is about 460 kilometers west of Karachi, and 70 kilometers east of the Iranian border, close to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.

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2.3.1.2 Subsea Pipeline construction in Islamabad and the Karakoram Highway to Kashgar Xinjiang Province, China.

China and Pakistan are cooperating to lay the trans-Himalayan pipeline to convey raw petroleum from the Center East to west of China. The route section is located in the region of the Himalayas, which after crude oil reached China and then the crude oil should be sent thousands of kilometers more to the east and to the area -area coast, where the most concentrated energy demand in China. The proposed pipeline will connect the port of Gwadar to western China region were isolated, and most of the construction will be financed by China. This oil pipeline was built in conjunction with the Karakoram highway.\(^{59}\)

2.3.1.3 Chinese cooperation with Sri Lanka in Strategy String of Pearls.

Sri Lanka is an island country situated in the southeast shore of India, is found around 32 miles off the bank of South India, India, and southwest Cove of Bengal and in southeast of the Middle Eastern Ocean. Until 1972, the nation was known as Ceylon, the name given to the time of English expansionism. The island is likewise known by the name of Lanka, Lankadeepa, Simoundou, Taprobane, Serendib and Selan. Sri Lanka wound up autonomous on February 4, 1948 and an individual from the Ward nations. The official name of this nation is the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.\(^{60}\)

“Chinese government will work in good faith and with the utmost sincerity to promote ocean cooperation with countries along the Road”\(^{61}\)

The very first nation to perceive China as a Nation is Sri Lanka. From that point forward the relationship Sri Lanka with People's Republic of China to be solid, both at that point held an abnormal state visit and lead different collaboration understandings. What's more, China has given monetary help, military and specialized work force to Sri Lanka. China participation attempted by Sri Lanka has accomplished a high monetary point with a gigantic speculation from China in the extension of framework in Sri Lanka, including the improvement of Sri Lanka port venture in

\(^{59}\)http://indonesian.irib.ir/editorial/fokus/item/103979-hubungan-strategis-cina-pakistan  
Hambantota. Other than China and Sri Lanka are additionally coordinating in military relations, China providing an extensive variety of current weaponry for the military of Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{62}

2.2.1.4 \textit{China substance Cooperation with Bangladesh in Strategy String of Pearls}

China is a major aid donor and infrastructure developer for Bangladesh. China is actively carrying out a number of developmental projects in Bangladesh particularly in ‘power, communication, and infrastructure development and telecommunication sectors’. The nature of Chinese aid and assistance are both economic and military. China has also emerged as a prominent stakeholder in the port development programs in Bangladesh. The Chittagong port is the major port of Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{63} All the three prominent ports of Bangladesh- the Chittagong port, Khulna port and Mongla port- are river ports. As these ports are river ports, their depth has been affected by siltting. So, these ports need modernization in regular interval. China is a natural choice for the port modernization program Bangladesh due to its technological and manual competency. While talking at the gathering party, together masterminded in her respect by the China Board for Advancement of Global Exchange and Bangladesh Consulate in Beijing on 19 Walk 2010, Prime Minister Hasina requested Chinese collaboration to build a remote ocean port in Chittagong. She said “China can be benefited by using the Deep Seaport while all neighboring countries also can use it.”\textsuperscript{64} Apart from modernization of the Chittagong port Bangladesh is also planning to convert the Sonadia port of the Cox’s Bazar district into a deep-sea port. It will enhance Bangladesh’s alternative port capability. It will also boost Bangladesh’s strategic capabilities. Bangladesh needs Chinese funding and technology to modernize these ports.

“\textit{Building platforms for marine technology cooperation. Together with countries along the Road, China will build platforms for the sharing of marine research infrastructure, data and technic resources, and marine technological cooperation parks.}”\textsuperscript{65}

Aside from the technology collaboration, Bangladesh has extensive economic relations with China. Their bilateral trade is expanding every year. Productive and extensive maritime

\textsuperscript{62}http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/\%5Cpapers37\%5Cpaper3662.html
\textsuperscript{63}Chittagong port is the largest port of Bangladesh. According to Chittagong Port Authority’s report in 2007 the port handled 30.08 million metric tons of cargo including 958,020 TEUs containerised cargo
\textsuperscript{64} She also sought Chinese cooperation to establish road link between Kunming and Chittagong. “PM Seeks Chinese Assistance to Setup Deep Sea Port” (2010), The Financial Express, Dhaka, 20 March 2010
cooperation with China will further boost Bangladesh bilateral trade with China. As there is no direct rail and road link between Bangladesh and China, sea routes are the most reasonable path for Bangladesh to import and export goods. Maritime cooperation with China will also render extra sea surveillance capability to Bangladesh. This will help Bangladesh to counter piracy and to protect its maritime trade.

2.4 Military Interests of China in Indian Ocean

China would like to expand their military cooperation which based on the trust and all-win cooperation particularly with the states around the Indian Ocean which is aligned with what China has emphasized in their 2015 Defense White Paper:

“Pushing ahead with pragmatic military cooperation on the basis of mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit and all-win cooperation,”66

“China proposes an initiative for jointly developing and sharing maritime public services along the Road, encouraging countries to jointly build ocean observation and monitoring networks, sharing the results of marine environmental surveys, and providing assistance to developing countries in this area.”67

To understand China's national vital mission and to execute its perspectives on national security and additionally China's national advantages, the measures of improvement of inventive military procedures have been upgraded and additionally the finish of military missions and obligations. In that case, the China’s armed force will increase its strength and purpose.

China's military will effectively play out their missions in the new evident period, courageously keep up the expert of the CPC and the framework of socialist with Chinese characteristics, shielding China's energy, security and headway interests, ensure the basic time of crucial open entryways for China's change, keep up regional and world peace, and attempt to give a strong confirmation to completing the working of a fairly prosperous society in all respects and achieving the titanic restoration of the Chinese nation. One of the vital undertakings of China's military is to secure the security of China and furthermore secure the interests of China in new

regions or areas. This could be a reference to the Chinese military's purpose in the Region of Indian Ocean region.

Indian Ocean has turned into a need and priority for China in light of a legitimate concern for sea and security since it fills in as a point of convergence to China's greatest advantage calculative identified with vitality and exchange abroad shipments via ocean. In excess of 70 percent of China's Vitality supply imports are transported by methods for transportation ways in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), with checkpoints on the essential key course. Senior Colonel Xu Qiyu, deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at China’s National Defense University, said China’s principal security interests in the Indian Ocean are access to SLOCs, good relations with nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, general stability in the region, and protecting Chinese interests and citizens. Xu Qiyu added that protecting these interests requires that China counter the threat of piracy and terrorism, take into account Indian and American influence, and be prepared for threats from other major powers.

If we refer to the document issued by The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China containing Military Strategy of China, China's national key objective is to finished the prosperous society's advancement by 2021 when the Chinese Communist party commending its 100th birthday celebration year. Likewise, its main goal is to acknowledge and fabricate a socialist nation that is prosperous, solid, equitable, socially progressed, and living in congruity.

It is moreover a Chinese Yearn for achieving the huge restoration of the Chinese as a country. The Chinese Dream is to make the country strong and solid. China's military take their dream of making the military strong and solid as a piece of the Chinese Dream. Without a strong and solid military, a country can be neither safe nor strong. In the new chronicled period, going for the CPC's target of building a strong military in the new situation, China's military will unswervingly stick to the rule of the CPC's inside and out activity, keep up fight reasonability as the sole and significant standard, carry on their glorious traditions, and work to join themselves

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68 ibid
69 https://sites.tufts.edu/gis/files/2013/02/Brutlag_Daniel.pdf
71 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628_2.htm
with the general population's military that takes after the CPC's requests, can go to fight and win, and gloats a fine style of work.\textsuperscript{72}In the new conditions, the national security issues confronting China incorporate significantly more subjects, reach out finished a more prominent range, and cover a more drawn out time traverse than whenever in the nation's history. Inside and remotely, the components at play are more intricate than any time in recent memory. Subsequently, it is important to maintain an all-encompassing perspective of national security, adjust inside and outside security, country and resident security, customary and non-conventional security, subsistence and improvement security, and China's own security and the regular security of the world.

To secure the national interests of China, China expanding its military stance and modernize their naval forces in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{73}One of China’s action to securing the region of Indian Ocean begun in 2007, when China’s President at the time Hu Jintao visited Seychelles, and signed agreements in bilateral cooperation between the two countries.\textsuperscript{74} And in 2012 around 40 People’s Liberation Army delegations, led by Liang Guanglie (Chinas Defense Minister) got themselves in Seychelles In holding talks to create a better military cooperation between the two, including granting a surveillance aircraft to be used for anti-piracy by the Seychelles government.\textsuperscript{75} China and Seychelles are reported to be holding talks in regards the possibility of China’s negotiation to establish a military base in the island-country of Seychelles, though China has only be claiming it to be a military supply base, in order to put one foothold in the Indian Ocean Region.\textsuperscript{76}

And one case that also shows china strategy for the Indian Ocean is a maritime exercise in January 2014 which did by three Chinese maritime vessels, the first is the Ship Changbaishan which is the biggest land and/or water vessel that capable to land both on water and land. At that

\textsuperscript{72}http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628_2.htm
\textsuperscript{74} China’s Politics in 2007: Power Consolidation, Personnel Change and Policy Reorientation, University of Nottingham, Chinese Policy Institute.

\textsuperscript{75}www.ypsnhk.com/pressmaterials/China%20Maritime%202012.pdf
\textsuperscript{76}Ibid.
point, alongside two destroyers specifically Wuhan and Haikou.\textsuperscript{77} the determination to choosing of Lombok Strait that close Indonesia as a territory to coordinate getting ready activities has transformed into an essential choice which to shows to the Indo-Pacific region to trusted that China have the ability to achieve the battle capacity of china has now comes to and extends toward the east Indian ocean.\textsuperscript{78}Srikanth Kondapalli noticed that with this - China could try things out in the eastern part of the Indian ocean, including the capacity to work somewhat a long way from the base in region.\textsuperscript{79} Most importantly, the driving principle behind China's strategic gaze to the Indian Ocean can be understood in aspirations for great power status was driven by the economic growth of china are very fast and are mainly guided by a mission to the economy and energy security.

\textbf{Chapter III}

\textbf{People’s Republic of China National Defense Policy}

3.1 China’s Defense Policy 2015: An Overview

Defense policy is formulated with countries own interest on how to maintain their security and to manage and support their national interest. Yet, the changes in environment also affects the pattern of a country's defense policy. As Part of defense policy, military approaches can be helpful to review the fulfillment of defense policy targets and how is a country defend itself and the national interest in the international system.\(^{80}\)

In order to understand the reason behind the phenomenon of China existences in Indian ocean as part of its national interest, we could refer to China’s Defense white paper that explain the goals and the strategy of China in maintaining and developing their power in the region. The China’s Defense White Paper (DWP) have their own trends in order to face the unprecedented changes that continue to happen in global environment\(^{81}\), especially in the name of “protecting the national interest” of china in the overseas which is the string of pearl\(^{82}\). Where China national defense policy from 2008 – 2015 continue to play purely defensive as its nature. China has puts the insurance of their national sovereignty, security, regional trustworthiness, as well as protecting the interests of China national advancement, also the interests of the Chinese individuals to the exclusion of everything else. Furtherbuilding a solid national resistance and effective military is a core assignment in regards of China's modernization and a security that needed to ensure China's peaceful improvement\(^{83}\).

In 2015, China released their 10th DWP in which entitled “China’s Military Strategy”\(^{84}\). This 2015 DWP are published\(^{85}\)by the State Council Information Office and approved\(^{86}\) by the Central Military Commission, Ministry of National Defense, and State Council. China primarily

\(^{80}\)Defense Policy, can be accessed through webat https://brookings.edu/defense-policy/


\(^{82}\)Ibid

\(^{83}\)Ibid


\(^{85}\)Ibid

\(^{86}\)China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm
uses these DWP as a public relations tool that help to create a deep understanding for international concern over China’s military modernization and DWP 2015 also serve as an answer for greater transparency\textsuperscript{87} in regards of China’s Military Strategy.

Hence there are 3 point of concerns that China DWP 2015 stated in which explaining their existence in Indian Ocean\textsuperscript{88}. First, China put greater concern on Maritime domain, Second, China’s new situation and requirement in security environment, and the last but not least China’s new readiness to military struggle.

3.1.1 Emphasis on Maritime Domain.

“The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable development of China. The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.\textsuperscript{89}”

In 2015, China's recently discharged defense white paper, while illustrating local dominion desires, has pointed a more noteworthy spotlight on the oceans. As it expressed above, China put their worry on continuing peace, maintaining dependability and supportable advancement of china, and emphatically stressed to deserted the customary mindset that land exceeds ocean in which conclusively raises the sea area in China's key reasoning\textsuperscript{90}Its additionally clarify the need of china to build up a cutting-edge sea military power as their military stance keeping in mind the end goal to ensure their sea right and intrigue. This approach additionally incorporated an extended maritime part past China's oceanic lawn that reflected by the announcement of ensuring the

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid
\textsuperscript{88} Beyond the wall, China far seas interest. Can be accessed through web at www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1014494.pdf
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid
\textsuperscript{90} Beyond the wall, China far seas interest p5. Can be accessed through web at www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1014494.pdf
security vital SLOCs and their abroad enthusiasm, and in addition in taking an interest the sea collaboration to protect the sea control.\textsuperscript{91}

\textit{“The PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from "offshore waters defense" to the combination of "offshore waters defense" with "open seas protection," and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense and comprehensive support.”}\textsuperscript{92}

In further reading the China’s DWP 2015 explain the China’s effort in order to push China as a huge maritime power where China Navy change their focus on “offshore waters defense”\textsuperscript{93} into “open seas protection”.\textsuperscript{94} This move is reflected by the PLA Naval force in their current acquisitions, preparations, and the tasks. For instance, China's first plane that carrying warship, longer-continuance watches by PLA Naval force surface ships and submarines.

As its expressed to move into open oceans security, China showed a move that clarifies China's new spotlight on the Region of Indian Ocean, with the MSR Initiative at the vanguard of the Chinese massive strategy to make a blue water force and grow their naval, China is putting vigorously investment\textsuperscript{95} in submarines and warships, and chipping away at a moment of plane carrying warship.

China’s also realized that the shift role of their navy will address maritime territorial dispute, since many neighborhoods neglect the China’s claim over territory that categorized by China as maritime right and interest. Hence, The DWP 2015 addresses China’s maritime territorial disputes,

\textit{“On the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied.”}\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid
\textsuperscript{92}China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm

\textsuperscript{93}Ibid
\textsuperscript{94}Ibid
\textsuperscript{95}Ibid
\textsuperscript{96}China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm
Eventhough that The DWP 2015 does not directly explain or address on how China will respond to perceived affronts to their sovereignty in the maritime realm. In further reading, the DWP 2015 assures the reader that that China will “strike a balance between rights protection and stability maintenance” and strive to “prevent crises.”

The DWP 2015 leaves the context for this statement somewhat ambiguous, but if we refer to China’s maritime disputes, it explain the objectives of protecting territorial sovereignty and maintaining peaceful relations with other claimants are elastic in nature, which mean that China will employ a flexible approach to its disputes rather than pursue the consolidation of its perceived rights and claims at any cost.

In regard to China’s DWP 2015, President Xi Jinping emphasizing about securing and expanding all routes towards The Middle East and through over The Region of Indian Ocean, which is the bridge among Asia and Europe. In which officially labeled the “One Belt, One Road” where it constitutes a strategic push to expand China’s hegemony in maritime. President Xi’s plan on Indian Ocean draw strength to push for Chinese existence in the South and East China seas in which reflected in DWP strategic principle

“To foster a strategic posture favorable to China's peaceful development, adhere to the national defense policy that is defensive in nature, persevere in close coordination of political, military, economic and diplomatic work, and positively cope with comprehensive security threats the country possibly encounters.”

3.1.2 A New situation and Requirement for China’s Security Environment

“It is a Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Dream is to make the country strong. China's armed forces take their dream of making the military

97Ibid
98Ibid
100Ibid
101Ibid
102Ibid
103China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm
104Ibid
China clearly stated their goal to achieve the rejuvenation of Chinese nation, in which need a strong military forces to make the country safe from any threats toward their sovereignty and national interest in their security environment. In regards of security environment, China clearly stated in the 2015 DWP about possible threat in their national security.

“In the new circumstances, the national security issues facing China encompass far more subjects, extend over a greater range, and cover a longer time span than at any time in the country’s history. Internally and externally, the factors at play are more complex than ever before. Therefore, it is necessary to uphold a holistic view of national security, balance internal and external security, homeland and citizen security, traditional and non-traditional security, subsistence and development security, and China’s own security and the common security of the world”

China’s illustrates national security situation where the security outlook is favorable but faces localized threats. China assesses the world is becoming a more peaceful place, and that risks of large-scale war are declining and put concern on the potential issues like domestic disputes and hotspot issues (e.g. ethnic, religious, border, and territorial disputes). Also the threat from non-traditional threats of terrorism, piracy, natural disasters and epidemics is also growing. China’s DWP 2015 categorized this complex security threats and its environment as “the new situation” in which need several “new requirements” for China to accomplish its missions and strategic tasks in light of the complexities of the “new situation”. Where China can prepare itself to address these threats and enable China to realize their goal that stated in DWP 2015 “the Chinese Dream of great national rejuvenation.”

“....In response to the new requirement arising from the changing security situation, the armed forces will constantly innovate strategic guidance and operational thoughts so as to ensure the capabilities of fighting and winning.....the armed forces will actively participate in both regional and international security cooperation and effectively secure China's overseas interests”

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105 Ibid
106 China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm
107 Ibid
108 Ibid
109 Ibid
The armed forces of China will pay close attention to the challenges in new security domains, and work hard to seize the strategic initiative in military competition in order to face the complex threats that China stated as “new situation”, china address the “new requirement” is to contantly innovate their strategic guidance and operational in their armed force in order to adapt the “new situation” and increases their armed force capabilities in fighting and increasing the perctage of winning. Hence, China also stated directly on how to address its armed force capabilities in fighting and winning is by actively engage in regional and international security cooperation and joint military training in order to secure effectively their national overseas interest110. By actively participate in regional and international security cooperation, China also aiming to maintain their regional and world peace at once.

“maintain regional and world peace, and strive to provide a strong guarantee for completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects and achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation111”

Therefore, there several main strategic task112 of China’s armed forces that clearly stated in DWP 2015 in order to safeguard the national interest of China in this “new situation”. In order to deal with the threats towards its national interest, China elaborate the their strategic move in DWP 2015, as follow:

  a) To resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland;
  b) To safeguard China's security and interests in new domains;
  c) To safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests;
  d) To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack;
  e) To participate in regional and international security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace;
  f) To strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China's political security and social stability; and

110 China on Indian Ocean, can be accessed through https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/06/23/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-indian-ocean-strategy/#.WsBSrzUYHMw
111 China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm
112 Ibid
3.1.3 Readiness for Military Struggle

There is another theme in DWP 2015 that represent the China’s existence in Indian Ocean which the section called “Preparation for Military Struggle,” in this section the DWP emphasizes on how the armed forces of china prepare for any threat or being called as military struggle, President Xi Jinping explained that there is need for China to prepare to fight and win from any threat towards their national interest by training in “realistic conditions”. It notes that the China armed forces will begin intensify training in complex environment with their national allies especially the countries in surrounding area of Indian ocean.

“.... PMS must be carried out in a well-planned, prioritized, comprehensive and coordinated way, so as to maintain the balance and stability of the overall strategic situation. China's armed forces will make overall planning for PMS in both traditional and new security domains, and get ready to safeguard national sovereignty and security, protect the country's maritime rights and interests.”

Reportedly, China has establish stronger relation with surrounding countries of indian ocean. It proves by many joint military training was conducted by China, (e.g:China and Sri

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113Ibid
114Ibid
115Ibid
Lanka conducted their second joint military Exercise Silk Route 2015\textsuperscript{117}, that likely called so for its concordance with China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative in Indian ocean, in which Sri Lanka is a partner, incorporated a 43-member Chinese People’s Liberation Army contingent and soldiers from the Sri Lankan army). Beijing also signed a military accord with Djibouti allowing the Chinese Navy to use facilities there\textsuperscript{118}, China also has turning Maldives into another trading outpost with the acquisition of land there, even though that the high ranked official says that the port are only for trading, but further involvement of China armed force in Indian Ocean has doubted this statement. The China concern on military preparedness and training in surrounding Indian ocean also being supported by the DWP 2015 that stated,

“...enhance exchanges and cooperation with naval task forces of other countries, and jointly secure international SLOCs. China’s armed forces will engage in extensive regional and international security affairs, and promote the establishment of the mechanisms of emergency notification, military risk precaution, crisis management and conflict control.\textsuperscript{119}”

Along with the DWP 2015, China existence in Indian ocean also being supported by the China power in military spending that allow them to invest port and held many joint military trainings with surrounding countries of Indian ocean, the move of China in Indian ocean look like china want to be the leader in Indian ocean not merely as a sole stakeholder\textsuperscript{120}. Hence, by explaining the defense budget of China explain how China could possibly realize their national overseas interest and maintaining their string of pearl and SLOC\textsuperscript{121}.

3.2 China’s Defense Expenditure to Support DWP 2015 Mission


\textsuperscript{118}Ben Blanchard, “China Hints More Bases On Way After Djibouti,”

\textsuperscript{119}China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm

\textsuperscript{120}China on Indian Ocean, can be accessed through https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/06/23/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-indian-ocean-strategy/#.WsBSrzUYHMw

\textsuperscript{121}China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm
A country’s defense budget and spending represent the most direct way to explain and measuring the country’s potential military capability on how they could capable to secure their national interest and maintaining their country’s influences. In terms of military strength, the size of defense budget can be compared between countries that particularly insightful when tracing the military trends in spending and helpful in identifying critical political events that have accelerated defense allocations based on their national interest. What’s more, the Defense budgets also have a role to identify the importance of a country’s armed forces relative to other organs of the state. Therefore, the size of defense budget still finds its way to explain the country potential in turning and in increasing power.

![China's Defense Spending](https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/)

Figure 3.1: China’s official defense budget over the year\(^{122}\).

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\(^{122}\)China defense spending, can be accessed through web [https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/](https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/)
The trends in China defense budget continue to increase start from 2008 to present, since their put their interest in manifesting in Indian ocean. From 2008 until 2015, has put significance increase in military budget that increase about 100% from $60 Billion in 2008 to $141 Billion in 2015. It’s also indicates China’s degree of transparency of their planned acquisitions. Moreover a high ranking officer in the chinese military stated that in general Chinese spending is,

“divided into about three equal parts made up of personnel expenses, activity expenses to pay for training and military exercises and expenses to purchase and repair weapons and other military equipment.”123

As the statement explained, the Chinese defense budget mostly categorized by the following categories such as personnel expenses (e.g salary, food, clothing of military and non-military personnel); maintenance of activities in which are including military training, construction and maintenance of facilities and running expenses124. Hence, the expenses for equipment that include the research and experiment, purchasing, maintenance of equipment, transportation and storage. And the last but not least, the China military budget in order to support the DWP 2015 mission to protect their overseas national interest is in term of the scope of logistic support, in which these expenditures cover not only for active service personnel but also their militia and reserve requirements125.

Yet, when we look to DWP 2015, its indicating that China has not only emphasized “active defense”126 but also articulated a more expansive role for the country127. As China emphasized their maritime goal is to redraw the larger geopolitical map by bringing within China’s orbit regional countries, especially those in the Indian Ocean Rim, which extends from Australia to the Middle East and Southern Africa128.

“Pushing ahead with logistics modernization. China's armed forces will deepen logistics reform in relevant policies, institutions and support forces, and optimize strategic logistics

123 China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm
124 China defense spending, can be accessed through web https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/
125 Ibid
126 China on Indian Ocean, can be accessed through https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/06/23/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-indian-ocean-strategy/#.WsBSrzUYHMw
127 Ibid
128 Ibid
deployment. They will innovate the modes of support, develop new support means, augment war reserves."  

Once we look at the China Defense budget and on how they expense their budget to support their national interest, especially those in Indian Ocean. It explains that China have put focus on maritime and modernize their support forces such as acquisition or purchase new weapons to support their Navy. China’s expanding international economic interests are increasing demands for the PLAN to operate in more distant maritime environments to protect Chinese citizens, investments, and critical sea lines of communication (SLOC). China likely seek to establish the additional military bases in countries which has a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, and in which there is a precedent for hosting foreign militaries.

Therefore, China’s effort on modernization their naval posture encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon purchase, such as anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs) and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. Also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises that is worth up to $141 Billion in 2015. More generally, this China’s outstanding defense budget has enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs),

Furthermore, President Xi Jinping has instructed their Armed Forces to “steadily advance overseas base construction.” In which resulted a more robust overseas logistics and basing

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129 China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm
130 Ibid
131 Ibid
132 Ibid
135 Ibid
136 Ibid
137 Ibid P 25
infrastructure that essential to enable China to project and sustain military power at greater distances from China. An argument from China’s foreign minister Wang Yi also strengthened China interest in overseas especially those in Indian Ocean, with simply stated “We are willing to try to carry out the construction of infrastructure facilities and logistic capacity in the regions where China’s interest is involved.”

To secure and protect those interest in maritime, China has possessed many Navy power that supported by them continues increasing defense budget, The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) from U.S, has reported how strong Chinese Navy based on how many Navy armaments that China Possessed.

Table 4. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships Provided by ONI in 2013
(Figures for numbers of ships include both older and less capable units—including some of questionable operational status—and newer and more capable units)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diesel attack submarines (SSs)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57 to 62</td>
<td>59 to 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 to 8</td>
<td>6 to 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic missile submarines</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 to 5</td>
<td>4 to 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 to 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28 to 32</td>
<td>30 to 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52 to 56</td>
<td>54 to 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20 to 25</td>
<td>24 to 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious ships</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>53 to 55</td>
<td>50 to 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile-armed coastal patrol craft</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximate percent of modern design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship type</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diesel attack submarines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear-powered attack submarines</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.2: China’s Navy Power

Furthermore, ONI also reported in 2015 regarding of the advancements of China’s Navy that stated China’s Navy currently have more than 300 surface combatants, submarines,

1392015 ONI Report, p. 10
amphibious ships, along with missile-armed patrol craft in which consists of approximately 26 destroyers (21 of which are considered modern), 52 frigates (35 modern), 20 new corvettes, 85 modern missile-armed patrol craft, 56 amphibious ships, 42 mine warfare ships\textsuperscript{141}.

With all those defense spending and defense posture especially on maritime section, has strong enough to support China DWP and its National Overseas Interest especially in Indian Ocean. With this Navy power only, has make China as the greatest Navy power in the region that enable China to actively engaged in open-sea protection\textsuperscript{142}. China already have their grand project that involved String of pearl, their existence in open-sea explained by their DWP and supported by their defense expense, in further discuss writer would like to answer the question on How China implement their military approaches in Indian Ocean.

\textsuperscript{141} 2015 ONI Report, p. 13
\textsuperscript{142} China Defense White Paper, can be accessed through http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm
CHAPTER IV

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINA MILITARY APPROACHES TO PROTECT ITS NATIONAL INTEREST IN INDIAN OCEAN

Sufficient Resources is also a dilemma\textsuperscript{143} for a big country like China, to support the development and economic growth of China whilst maintaining their power in the world and as a first in securing their foothold in the Southern Asia, to realize their vision of the String of Pearls, it is all the reason behind China movement and existences in Indian Ocean, this interest also being supported and protected by their DWP year to year and strengthened in DWP 2015.

Even though this interest as not transparency as it seems when china put more effort in strengthening their existences in Indian Ocean, China continue to establish stronger relation with Indian Ocean Surrounding Countries with several approaches that one of them is military approaches\textsuperscript{144}. In Implementing the military approaches of China in Indian Ocean as well as to answer the research question, China in 2010 – 2015 put more focus on Joint Military Training,

\textsuperscript{143}China’s water dilemma, can be accessed through web at https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/oct/10/china-water-dilemma-farming-growing-urban-population

\textsuperscript{144}The Great Power and Great Game, can be accessed through web at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650040701783243
Port Investation and Building, and the last but not least Open-Seas Patrol in Indian Ocean\textsuperscript{145}. These efforts being strengthened by China’s DWP in 2015.

“...protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.”\textsuperscript{146}

### 4.1 Joint Military Trainings and Supplying Military Technology

“The Chinese military will also strengthen cooperation with related countries in personnel training, material assistance, equipment and technology, so as to strengthen mutual support and enhance respective defensive capabilities. Bilateral and multilateral joint exercises and training, involving various services and arms, will be conducted at multiple levels and in various domains to enhance joint operational capabilities”\textsuperscript{147}

Joint military training is a military training that conducted by two or more countries, that basically to strengthen their relationship and as a statement of political support in which categorized as an expression of trust for current and possible future\textsuperscript{148}. China in their existences in Indian Ocean with their national interest of their grand strategic string of pearl, have put concern on strengthening relations with Indian Ocean surrounding countries, especially on Navy force as their military approach to maintain and securing their interest for possible future outcomes, yet their defense policy also supported this measure in order to engage regional and international security, especially on SLOCs.

“...enhance exchanges and cooperation with naval task forces of other countries, and jointly secure international SLOCs. China’s armed forces will engage in extensive regional and international security affairs and promote the establishment of the mechanisms of emergency notification, military risk precaution, crisis management and conflict control.”\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{145} China’s Defense White Paper 2015, can be accessed through web at [http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm](http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm)

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid


\textsuperscript{149} China’s Defense White Paper 2015, can be accessed through web at [http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm](http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm)
Hence, China in period of times have conducted some military training that include joint exercise and military technology exchange with some influenced actor in Indian Ocean, namely: Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

4.1.1. Sri Lanka

The military approaches that China implement to Sri Lanka is reflected by the statement of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister G.L. Peiris, in which he said that China and Sri Lanka have agreed on defense cooperation.

“...defense-related training, logistics and maritime security, and have agreed in principle to establish a free trade agreement”

As for the background, China – Sri Lanka relations save being maintained for more than half a century, China and Sri Lanka have helped each other since 1950s. The history noted that in 2009, China has played a crucial role to end the war in Sri Lanka, in which where China supplied Lanka with ships, weapons, ammunition and rockets for money or for soft loans during the war when many other countries had imposed sanctions on supplying military assistance to Sri Lanka.

After those event, China – Sri Lanka began their military training for the first time in 2013. The joint military training being called ‘CORMORANT STRIKE IV – 2013’ that focus on air forces in which commenced on 9th September, even though that these military participants are not only China and Sri Lanka. But this event is where the China and Sri Lanka started building

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150China – Sri Lanka agree on loan and defence, can be accessed through web at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-srilanka-loans/china-sri-lanka-agree-loans-defence-seek-to-allay-indian-worries-idUSBRE94S0D220130529


152Donovan C. Chau and Thomas M. Kane, "China and international security: history, strategy, and 21stcentury policy,” Choice Reviews Online 52 (04), (2014): 228

trust in military defense that resulted China agreed on helping to modernize and expands the Sri Lanka’s defense force (E.g. China exports on ammunition, missiles, rocket launchers, and shoulder-fired surface-to-air-missiles, tanks, F7G Jets, Naval Vessel and radars and communication equipment.156)

In 2015, China and Sri Lanka continue to hold their 2nd joint military training as a further military approach of China. The Joint military training being called “SILK ROUTE 2015” in concordance with China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative, the training put concern on Navy forces that incorporated 43 members from China and Sri Lanka. The training was held on June 22 to July 13, 2015 that demonstrates the continuing deepening of security ties between China and Sri Lanka, that focus on primarily tactical exercises (E.g. skill firing, special mission planning, combat tracking techniques, situation training exercise, jungle warfare and basic battle skills, vehicle ambush drills, aircraft and building option training, etc.)”

4.1.2. Pakistan

The relations between China – Pakistan is explained as long-standing friendship that began in 1951 when Pakistan recognized China. Since then their relation continue to strengthen where China has provided Pakistan with considerable economic, military and technical assistance over the years that has resulted in a strategic partnership between the two countries.

154Ibid

155 A Resurgent China: South Asian Perspectives, can be accessed through web https://books.google.co.id/books?id=KQkVAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA256&lpg=PA256&dq

156 Ibid


158 Ibid


160 Ibid
In term of military training, the purpose of China to extend their existence in Indian Ocean through Pakistan is reflected by the statement of General Hou Shusen, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese Army,

"To hold the joint training or exercises on the subject of counter-terrorism between China's and Pakistan's armed forces will help us to fight against the regional terrorist forces and deepen the cooperation between us and promote peace and security in the region,“\textsuperscript{161}

Yet, this statement also being strengthened by a further statement by Sri Lankan Military General Kayani,

“.... we had a very close cooperation, and we do exchange intelligence and we have done our utmost to eliminate this threat of ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement) and other extremists for China,”\textsuperscript{162}

The first military approach that conducted by China to Pakistan was in 2011 when they conducted their first joint military training that being called “Shaheen 1” that focus on air forces military exercises. In 2014, China – Pakistan held a two week long joint military training that being called “Peace Angel 2014”. The joint military training is aimed on sharing mutual experiences between China and Pakistan and sharing medical field through a comprehensive training programme in near real time environment\textsuperscript{163}. The main focus of this joint military training was disaster relief operations that caused by massive floods and terrorist attack.

Further, China military approaches to Pakistan being reported that China agreed\textsuperscript{164} to provide an opportunity to exchange latest technological advancement in medical field to improve medical operations during peace and war. Yet, China also has supplied to Pakistan a number of naval platforms and their technology for building frigates and missile vessels\textsuperscript{165}.

\textsuperscript{161} China – Pakistan Military Training, can be accessed through web at https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-and-china-hold-joint-military-exercises-570228

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid

\textsuperscript{163} Peace Angel 2014, can be accessed through web at https://www.dawn.com/news/1101146

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid

\textsuperscript{165} Pakistan Navy Modernization, can be accessed through web at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/navy-modernization.htm
4.1.3. Bangladesh

China and Bangladesh have established their relations in 1975, Bangladesh has maintained the development of China-Bangladesh military relations for 40 years ago and pledged for a deeper cooperation in the future. The military approaches that being conducted by China to Bangladesh to solid their existences in Indian Ocean surrounding countries is to up a solid military relationship. The China approaches to Bangladesh to extend their existence in Indian Ocean is reflected by the statement the Senior Colonel Zhang Wei,

“China is not only a reliable and affordable source of weapons and equipment for Bangladesh’s armed forces, but also provides military training and technology”

Reportedly, since 2010 China has supplied Bangladesh with 5 maritime patrol vessels, 2 corvettes, 44 tanks, and 16 fighter jets, as well as surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. Hence in 2013, Bangladesh officially ordered new Ming-class submarines to China that expectedly to enter Bangladesh in 2016.

Besides on technology approaches, China also developed relationship for training and military exchanges. China’s armed forces sends nearly as many delegations to Bangladesh each year. Since Bangladesh is an important actor in “Belt and Road, Bangladesh role in the Belt and Road is as a part of the overland component – via the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar

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166 China – Bangladesh pledged to deeper relation, can be accessed through web at https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-bangladesh-pledge-deeper-military-cooperation/

167 Ibid

168 China Strategic Partnership, can be accessed through web at http://southasiajournal.net/chinas-strategic-partnership-with-bangladesh-in-21st-century/

169 Ibid

170 Ibid

171 China military news, can be accessed through web at http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-12/03/content_6798961.htm

172 How Bangladesh can be benefitted, can be accessed through web at http://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/economics/how-bangladesh-can-be-benefitted-1407247
corridor – and serve as a port hub for the Maritime Silk Road\textsuperscript{173}. It is reasonable for China to upheld their relation with Bangladesh to secure their interest in Indian Ocean.

### 4.2 Investment on Potential Naval Base

The second military approach that being conducted by China in order to maintain their existences in Indian Ocean is doing some investment on port building. The investment targeting several countries around Indian Ocean based on a variety of factors including economic, political, diplomatic, and strategic concerns, hence the ports mainly concern as a trade but in some circumstances this ports that China invested has a potential to be categorized as Naval base.

\textbf{String of Chinese pearls}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{string_of_pearls.png}
\caption{China’s String of Pearls\textsuperscript{174}}
\end{figure}

As the figure show China grand strategic on enhanced their economic. The red line indicates the shipping routes of China and the closest way to connect with western and Africa region is by sailing through Indian Ocean, and yet the red dote indicates ports and terminal that have China influence over them, China has looked to secure greater access to Indian Ocean port

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid
and currently there is only Djibouti ports and officially supported China to use it as China Naval Bases in Indian Ocean\textsuperscript{175}. Hence, the other port has possibility to do the same, namely there are some major countries that helping China in building their hegemonic power in Indian Ocean which are Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh that some of this port have a potential use to be China Naval Bases in Indian Ocean in the future\textsuperscript{176}.

4.2.1. Sri Lanka

The potential naval base in Indian Ocean was located in Sri Lanka, in which as a fruit of political relations between China and Sri Lanka\textsuperscript{177}. The port is called The Hambantota Port and its located on the southern of Sri Lanka, with 6 nm from the major Indian Ocean east-west shipping route\textsuperscript{178}. In which the Sri Lankan government seek for investment to China, that expressed by the statement of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Harsha de Silva,

\textit{“We have US$1.5 billion sunk in the project and no revenue. We need to make use of it. We want Chinese investors to come and help turn it into a dockyard as well as invest in an industrial park there,”}\textsuperscript{179}

The Hambantota Port is consisting of a harbor, cargo terminals, repair bunker and refueling facilities\textsuperscript{180}. There were 2 phases that being conducted in order to build this port Phase I was completed in 2010\textsuperscript{181}. In 2012, China agreed to provide $600 million to finance the Phase II of the

\textsuperscript{175}Djibouti as a Gateway, can be accessed through web at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/djibouti-is-becoming-gateway-to-africa-for-china-a-1191441.html

\textsuperscript{176}How China rules the waves, can accessed through web at https://ig.ft.com/sites/china-ports/

\textsuperscript{177}China – Sri Lanka majority state in Indian Ocean, can be accessed through web at https://www.voanews.com/a/sri-lanka-china-majority-state-indian-ocean-port/3964042.html

\textsuperscript{178}Ibid


\textsuperscript{180}Ibid

\textsuperscript{181}Ibid
port project. Hambantota port project cost approximately $360 million, and 85% of which is funded by China.

Most of the activities that being held in the Hambantota Port is for civilian use and for trade. But later years, Sri Lanka officially give the port management to china and signed an agreement on the Hambantota Port to lease the port to China for 99 years. In the meaning of that China could use the Hambantota Port for their strategic economic or as a naval base in the future. Hence, the deal gave the Sri Lankan government $1.4 billion. Furthermore, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe stated that “With this agreement, we have started to pay back the loans,” in which indicating the reason behind Sri Lanka’s action.

4.2.2. Pakistan

The investment that conducted by China as the military approach in building port to secure their existences in Indian Ocean. In Pakistan, the Gwadar Port is the name of the port that china heavily invests. China committed to not only fund the port’s construction, but also to assist in building road, rail and pipeline links. In further reading, China envisioned an infrastructure corridor that link Gwadar to Kashi in Xinjiang Province through the Karakoram Pass. It expressed by the Xi Jinping speech on his visit in 2015.

“...We should use China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to drive our practical cooperation with focus on Gwadar Port, energy, infrastructure development and industrial cooperation so that

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183 Ibid

184 Ibid

185 Sri Lanka struggling with Debt, can be accessed through web at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lanka-china-port.html


187 Ibid
the fruits of its development will reach both all the people in Pakistan and the people of other countries in our region."  

Construction of the project for Phase I began in 2002 and completed in 2005. The Chinese have contributed vast sums to finance the Gwadar project. from $240 million required for Phase I of the project, the Chinese have provided $198 million. Construction of Phase II started in 2007. this Phase II will expand the port with the addition of 9 berths; 4 container berths and various terminals to handle bulk cargo, grain and oil.

Reportedly, China provided such significant financial backing to a regional port project with Pakistan for future military use. And China being given ‘sovereign rights’ to unimpeded access to the port, which means would include military use that have lease for 40 years, this issue gained a great deal of traction within Indian and some Western security circles.

4.2.3. Bangladesh

The last but not least of China military approach in Indian Ocean in regards of Investment toward potential Naval Base to maintain their existence and secure their interest in grand strategic of String of Pearls, is the investment toward Bangladesh.

China and Bangladesh have enjoyed a long close relationship, in which China has provided Bangladesh with military hardware, economic assistance and technical support. Hence, Chinas ambition to strengthen their existence in Indian Ocean and with Bangladesh has led to China

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188 Xi Jinping speech, can be accessed through web at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdbjestjxsfsfbydntyfildo/rlyhwhlyy60znjnhd/t1257288.shtml


190 Ibid


192 Ibid

193 China’s Strategic partnership with Bangladesh, cane be accessed through web at http://southasiajournal.net/chinas-strategic-partnership-with-bangladesh-in-21st-century/
willingness in providing the network of port, pipeline and road links that feed resources into the Asian giant\textsuperscript{194}.

The investment project that China put concern in Bangladesh is the Chittagong port, in which China sought access to certain facilities at Chittagong in the early 2000s\textsuperscript{195} since there is a Naval base of Bangladesh in the vicinity of Chittagong. And then its reported\textsuperscript{196} in 2010 that China already securing assistance to develop the $8.7-billion port in Chittagong in which granted the access to use Chittagong port in the future\textsuperscript{197}.

\textit{“We want to be a partner wherever the deep seaport is build, we will also be glad to be the partner of Bangladesh in any big project that benefits Bangladesh”}\textsuperscript{198} said Chinese Ambassador in Bangladesh Ma Ming Qiang

The China investment in this commercial ports in the Indian Ocean and Chinese naval diplomacy with Sri Lanka, Pakistan and bangladesh in the region, will enhance and improve The China’s Navy Armed Force ability to replenish using regional ports and could lay the groundwork for future logistics hubs in the Indian Ocean\textsuperscript{199}.

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid
\textsuperscript{196}Ibid
\textsuperscript{197}China offer to develop Chittagong port, can be accessed through web at \url{https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/china-offers-to-develop-chittagong-port-50656/}
\textsuperscript{198} China keen to be a partner in deep sea port, can be accessed through web at \url{https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/china-keen-be-partner-building-deep-seaport-1293727}
4.3 Open – Seas Patrol

“In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas protection, the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from "offshore waters defense" to the combination of "offshore waters defense" with "open seas protection," and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. The PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense and comprehensive support.”

As it explained by the China’s DWP 2015 that their Navy shift their focus from “offshore waters defense” to the combination of "offshore waters defense" with "open seas protection," China gradually started to patrol the Indian Ocean with their Navy. This Military approach of China in Indian Ocean seems to show and explain towards their allies in Indian Ocean that China is willing to protect their interest in Indian Ocean as well as supporting the security of their allies by strengthening the security in the region, it’s also supported by China’s DWP 2015.

“Threats from such new security domains as outer space and cyber space will be dealt with to maintain the common security of the world community. China’s armed forces will strengthen international security cooperation in areas crucially related to China’s overseas interests, to ensure the security of such interests”

Even though that China officially stated their navy force shifting their focus in the DWP 2015. In fact, there are already many of navy security conducts that being held by China. Since 2008, the China’s Navy armed forces has dispatched 20 task forces to the Gulf of Aden in order to support of antipiracy patrols, that involved destroyers, frigates, replenishment ships and amphibious vessels. China’s Navy also have escorted 6000 Chinese and foreign ships to undertake sustained far seas operations, expeditionary missions and humanitarian tasks that further showcased the Navy’s ability to operate in the Southern Indian Ocean. It’s also represented China’s first operational deployment of naval forces outside of China’s regional waters aside from naval diplomacy.

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201 Ibid

202 Ibid
In 2009, China continue to operate in Southern Indian Ocean to sustained counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden as well as protecting the China’s Commercial Shipping Interest. This Patrol on counter-piracy has deployed The Wuhan and Haikou (the Wuhan LUYANG I-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG), and the Haikou LUYANG II-class DDG) to participate in China’s counter-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden in 2009.

In 2012, The China’s Navy started to deploy their maritime intelligence collection ships to the Indian Ocean. In which the Navy ships have the equipment to collect signal and electronic intelligence to map the floor of the sea and gather up some data. This activity indicated that China building a more routine naval operation in the Indian Ocean.

In 2014, China Navy was deployed to improve operational proficiencies for antisubmarine warfare, air defense, electronic warfare, and expeditionary logistics in of Indian Ocean. Namely the Ships that deployed was the Changbaishan YUZHAO-class amphibious transport dock (LPD) (China’s largest indigenously-built ship class), the Wuhan LUYANG I-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG), and the Haikou LUYANG II-class DDG (The LUYANG I DDG and LUYANG II DDG are two of China’s most capable multirole destroyers). Reportedly they made a stopover in Colombo port (Sri Lanka) for refueling before heading to the Gulf of Aden in support of international efforts to fight piracy. Yet it’s also being reported that in May 2014, a Chinese submarine spotted, can be accessed through web at https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-submarines-in-sri-lanka-unnerve-india-next-stop-pakistan/

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204 Kyle Mizokami, “These 5 Ships Are the Real Future of the Chinese Navy,” Foreign Policy, December 16, 2013. http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/16/these_five_ships_are_the_real_future_of_the_chinese_navy


206 Ibid

207 Chinese submarine spotted, can be accessed through web at https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-submarines-in-sri-lanka-unnerve-india-next-stop-pakistan/
nuclear submarine was deployed in the Indian Ocean on patrol for two months\textsuperscript{208}, in which the official claims have a same mission to complete a two-month escort mission in the Gulf of Aden\textsuperscript{209}.

In 2015, Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND), declared\textsuperscript{210} that China will step up its deployment range of warships in the Indian Ocean, with the intention of to use their naval deployments and infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean for non-traditional security missions\textsuperscript{211} such as counterterrorist, counter - narcotics operations, non-combatant evacuation, international peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief operations, and the last and but not least is for the protection of Chinese citizens and commercial enterprises in the region.

Most of military approach of China towards Indian Ocean that categorized as open-sea patrol are labeled as “to maintain the common security of the world community” by the China’s high rank official\textsuperscript{212}, since its mentioned as the strategy in active defense policy in DWP 2015. By the label of “common security” China already succeed to implement and to strengthen their existences in Indian Ocean\textsuperscript{213}, and with the support of surrounding countries (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh) make it easier for China to secure and ensure their grand strategic of string of pearl\textsuperscript{214}. Yet at the strategic level, it helps China to showcase their blue water capability\textsuperscript{215}.

\textsuperscript{208}Ibid

\textsuperscript{209}Ibid

\textsuperscript{210}China will send more Navy ships to Indian Ocean, can be accessed through web at https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-navy-to-send-more-ships-to-the-indian-ocean/


\textsuperscript{212}China’s Defense White Paper 2015, can be accessed through web at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm

\textsuperscript{213}Ibid

\textsuperscript{214}Chinese navy and its regiona power, can be accessed through web at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700161.2012.670443?src=rechts&journalCode=rsan20

\textsuperscript{215}Ibid
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1 Conclusion

China has experiencing a rapid economic growth and this situation has made China transformed as a country that successfully imports energy in the form of oil in a quite large amount. Yet, this situation does not make China to have sufficient resources to support the development and economic growth. Hence. Indian Ocean in fat has rich mineral, great fisheries and nearly 40% of the offshore petroleum is produced in the Indian Ocean. This ocean also connected the borders of Middle East, Africa, Australia, and Asia. Reportedly, China is attempting to create strategic and economic presence in the region, by targeting specific locations described as choke points, to increase their influence over the region, and as a first in securing their foothold in the Southern Asia. China also has built the economic interests of the Indian Ocean during the last decade. In doing so, China has established its military approaches to foster and secure its strategic needs in Indian Ocean.

There are 3-point concern in China Military Approaches to foster and secure their grand strategic interest of String of Pearls in Indian Ocean, which are Joint Military Training and Supplying Military Equipment, Port Investment and Building, and the last but not least Open-Seas Patrol in Indian Ocean, in order to strengthen China existence and influences to surrounding country of Indian Ocean Namely Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
With Sri Lanka, China supplied ships, weapons, ammunition and rockets for money or for soft loans and conducted 2 joint military training “Cormorant Strike IV – 2013” And “Silk Route 2015”. As well as investing in The Hambantota Port. With Pakistan, China has given assistance in economic, military and its technical, also conducted Joint military training that called “Shaheen I” and “Peace Angel 2014”, as well as investing in the Gwadar Port. The last but not least, with Bangladesh. China has supplied Bangladesh with 5 maritime patrol vessels, two corvettes, 44 tanks, and 16 fighter jets, as well as surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles and sends nearly as many delegations to Bangladesh each year. And give a huge investment in Chittagong port.

Finally, the Implementation of China Military Approaches in Indian Ocean has succeeded strengthen China existences in Indian Ocean, and with the support of surrounding countries (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh) make it easier for China to secure and ensure their grand strategic of string of pearl and support China with sufficient resources and trade routes in the future. Eventhough, this implementation triggered Indian governments as the major actor in Indian Ocean, China still continue to implement these approaches to realize its grand strategic of String or Peals and Maritime Silk Routes initiatives.
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