



**THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SPORT DIPLOMACY AS THE
TOOL TO REDUCE THE TENSION BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND REPUBLIC OF
KOREA: IN THE CASE OF PYEONGCHANG WINTER
OLYMPICS 2018**

BY

**M. NURSYAID SUSILO
016201500198**

A THESIS PRESENTED TO

**FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
PRESIDENT UNIVERSITY**

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
BACHELOR DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MAJOR
CONCENTRATION DIPLOMACY**

THESIS ADVISER RECOMMENDATION LETTER

This thesis entitled "*The Implementation of Sport Diplomacy as the Tool to Reduce the Tension between North and South Korea: In the Case of PyeongChang Winter Olympics 2018*". Prepared and submitted by Muhammad Nursyaid Susilo in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor in the Faculty of Humanities, has been reviewed and found to have satisfied the requirements for a thesis fit to be examined. I therefore recommend this thesis for Oral Defense.

Cikarang, 12 Agustus 2019

Recommend and Acknowledged by,



Dr. Endi Haryono, M.Si

PANEL OF EXAMINERS APPROVAL SHEET

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that this thesis, entitled *“The Implementation of Sport Diplomacy as the Tool to Reduce the Tension between North and South Korea: In the Case of PyeongChang Winter Olympics 2018”* is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an original piece of work that has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, to another university to obtain a degree.

Dr. Fadi Nursyaid Susilo
Head of Panel

Cikarang, 12 Agustus 2019




Muhammad Nursyaid Susilo

Dr. Fadi Nursyaid Susilo
Head of Panel




Dr. Fadi Nursyaid Susilo
Head of Panel

PANEL OF EXAMINERS APPROVAL SHEET



Dr. Endi Haryono, M.Si
Thesis Advisor



Hendra Manurung
Thesis Examiner



Dharma Agastia
Thesis Examiner

ABSTRACT

Muhammad Nursyaid Susilo, International Relations, 2015, President University

Thesis title: The Implementation of Sport Diplomacy as the Tool to Reduce the Tension between North and South Korea: In the Case of PyeongChang Winter Olympics 2018.

This thesis is about the sport diplomacy as a tool to reduce the tension between the North and South Korea. The world knew that North and South Korea had their own tension even after the World War II, in which it is getting worse because of the nuclear missiles had by the North Korea that the world believe that it might be dangerous and could threatening the peace situation of the international system. The sport diplomacy is one of the newest kind of public diplomacy in which could be used to tightened the bilateral as well multilateral relations with thh Korea participating in an event as well bringing the name of the whole Korea. The Winter Olympic itself is believe to restore the bad relations between the North and South Korea these days. This thesis then, is going to analyze whether the sport diplomacy could or could not to restore and maintain their bilateral relations in this diplomatic world. Through the diplomacy as well foreign policy of the South Korea, the state could convince the North Korea to maintain their bilateral relations in this international system

Keywords: Sport diplomacy, *North Korea*, South Korea, Bilateral Relations, PyeongChang Winter Olympics 2018

ABSTRAK

Tesis ini membahas tentang diplomasi olahraga sebagai alat untuk mengurangi ketegangan antara Korea Utara dan Korea Selatan. Dunia tahu bahwa Korea Utara dan Korea Selatan memiliki ketegangan mereka sendiri bahkan setelah Perang Dunia II, di mana keadaannya semakin memburuk karena rudal nuklir yang dimiliki oleh Korea Utara, dunia percaya bahwa itu mungkin berbahaya dan dapat mengancam situasi perdamaian di sistem internasional. Diplomasi olahraga adalah salah satu jenis diplomasi publik terbaru yang dapat digunakan untuk mempererat hubungan bilateral maupun multilateral dengan negara-negara lain. Salah satu contohnya adalah Olimpiade Musim Dingin PyeongChang 2018, yang baru-baru ini menjadi momen di mana Korea Utara dan Selatan berpartisipasi dalam sebuah acara serta membawa nama seluruh Korea. Olimpiade Musim Dingin itu sendiri diyakini akan memulihkan hubungan buruk antara Korea Utara dan Korea Selatan akhir-akhir ini. Tesis ini kemudian, akan menganalisis apakah diplomasi olahraga dapat atau tidak dapat memulihkan dan mempertahankan hubungan bilateral mereka di dunia diplomatik ini. Melalui diplomasi dan juga kebijakan luar negeri Korea Selatan, negara dapat meyakinkan Korea Utara untuk mempertahankan hubungan bilateral mereka dalam sistem internasional ini.

Kata Kunci: Diplomasi Olahraga, *Korea Utara*, Korea Selatan, Hubungan Bilateral, Olimpiade Musim Dingin PyeongChang 2018

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It has been three and a half years of my university life and I would never be survived without Allah Blessing, without the love and support from my family and my friends. Thus, with this as my last university's project, allows me to express my gratitude for the ones who chooses to stay and been keeping up in all my up and downs for the last few years.

First of all, I would like to thank to Allah SWT for if it is not with His endless blessings and guidance through every phases of my life journey. I have been in a few dark and low points in my life and yet He still there to show me nothing but love and guidance. I would like to thank my beloved parents Adi Susilo A. Ptnh and Siti Nurul Hasanah A. Ptnh, S. H for giving me perfect comfort and advices, also being so supportive to all my past decisions.

Further, I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisor, Sir Endi Haryono, for being very cooperative and very understanding also helpful during these past couple of months. Thanks to Natalie for helping me with the data selection and advices, also my senior Kak Tania for helping me understand the concept of the theory, even though she already busy for her own work.

During my university life I have been so caught up not only in academic activities, but also with events and organizations matters. I wanted to thank you to all members and Head of Divisions in President University of Major Association of International Relations, and also my President University Basketball Association club team which give me all the experience, memories, lessons in my learning process that was given to me. Also shout out to my division when I was the head of division, it had been a pleasure working with all of you.

Special thanks to my best Astrid Putri Prasetyo, that always able to keep up with my dramas, jokes, complaints, laugh and tears. You always there for me, I do know that sometimes it is too much but still you are still here by my side. I thank you for that. Thanks to Naufal, Satrio, Rizky Akew, Ruhmaya, Bos Krisna, Mbak Sita, for keeping up with my weirdness, giving me advices and help me to becoming who I am today. And to my friends that I am not able to mentioned, the ones that stays and leaves, I thank you too.

Cikarang, May 2019

Muhammad Nursyaid Susilo

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESIS ADVISER RECOMMENDATION LETTER	ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY	ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
PANEL OF EXAMINERS APPROVAL SHEET	III
ABSTRACT.....	IV
ABSTRAK.....	V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS	VII
CHAPTER I	1
I.1. BACKGROUND.....	1
I.2. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION	3
I.3. RESEARCH QUESTION.....	7
I.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES.....	7
I.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	7
I.6. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY	8
I.7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	8
I.7.1. <i>Sport Diplomacy</i>	10
I.7.2. <i>Soft Power</i>	12
CHAPTER II.....	14
II.1. MICHAL MARCIN KOBIERECKI, THE INTER KOREAN SPORTS DIPLOMACY AS A TOOL OF POLITICAL RAPPROCHMENT. 2018. (JOURNAL)	14
II.2. PYEONGCHANG 2018 AND INTER KOREA RELATIONS. AN ANALYSIS OF INTER KOREAN RELATIONS AND SPORTS DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO, DURING AND FOLLOWING THE 2018 PYEONGCHANG WINTER OLYMPICS IN SOUTH KOREA. (JOURNAL).....	16
II.3. MELLISSEN, JAN. THE NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE. 2005. (BOOK).....	18
II.4. UDO MERKEL. THE SPORT, POLITICS AND REUNIFICATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF KOREA AND GERMANY. (JOURNAL).....	19
II.5. DR. ALAN LEVKOWIZ THE 2018 WINTER OLYMPICS AND NORTH KOREA. 2018. (JOURNAL)	20
II.6. GIAN GENTILE, YVONNE K. CRANE, DAN MADDEN, TIMOTHY M. BOUNDS, BRUCE W. BENNET, MICHAEL J. MAZZARR AND ANDREW SCOBELL. “FOUR PROBLEMS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: NORTH KOREA’S EXPANDING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES DRIVE A COMPLEX SET OF PROBLEMS”. (BOOK).....	21
CHAPTER III.....	23
III.1. THE KOREAN WAR AND THE AFTERMATH	23
III.2. THE REDUCE TENSION UNDER MOON JAE IN	31
CHAPTER IV	38
IV.1. SOUTH KOREA FOREIGN POLICY	38

IV.1.1. THE SOUTH KOREA GOVERNMENT EFFORTS FOR NORTH KOREA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE PYEONGCHANG WINTER OLYMPIC GAMES	40
IV.1.2. THE INTER KOREA RELATIONS.....	41
IV.1.3. THE SUNSHINE POLICY	43
IV.1.4THE SPORT DIPLOMACY OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE TENSION ON NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA	44
IV.1.5. THE SPORT DIPLOMACY OF INTER KOREA: THE PARTICIPATION OF NORTH AND SIUTH KOREA.....	46
IV.2. THE PYEONGCHANG WINTER OLYMPIC 2018.....	47
CHAPTER V	49
BIBLIOGRAPHY	53

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.1. BACKGROUND

The tension between Democratic People's Republic of Korea (mentioned: DPRK) and Republic of Korea (mentioned: ROK) is not new to international society. Further, the existence of their tension intensified with the ballistic missile tests that being done by DPRK multiple times started from 2006.¹ The tension also intensified not only between two countries, but to the extent of their ally, which United States on ROK side, and Russia with the DPRK side. Despite many condemnations from international society, the nuclear testing that being done by DPRK still continue to be happened targeting the area near the border of ROK which indefinitely endangering the position of ROK itself. Within this hostility that being shown by one party, it is less likely that reduce the tension is about to happen.²

Having said that, the effort of the reducing the tension did not stop being enforced, with the international support to immediately unified the Korean peninsula, since it would create DPRK refrain their nuclear program. That is the only hope that international arena has, due to many sanctions and condemnations have already declared to DPRK, from the condemnations, to the economic sanctions could not make any difference to the action of DPRK, even worsening the situation, as they keep testing their ballistic missile. Within this only hope, the only question

¹ Cheng, Dean. 2018. "Chinese Calculations of Security and the Korean Peninsula." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*.

² Ibid.

remain is whether or not this reduce the tension possible to be happening, and what kind of the factors that could succeeding the process of this reduce the tension within Korean Peninsula.³

One of the possible ways to achieve the goals of reduce the tension would not be the military intervention, as one would expect. The sanction, in the certain ways, as it is not binding the countries with enough force, also could not create such responsibility to the country to obey or accept the sanction.⁴ The one and most suitable way is through diplomacy, although the author realized that doing diplomacy with DPRK would not be easy, noting from the openness of the country that less from the countries in general, having military intervention, in that sense, would even worsen the situation, and therefore the diplomatic way is indeed more favorable to handle.⁵

The sanction that might be given towards the DPRK by the world powers could be pursued by the economic and financial sanctions. Which could also be deployed to also punish the states that implement cyberattacks, money laundering, and human rights violations.

Realizing the spectrum of diplomacy context that rather vast, one of the ways that could be done to approach DPRK including but not to limited to the sports activity, whereas from time to time, sports activity was being used to unify countries or at least reduce the tension among the country. The sport activity, nevertheless becomes one of the highlights in the diplomacy tools to overcome the problem in any countries, where military intervention or economic sanction could not be able to handle. Further, as it is becoming one of the favorable diplomacy tools to overcome the problem, the sport activity concerning international stage is indeed used not only

³ Grossman, Derek. 2018. China's Reluctance on Sanctions Enforcement in North Korea. January 4. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/01/chinas-reluctance-on-sanctions-enforcement-in-north.html>

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Bellamy, Alex J. 2009. Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities. Cambridge: Polity Press.

as the expression or the platform to fill the passion or winning the competition, but rather to achieve national interest as well.⁶

“The Sport Olympics for instance, is the platform for countries to be participated in such event, bringing their athletes to compete, also to achieve their national interest be it in the form of forming the bilateral cooperation or to reduce the tension among countries.”⁷

The existence of the sport Olympics in the midst of the tension between DPRK and ROK is going to be the main idea upon this thesis, because this thesis is to analyze on how the sport diplomacy could reduce the tension between both countries and enhance the opportunity of cooperation. Although the action of using the Sport Olympics to reduce the tension between the Korean Peninsula has been done before, the thesis is going to explain the idea of Sports Olympic on reducing the tension in the midst of the new administration of ROK, Moon Jae-in and his leadership affect the relationship between two countries in Korean Peninsula.⁸

I.2. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

The reason why DPRK, conducted the nuclear testing could be seen as an act of defend towards their country, which is part of the rights as the country. Having said that, the necessity of the action to be counted as the act of defend themselves, cannot be accepted by international society. This situation further, worsened by the condition where the West World support fully lies to ROK, intensifying the tension between Southern and Northern part of Korean Peninsula. Further, the new leadership under Trump also intensify their tension as the commentaries from

⁶ Steinbach, Alison. 2016. Competition, Cooperation, and Cultural Entertainment: The Olympics in International Relations. April 26. <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=13196>.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

Trump and the status that United States is ROK's ally cannot be denied and clearly worsened the situation.⁹

The point that being made by observing the reason or intention of DPRK for the nuclear ballistic program is the idea whether the reduce the tension is still possible or not within Korean Peninsula. First, if the DPRK reason behind their excessive ballistic test is to trigger the ROK, then it is the hostility that intentional, and further, the reduce the tension would not be possible to be happening, or at least it would be much harder than it is expected. Second, noting the idea of the DPRK doing ballistic missile is to have their self-defense within the country, the reduce the tension is still possible despite their differences in ideology and statecraft. Further, noting from the nuclear development program, it is not intentionally hindered the process of reduce the tension.¹⁰

Moving to the condition where both new leaders have taken the administration, Moon Jae-in and Trump shortly after both govern the countries, held a summit on November 7, 2017 where Trump met Moon Jae-in in ROK, precisely talking about trade and also talking about the terror that happened in the DPRK and the statement that being made by Trump whereas America is going fight back, which in this case, worsened the tension of the Northern and Southern part of Korean Peninsula. In this sense, the 2017 summit between United States and ROK indeed worsened the situation despite the fact that United States gives hope of having the peaceful unification between two countries.¹¹

⁹ Steinbach, Alison. 2016. Competition, Cooperation, and Cultural Entertainment: The Olympics in International Relations. April 26. <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=13196>.

¹⁰ White House. 2017. Remarks by President Trump to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea | Seoul, Republic of Korea. November 7. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-national-assembly-republic-korea-seoul-republic-korea/>.

¹¹ Ibid.

Further, the Korean Peninsula, indeed hard to be unified, but the new ROK leader and President, Moon Jae-in, took power recently, and enforce the diplomatic action to approach DPRK Supreme Leader, Kim Jong Un, to discuss the potential of any action reducing the tension on April 2018.¹² Further, not only Kim Jong Un agreed to meet the ROK President, he also agreed to meet the United States President, Donald Trump, to discuss the denuclearization.¹³ This significant change further, brings another hope to the reducing the tension that might be happening.

Although the hope is blooming due to the meeting between the leaders of both parties, the challenge within their difference would always be there. For instance, the political differences between their governmental structure and how this could be a problem within the process of reduce the tension, economic condition and economic gap within two countries, their social condition differences, security alliance and geopolitical condition of both countries.¹⁴ Further, the challenge would not stop only within their internal differences but the influence of the West world, especially United States in ROK.¹⁵

Having said that, the meeting among Korean leaders still happened, and further, create the chance of the reduce the tension to be really happening in the very first place. In this case, the signs of the tension being reduced had previously depicted in this year's Winter Olympics on February 2018. Both countries have agreed to march under the unified flag for this Olympics

¹² Campbell, Charlie. 2018. Don't Hold Your Breath: What Would Korean Reunification Look Like? Five Glaring Problems to Overcome. April 26. <http://time.com/5255381/north-south-korea-kim-jong-un-reunification/>.

¹³ Campbell, Charlie. 2018. Don't Hold Your Breath: What Would Korean Reunification Look Like? Five Glaring Problems to Overcome. April 26. <http://time.com/5255381/north-south-korea-kim-jong-un-reunification/>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

with the hope that the games will help to ease tensions between DPRK with its Supreme Leader and ROK with its President.¹⁶

The 2018 Winter Olympics that happened in Seoul had increased the urgency of tension amongst two countries. The 2018 Winter Olympics is a good start to warm up the relationship in the Korean Peninsula. Further, realizing that within this event the DPRK is actually late to register, there is a specific story behind that incident. The DPRK is refusing to be participating in the Winter Olympics, but ROK in this sense, sees the opportunity of having DPRK participated and in hope could warm their relationship, persuade the DPRK to participate even if the registration date is due. The effort does not stop only from persuading DPRK to join the Winter Olympics, but also to persuade United States to reduce its tension and its anti-Kim Jong Un paradigm within the West to make DPRK becoming more approachable, which in the end resulting DPRK agreed to join the Winter Olympics even under the same flag as their Southern part of peninsula.¹⁷

This move, further, perceived positively by the international stage, with the blooming hope that this could mean something more than just sporting events. From this state, the sporting event which is 2018 Winter Olympics could be more than just a sporting event, as it is expected. The Winter Olympics, further, expected to be used as one of the milestones to get the relationship within Korean Peninsula better than it ever was. Within the blooming hopes for the reduce the tension, and the clear progress after the Winter Olympics, hereby, questioning the

¹⁶ Telegraph Staff. 2018. North and South Korea to march under same flag at Winter Olympics in diplomatic breakthrough. January 17. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/17/north-south-korea-agree-united-womens-hockey-team-single-flag/>.

¹⁷ Levkowitz, Alon. 2018. 2018 Winter Olympics: Divided We Stand. BESA Center Perspectives Paper.

effect of having the unified single flag of Korea at 2018 Winter Olympics, to the process of reduce the tension of Korean Peninsula.

I.3. RESEARCH QUESTION

How did Sport Diplomacy Work as the Tool of Diplomacy to Reduce the Tension between The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and The Republic of Korea: In the Case of PyeongChang Winter Olympics 2018?

I.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

- To examine the influence of sport diplomacy in reducing Korean Peninsula conflict.
- To further analyze the role of sport diplomacy upon the relations between the DPRK (The Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and ROK (The Republic of Korea).

I.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Under this section, the author would explain the method of doing this research, whether the author would use the quantitative method of research or qualitative research that is best fitting to the topic and the agenda. Further, in this case, the author use the qualitative method to enhance the research of the thesis, by collecting the necessary data in the form of the interview, journals, books and reports that could be used to enhance the research and further analyze the continuity of the previous research itself.

Further, in order to answer the questions, the author would find it useful to use the qualitative to enhance the data research by collectively finding the related research about the reduce the tension of Korean Peninsula, both of the government's officials report regarding the reduce the tension process, the international organizations' officials wording regarding the reduce the tension of the Korean Peninsula, the international action regarding this issue, and

other reliable reports that could be found to enhance this research, along with the journal studies about the Korean Peninsula and the Winter Olympics and how sport has brought the improvement to both countries' relationship.

In order to enhance the research of this thesis, the author will be using several instruments in the context within the topic, to further enhance and enrich the research that related to the topic within this thesis. There are several instruments, which are, transcript of the interview, government official reports as the primary data that is going to be used to conduct this research, furthermore, there are other data from the secondary data that would be consisted by the Journals, Books, other Reports, and online articles and news, with the full consideration of the media reliability.

I.6. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Within this research, the author believes the necessity to set the perimeter to make this research specific and within the context that the author had chosen. In this case, the author would limit the case to the sport diplomacy as main subject within this thesis. Further, the author would analyze the key actors that would be limited to the government of DPRK and ROK. In this research, the author would also highlight the single unified flag that being used at the Sports Olympics and how both the action and the unified flag, could further influenced the reduce the tension process. Since the incumbent of ROK is rather new, also with the Sports Olympics event that just happened, the author would be focusing this research to the timeframe started from 2017 to 2018 that being highlighted to be analyzed further.

I.7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Within this section, the author would explain about the framework that being used in this research to further clarify and make the research clear and obvious. The research framework is going to be consisting of the existing variable that is happening within this topic. Further, the author is going to divide into the existing variable into dependent and independent variable, which furthermore is going to be explained in the subsequent chapters. In this case, within the topic of Korean Peninsula nuclear conflict as well as the sport as peaceful efforts of both sides, the author believes, that there are two variables that exist within that case, which are the Sports Olympics, and the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Conflict. As attached below, the independent variable within this context is the Nuclear Conflict of the Korean Peninsula, and the dependent variable is the Sport Olympics and Summits that happened between both countries.

In this case the South Korea is the more peace country between both South and North Korea, is being threatened by the existence of the North Korea, in which they have executed the nuclear missiles testing in the area named Punggye-in which located near the southern part of Korea. It was known as an abandoned site, but after the appearance of around two-dozen personnel were visible on site in the southern support area providing additional evidence that the site has not been fully abandoned.

The nuclear testing of North Korea could really threatened the peace situation of the Korean Peninsula. It also could threatens the security and sovereignty of the South Korea. Because people are still questioning the power (how massive) is the nuclear as a weapon. If, there is a human error or the fact that the nuclear testing is not what it should have been done. It could really give a bad impact towards the states around the region.

In order to maintain the threats not getting bigger, the South Korea itself needs the use a proper policy whether it is a defense policy(to maintain the threats militarily) or believe in the

power of foreign policy (mostly diplomacy and building a diplomatic relations to reduce the tension). This part is going to be about the paradigm that could properly used as in the case of South Korea and North Korea.

The South Korea believe on the use of soft power as their approach towards the North Korea. In this case the approach could be stated as in the use of public diplomacy.

In this context, the three variables that shown above is the fundamental variable in which the author believes that it is supposed to be cleared in the very first place, before further analyzing the topic itself.

Further, the dependent variable in this context is the Sports Olympics, specifically in 2018 where both DPRK and ROK marched under the same unified flag, representing Korean Peninsula in both PyeongChang. Further, in this case, the author believe the Sports Olympics is the dependent variable in the way that the single flag marching is concerned, because without the idea of the reduce the tension, or without the separation of the Korean Peninsula the idea of having the same unified flag would not be there in the very first place.

I.7.1. Sport Diplomacy

In this case, the author would explain the meaning of the sport diplomacy concept in the general and how this concept fit to the topic of this research. The sport diplomacy is as obvious as its name. Although often being perceived, as the denomination of public diplomacy or cultural diplomacy the sport diplomacy is not entirely part of other diplomacy, which meant, they have their own way, despite being perceived as a part of the other major diplomacy. Further, under political point of view, the sport diplomacy is the tool that can be used and preferably used by

interested parties to solve international problems of a political nature by using sport as the media.¹⁸

Further, the idea of utilizing sport as the media to get things done politically is now becoming more preferable than traditional diplomacy.¹⁹ Further, states or geopolitical blocks to display their alleged superiority or any other desired characteristic also can use the idea of sport, and further the government can use the sport to show the power of the state and its political and economic system.²⁰ It is true, that the sport diplomacy alone would not be able to solve the international problem, nor the international dispute, having said that, in terms of practical way, sport diplomacy approaches the problem faster than political conduct would do.

In this case, the author would use the sport diplomacy as the form that both ROK and DPRK used the process for reduce the tension within the event of the 2018 Winter Olympics in Seoul. Further, within this concept, the author believes that the approach that being done within the single flag march is indeed one of the actions under the umbrella of the sport diplomacy that could enhance or influence the process of reducing the tension in Korean Peninsula. It is not the first time that both Northern and Southern part of Korea agreed to march under the single flag.²¹ As it may seem, both countries have marched under the same flag within the Olympic Games in Sydney 2000 and in the Athens 2004.²² Within this continuous action, the sport diplomacy acted within this context as the catalyst to further solve international problems.

¹⁸ Murray, Stuart. 2012. *Sports-Diplomacy: a hybrid of two halves*. Bond University.

Nye, Joseph. 2008. "Public DIplomacy and Soft Power." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Science* 96.

¹⁹ Kobierecki, Michal Marcin. 2013. "Sport in International Relations Expectations, Possibilities and Effects." *Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal* 49-74.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

The sport diplomacy as the concept that being highlighted by both parties in Korean Peninsula and how both of the countries have agreed several times to march under the single unified flag, and how it would further, influence their relationship afterwards. Further, as there are some cases before the Sports Olympic 2018, the sport diplomacy is going to be used as the analysis towards the difference of actions that have been brought to the relationship between two countries in the Korean Peninsula, and how the action at Winter Olympics should be paid more attention to bring changes.

I.7.2. Soft Power

Within this context, soft power was pointed out by Joseph Nye that argued in order to get the interest, the ability of influencing others is what may consider as power itself.²³ Soft power, further, within the argumentation of Joseph Nye, included as the power itself. As the power used to be connotated with the coercion, the soft power, on the other hand, is the ability of achieving the interest from attraction which contradicts the context of coercion itself.²⁴

According to Joseph Nye, *“the value of soft power would be cultural, political values, foreign and foreign policies and in terms of resources, soft power resources are assets that produce the attraction itself.”*²⁵ Further, the existence of the soft power would be more powerful in order to achieve the interest rather than coercion, since getting other admire the ideas or vision would make them more acquiescent rather than using coercion to make them obey the expectation of ours.

²³ Nye, Joseph. 2008. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Science* 96.

²⁴ Nye, Joseph. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means of Success in World Politics*. Barnes & Noble.

²⁵ Ibid.

Through the explanation above, the writer believes that the use of soft power relevant to the issue that being examined within this thesis, since the sport diplomacy is highlighting to use sport as a tool to get the interest by having the similar approach to the extension of the soft power which is public diplomacy. Further, the use of soft power in getting the interest in which to reduce the tension between ROK and DPRK further, shows more progress rather than using the coercion. Which happen to be the Winter Olympic 2018 participation as one flag, one nation, one team that is showing progress of reduced tension.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

II.1. MICHAL MARCIN KOBIERECKI, THE INTER KOREAN SPORTS DIPLOMACY AS A TOOL OF POLITICAL RAPPROCHMENT. 2018. (JOURNAL)

The main purpose of this article is to analyze the significant sport diplomacy that is happening between the North and South Korea. It is the development of their relations, because both of the countries are known for their bad relations. The situation might be changing due to the Inter Korean sport diplomacy that is one of the situations where the North and South Korea has build the cooperation in the field of sport. The sport diplomacy or else could be said as the sports cooperation between the North and South Korea, is actually a reflection of their political relations. It is like the one stated by the Jung Woo Lee, who claims that sport could function as the barometer to measure the political relations between the two Koreas.²⁶

North and South Korea used the sport diplomacy as one of their way to pursue a diplomatic dialogue. This relation encompasses the sport exchanges on the various level, from the elite sport events as well the lately they use the sport events as one of the circumstances in order to arrange the political talks between two countries. The purpose of this Inter Korean sport diplomacy is to bring the two state closer, maybe it is not one of the only ways for the North and South Korea to have a positive bilateral relation. But at least, due to this sport diplomacy both countries could initiate negotiations, which is going to be difficult if it was not about sport. The

²⁶ Michal Marcin Kobierecki, *The Inter Korean Sports Diplomacy as a Tool of Political Rapprochement*, 2018, p.2

Inter-Korean sport diplomacy should be regarded as one of the subsidiary tools of shaping the mutual relations, with the limited but identifiable effectiveness.

North and South Korea utilized sport in order to pursue diplomatic dialogue in a number of ways. Review of particular cases allows to state, that in comparison to other cases of sports diplomacy aimed at political rapprochement between states, the inter-Korean case was and still is conducted in various different ways. It encompasses sports exchanges on various levels, from elite sport to sport of children and youth, negotiations concerning the joint participation in sports events, and lately even using sports events as a circumstance for arranging political talks. This diversity of methods within inter Korean positive sports diplomacy is one of its main distinctive features.

A characteristic fluctuation of the intensity of sports exchanges and cooperation between North and South Korea has been observed, what on the other hand pertains to the secondary character of sports relations in respect to political relations. As has been pointed, inter-Korean sports diplomacy directed at bringing the two states closer flourished in the times of political détente, while being suppressed when political relations deteriorated. It does not mean though, that the use of sport by two Koreas in order to shape positive bilateral relations was completely useless. There were occasions, when due to sport Koreans from North and South were able to initiate negotiations, what could often be difficult if it was not about sport. Inter-Korean sports diplomacy should therefore be regarded as a subsidiary tool of shaping mutual relations, with limited but identifiable effectiveness.

It is often stated, that Koreans from North and South share common ethnicity and culture. Nevertheless, hostility and reluctance to dialogue remain as dominating attitudes. It appears though, that the enmity of the elites is not representative for the societies, what could be seen in

the behaviour of sports fans from both Koreas during sports events, who often cooperated. In this context inter-Korean sports diplomacy could be compared to famous USA-China ping-pong diplomacy, which inter alia showed that both Chinese and American societies were ready for a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Inter-Korean sports diplomacy appears to give policymakers the same lesson.

II.2. PYEONGCHANG 2018 AND INTER KOREA RELATIONS. AN ANALYSIS OF INTER KOREAN RELATIONS AND SPORTS DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO, DURING AND FOLLOWING THE 2018 PYEONGCHANG WINTER OLYMPICS IN SOUTH KOREA. (JOURNAL)

This main purpose of this journal is to tell the people that the joint march between the North and South Korea has increased their communication in term of their bilateral relations. This is because of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in 2018, where the both countries decided to have a participation in the sporting competition. This Pyeongchang Winter Olympics 2018 has become the proof that the sport diplomacy could be useful in regards on the positive discourse that emanates from the event. Because of the sport diplomacy, the North and South Korea are not only going to participate in the Pyeongchang Olympic only, but they are attempting to introduce the long term sporting that they are going to be together in the 2018 Asian Games, the 2018 World Team Table Tennis Championship as well a series of basketball matches and both of the countries are intended to join the 2032 Summer Olympics together.

Thus, the sport diplomacy is a very useful tool in term of influencing the neutral international sporting organizations, with the positive discourse from the media, public diplomacy at the sporting mega events as well the interaction between leaders of both countries. Through sport diplomacy also, the nations could increase the possibilities on demilitarization as

well the denuclearization on the region. Through the sport diplomacy, the world finally find another tool to achieve the peace between state nations.

Sporting mega-events presented the perfect opportunity to display a more peaceful inter-Korean relationship to the public. The opening ceremonies, which can win the ‘hearts and minds’ of an audience, determined whether inter-Korean relations were harmonious or fractious. In London 2012, for example, the two Koreas did not march together reflecting the Yeonpyeong Island attacks whereas in Pyeongchang 2018, they jointly paraded the flag as North and South Korea agreed to work together. Thus, the public would infer the change attitudes in inter-Koreans relations from hostility to harmony.

A potential challenge to the success of sporting mega-events highlighted in the literature review pertained to the information the media distributes regarding a sporting mega-event. In terms of Pyeongchang 2018, the media conveyed the message of peace, which was envisaged by the IOC and South Korea. London 2012 also exemplified the role the media has played in easing tensions between the two Koreas. Evidently, the visibility of sporting mega-events can create the space whereby the media is an outlet in which relations can be publicised. Thus, individuals can display ethnic solidarity in media interviews, which will then be broadcast globally. The media as a tool of sports diplomacy must not be underestimated in its potential of creating a narrative between two states. Moreover, the inter-Korean summits were broadcasted in the global and domestic media and emphasised Kim Jong-un and President Moon communicating effectively together. The summits appeared to be symbolic more than political in some respects as the leaders were photographed hand-in-hand and President Moon was pictured waving at the

Pyongyang crowd. Thus, these incidents help to maintain the relationship between the audience and the event, keeping the summits in the public eye.

II.3. MELLISSEN, JAN. THE NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE. 2005.²⁷ (BOOK)

In order to strengthen the relations between state nations in this international stage, the use of Soft Power as the base of diplomacy is significantly important. Because of what happened on the Second World War, the world is starting to concern on the importance of maintaining a good relation and of course cooperation between them in the international politics. Public diplomacy is one of soft power's key instruments, and this was recognized in diplomatic practice long before the contemporary debate on public diplomacy. Despite of that, the public diplomacy itself could be seen as the way to support the most vital interests of nations. The interests could be seen from the state's social stability, security and economic prosperity.

Despite of using the hard power, soft power is more useful in order to build the relations between state nations. In term of soft power's public diplomacy, which could also be seen as the cultural diplomacy or sport diplomacy (as in FIFA World Cup 2010) has a concept of the nation branding. This event of FIFA World Cup 2010 is going to help the South Africa to increase their nation branding and as soft power could help them increase their influence as well cooperation with the states in the international stage. The practice of branding a nation involves a much greater and coordinated effort than public diplomacy. For one, public diplomacy is initiated by practitioners, whereas branding is about the mobilization of all of a nation's forces that can contribute to the promotion of its image abroad.

²⁷ Jan Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, 2005

The conceptual differences between nation-branding and public diplomacy immediately meet the eye. First, branding's level of ambition easily outflanks that of the limited aims and modesty of most public diplomacy campaigns. Put simply, for public diplomats the world is no market and practitioners are constantly reminded of the fact that diplomatic communication is only a flimsy part of the dense and multi-layered transnational communication processes. In other words, the strength of public diplomacy lies in the recognition and acceptance of its limitations. Many public diplomacy campaigns are based on the common-sense assumption that they are by no means the decisive factor in determining foreign perceptions. In contrast, the main feature of branding projects is their holistic approach. The language of nation-branders resembles the 'can-do' approach from the practice of marketing and the clarity of strategic vision from the corporate world. It is hard to deny that the idiom of branding is 'cool' and promising, and branding has particularly attracted countries with a weak international image or a reputation that leaves much to be desired.

II.4. UDO MERKEL. THE SPORT, POLITICS AND REUNIFICATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF KOREA AND GERMANY. (JOURNAL)

The purpose of this journal is to analyze about the two uses of sport, in which sport could be the tool to maintain cooperation, celebrate the commonalities, increase understanding between countries as well to bridge the differences between them, like what happened between the North and South Korea. The cooperation between both states in the sport could be seen as the sport diplomatic tool. But in the Germany, both East and the West of the country used sport to establish a distinctive national identities and to fight the ideological battles, as if it stressed the differences as well the consolidated the existing of the political division.

Both the North and South Korea are not used to the cooperation in term of sport. Because during the period of Cold War, the South Korea went through a significant social, political and cultural changes. The world of sport did not remain unaffected and went through a rapid transformation process that was initiated but the Park Jung Hee military regime in the early of 1960s. The Park's government is responsible for the foundation of the many existing sporting organizations and developed some policies that could be used to enhance the state's international reputation as well the prestige.

During this period also the sport is also being an ideological battleground for the North and South Korea which both states were claiming to be the true representative of the Korean people. They both are either refused to participated in the protest of the other's presence or they competed against each other in that time. At that time also the world is portraying that the North Korea is the devious as well the dangerous enemy who could not be trusted and being the true threat of the national security of the South Korea.

But it was over, to the fact that nowadays there is this one policy known as the Sunshine Policy where the previous South Korea government created that to build peace, reconciliation as well the prosperity on the whole Korea peninsula. This is also correlated with the South Korea White Paper in 2005, where they are trying to make peace and prosperity, as in the extensive chapter 2 where it was entitled the progress in inter Korea dialogue as well in the chapter 3 where it summarizes in the expansion of inter Korea exchanges and cooperation.

II.5. Dr. ALAN LEVKOWIZ THE 2018 WINTER OLYMPICS AND NORTH KOREA. 2018. (JOURNAL)

Based on this journal, the North Korea's participation in the Olympic is going to be a peaceful offensive where the strategy that is itself part of the dual strategic policy; on the one hand to strengthen the North Korea deterrence against the Washington and the other to promote the pacific side of the North Korea in order to gain credit in the Seoul and Washington without giving up the nuclear arsenal.

For South Korea, as for any state that wins the right to host the Olympics, the event serves as a venue in which the hosting country can present to the world its economic, technological, sports, and tourist attractions, as well as its cultural achievements. The global media coverage of the Games gives the state an opportunity to project a positive "brand." Seoul hopes the PyeongChang Games will allow it to present South Korea in its best light – without focusing on the nuclear or missile crisis with North Korea.

One of Seoul's biggest concerns is that Pyongyang will not abide by the Olympic spirit of peace among nations and might conduct long-range missile (ICBM) or nuclear tests either before or during the Games. If it does so, Pyongyang will seize global attention and embarrass both Washington and Seoul. For the time being, Pyongyang plans to attend the Games because it believes it is in North Korea's interest to be there, but in the case of Kim Jong Un, anything can change at any moment.

II.6. GIAN GENTILE, YVONNE K. CRANE, DAN MADDEN, TIMOTHY M. BOUNDS, BRUCE W. BENNET, MICHAEL J. MAZZARR AND ANDREW SCOBELL. "FOUR PROBLEMS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: NORTH KOREA'S EXPANDING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES DRIVE A COMPLEX SET OF PROBLEMS". (BOOK)

The North Korea has increased their provocations and threats on the South Korea, they had created an unstable environment on the Korean Peninsula. The North Korea's ongoing

development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has increases the possibility of their use against the regional states, furthering the instability across the region and beyond, which based on the US perspective it might be affecting their vital interests. The US and its allies as well other threat powers, which include the China and Russia, they must attend to the four interconnected threats on the Korean Peninsula.

The failure to prepare the actions for these problem could increase the chance to create even bigger mistakes for the future conflicts. The world situation is always going to change as the time passed by, the nature of the military challenges might also change. One of the recent North Korea threat is the nuclear owned by the state that might challenge the security of the international system. Thus, it is the best way to make a change on the relations between the North as well South Korea to prevent on the war that might happening in the future, in which it could increase the possibilities on the usage of the nuclear missiles.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORY OF KOREAN PENINSULA

III.1. THE KOREAN WAR AND THE AFTERMATH

After the Second World War has finished in the 15th of August 1945, the Korea was also liberated from the Japanese after 35 (thirty-five) years being occupied. The year of 1948 was the time that Korea is being separated by the North and the South Korea. While in 1991, the United Nations finally recognized both Korean states are sovereign states. Thus, most of the countries in the international system would have a basically, normal relations with both of the North and South Korea.²⁸ The North Korea had their own de facto government that was completely alienated from the political activity in the south. The Northern leaders did not formalize their regime as a separate government until after the United Nations took the lead in creating the South Korea. 1947, the North Korea People's Assembly drafted its own constitution, which was adopted a year later.

The August of 1948, nations wide election was held to establish the Korean Supreme People's Assembly, and this Assembly ratified the constitution and elected was held to establish the Korean Supreme People's Assembly, and this Assembly ratified the constitution and elected the Kim Il Sung as the premier. Kim then proclaimed the inauguration of the North Korea in 9 September 1948. The Soviet Union was quick to recognize the North Korea as the only lawful

²⁸ Dr. Mark B.M. Suh. "A Tale of Two Koreas: Breaking the Vicious Circle". October 14th, 2013. http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo14/doc/suh_A-Tale-of-Two-Koreas.pdf

government in Korea and completed the withdrawal of the occupation troops by the end of the year.²⁹

Both of the states are not having a good relationship with each other. There is a war called the Korean War, which also known as the forgotten war, that is still ongoing as both the Korean states have not signed a truce agreement (2013). There are attempts to solve the problem between both of the Korean states. But, it was through the military means which resulted the death of four million people deaths, as the nuclear crisis of the North Korea as well the frequent military tensions on the Korean Peninsula could be seen as the abnormal political situation in the international stage.³⁰

The Korean War was happening based on both Korean states as they claimed to be the only legitimate government for the whole Korea as well they somehow denied the existence of each other in the international system. They also have their own supporter, which the United States is helping the establishment of the democratic state called the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Russia helped the establishment of the communist state of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).³¹

*“The situation in East Asia was also changing drastically as the civil war in China, which started in 1946, ended in victory for the Communist Party, which gave a great boost to North Korea which had been supporting the Chinese Communists. With the approval of Stalin and Mao Zedong, the young North Korean leader Kim Il-sung started the Korean War to solve the problem of division by military means.”*³²

²⁹ Young Ick Lew, Brief History of Korea: A Bird's Eye View.
https://www.koreasociety.org/images/pdf/KoreanStudies/Monographs_GeneralReading/BRIEF%20HISTORY%20OF%20KOREA.pdf

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Dr. Mark B.M. Suh. “A Tale of Two Koreas: Breaking the Vicious Circle”. October 14th, 2013.
http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo14/doc/suh_A-Tale-of-Two-Koreas.pdf

³² Although North Korea claims that the United States and South Korea invaded the North on June 25, 1950, there is clear evidence on Kim Il Sung's preparation for the war. See the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004 including the “Introduction” by Kathryn Weathersby.

In this civil war, the United States intervened the war between both of the Korean States, as the UN forces are also becoming involved in the first ever UN military action.³³ This could be happening due to the fact that the Russia was absent in the Security Council to protest the Republic of China (Taiwan) rather than the People's Republic of China on the representation of the China region.³⁴ Due to this matter, the US could freely intervene the military aspects in the Korea and quickly pushed back the North Korean military beyond the 38th Parallel within a few months, as mandated by the UN resolution.³⁵

Several years after the war between North and South Korea. Both leaders of the countries, Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee sent their trusted right hand to have a secret meeting in the 1972, which at that time both countries produced a historical document that called the July 4th North and South Joint Statement. This joint statement include the following principles of,

- “1. Reunification shall be achieved through the independent efforts being subject to external imposition or interference.*
- 2. Reunification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through use of force against one another.*
- 3. A great national unity, as a homogeneous people, shall be sought first, transcending difference in ideas, ideologies and systems.”³⁶*

The experts believe that both states had implemented the agreement between them, the Inter Korean relations is going to be very different state than they are today. But instead of doing

³³ During the three years of the Korean War, military forces of these nations were allied as members of the UNC. Peak strength for the UNC was 932,964 on July 27, 1953, the day the Armistice Agreement was signed: Republic of Korea (South Korea) – 590,911; United States – 302,483; United Kingdom – 14,198; Philippines – 7,468; Thailand – 6,326; Canada – 6,146; Turkey – 5,453; Australia – 2,282; New Zealand – 1,385; Ethiopia – 1,271; Greece – 1,263; France – 1,119; Colombia – 1,068; Belgium – 900; South Africa – 826; Netherlands – 819; Luxembourg – 44. However, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, India and Italy extended only noncombat humanitarian aid.

³⁴ Cumings, Bruce. 1981. *The Origins of the Korean War, I: Liberation and Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

³⁵ Cumings, Bruce. 1990. *The Origins of the Korean War, II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

³⁶ Full text of the communique in Kim Se Jin (ed.). 1976. *Korean Unification: Source Materials with an Introduction*. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, p. 319-320.

that, both of the leaders decided to strengthen their own powers in term of military and security of their border. In the meantime, by the end of 1992 South Korea had improved its relations with all former socialist countries including China, which thus served to isolate North Korea.³⁷

South Korea was confident that it could achieve unification on its own terms through the absorption of North Korea after its expected collapse. South Korea believed that the collapse of North Korea was inevitable, but in order to speed up the process the North had to be further isolated and pressured through sanctions. Accordingly, South Korea rejected North Korea's requests for economic aid during the prime ministerial dialogues in the early 1990s. However, Seoul has underestimated the durability of the North Korean regime which has not collapsed as many have predicted.³⁸

The ensuing three-year Korean War was a holocaust in terms of the number of lives lost around three million Koreans, both military and civilian, over a million Chinese "volunteers," and about 54,000 American soldiers perished amidst the fighting. The responsibility for driving the North Korean soldiers back was shared by the South Korean military and the troops from a sixteen-member coalition of the United Nations under the command of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur. On 1 October 1950, the UN forces crossed over the 38th parallel in hot pursuit of the North Korean invaders, deliberately violating the truce line. This caused Mao to send troops from the People's Republic of China as he had promised he would should the UN forces cross the 38th parallel. Consequently, what began as an ideological conflict within one country erupted into an international calamity involving the world's great power. The war was waged up and

³⁷ Young Ick Lew, *Brief History of Korea: A Bird's Eye View*.
https://www.koreasociety.org/images/pdf/KoreanStudies/Monographs_GeneralReading/BRIEF%20HISTORY%20OF%20KOREA.pdf

³⁸ Cumings, Bruce. 1990. *The Origins of the Korean War, II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

down the peninsula as each seeming victory proved to be short lived. The UN forces were forced to retreat from the ground that they had taken in the North, and Seoul was once again evacuated. A few months later the United States was deeply disturbed at the morass that the war was turning into and wanted to ensure that it remain a regional conflict. By the spring of 1951, a military stalemate developed around the 38th parallel. The United States government responded to a Soviet initiative for truce talks in mid-1951, again without consulting Korea. The negotiations commenced at Kaesŏng in July 1951 and dragged on for two years at P'anmunjom until armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. South Korean leaders, including President Rhee, were virulently opposed to ending the war. They felt that millions of Koreans had died for no purpose and demanded that the war be continued until the country was reunified.

The U.S. appeased South Korean leaders by signing a mutual defense treaty in October 1953. Hope for reunification was the primary reason that the people of Korea took up arms and fought each other. Ironically, however, the way that this internecine conflict was concluded made reunification an even more remote possibility. The war never resolved any of the central issues and resulted in tension ridden post-war relations between North and South Korea. After 1953, the two rival regimes each came to a mass armed forces of more than half a million men, each well-equipped with costly weapons to fight the other should fighting recur. Both Koreas were thus transformed into heavily armed military camps, spawning military-dominated, authoritarian political cultures. For South Korea, the next several decades would bring drastic changes in government and also tremendous economic growth as the country dragged itself out from the

ravages of war and into a sophisticated era dominated by advanced technology and industrial development.³⁹

The First Republic (1948-1960), in name, a liberal civilian democratic government under the leadership of an increasingly authoritarian leader, President Syngman Rhee, was toppled in April 1960 by a student uprising. The Second Republic (1960-1961), a liberal democratic regime with Premier Chang Myŏn at its helm, lasted only eight months before being overthrown by a military coup d'état led by Major General Park Chunghee in May 1961. President Park Chunghee presided over the Third (1961-1973) and Fourth Republics (1973-1979) as a dictatorial yet effective ruler until he was assassinated by the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in October 1979, after, UN forces reclaimed their offensive stance.⁴⁰

III.1.1. The Nuclear Situation in the Korean Peninsula

The North Korea has always utilized their nuclear power as a leverage for negotiation in world politics.⁴¹ The importance of nuclear power for the North Korea itself, could be seen from the North Korea understanding of the meaning of nuclear power, as the asymmetric powers which are the last measure for North Korea which lacks of absolute military and economic power. Even though they are steps behind the United States as well South Korea in both aspects, their possession of the nuclear power renders a significant threat towards the other countries.⁴²

³⁹ Young Ick Lew, Brief History of Korea: A Bird's Eye View. https://www.koreasociety.org/images/pdf/KoreanStudies/Monographs_GeneralReading/BRIEF%20HISTORY%20OF%20KOREA.pdf

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ "South Korea's soft power strategies to deal with North Korea's threat." Universidad de Navarra. Facultad De Derecho-Relaciones Internacionales. <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/south-korea-s-soft-power-strategies-to-deal-with-north-korea-s-threat>

⁴² Ibid.

Even though the nuclear power is not used significantly for the economic interests of the North Korea, as in this matter as the issue to leverage for negotiation to induce economic support of the nation. The North Korea has rather concentrated in completing the nuclear development, not considering persuasion from peripheral countries.⁴³ Many experts believe that North Korea is using their nuclear power to be a more powerful negotiation tool.⁴⁴

Around two decades have passed since the North Korea's nuclear program became the focus of the international stage. While the world is concerning about the nuclear program of North Korea, the state itself has made a technological progress in their nuclear program in which they had already did around five nuclear tests, numerous test firings of ballistic missiles, and the submarine launched ballistic missile tests. The South Korea believe that the North has their efforts for miniaturizing warheads and reducing their weight have achieved a significant degree of progress.⁴⁵ After the North Korea has done their fifth nuclear test in 2016, they also insisted to produce new kind of nuclear program where they could produce a variety of smaller, lighter, and diversified nuclear warheads.⁴⁶

Sustained efforts have been made to analyze important topics related to the North Korean nuclear issue: the motives behind North Korea's bid to become a nuclear state, the international community's engagement strategies and use of sanctions to dissuade North Korea from this

⁴³ Ibid, 28.

⁴⁴ Korea Times, 2016.

⁴⁵ Sung Chull Kim, North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine and Revisionist Strategy.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328598642_North_Korea_and_Nuclear_Weapons_Entering_the_New_Era_of_Deterrence.

⁴⁶ "North Korea Able to Miniaturize Nukes: DOD Intel Arm," NTI, April 12, 2013; Ministry of National Defense, ROK, 2014 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2014), 12; Anna Fifield, "North Korea Says It Has Technology to Make Mini- nuclear Weapons," Washington Post, May 20, 2015,

<https://www.washingtonpost>

[.com/world/pyongyang-says-it-has-technology-to-make-small-submarined-mounted-nuclear-warheads/2015/05/20/0e96d0bc-fec0-11e4-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pyongyang-says-it-has-technology-to-make-small-submarined-mounted-nuclear-warheads/2015/05/20/0e96d0bc-fec0-11e4-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html); "N. Korea Conducts 5th Nuclear Test," Yonhap News, September , 2016, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2016/09/09/0401000000AEN20160909002556315.html>

course of action, and the impact of Pyongyang's development of nuclear weapons on the global proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons in general. In contrast, little effort has been made to examine the evolution of North Korea's nuclear doctrine and the exact nature of its nuclear deterrence strategy. It may be assumed that in line with its nuclear capability, a small nuclear state will also develop its own nuclear doctrine and deterrence strategy, either clandestinely or in plain sight.⁴⁷

Indeed, this is precisely what North Korea has done. North Korea's nuclear doctrine was articulated in the Law on Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear Weapons State (hereafter the Nuclear Weapons State Law) in 2013, although it had evolved for a decade before that law was adopted. International efforts aimed at halting this dangerous move and resolving the problem, or at least alleviating the tension surrounding it, should be paired with a close examination of North Korea's evolving nuclear doctrine and its nuclear deterrence strategy.⁴⁸

The North Korea has more than 650 (a hundred and fifty) short and medium range ballistic missiles, that are capable to hit cities throughout South Korea, Japan as well the eastern of China. If this successfully mated, then the North Korea could put the military bases and population centers in the northeast Asia at risk, not only that but several other regions like Guam, Hawaii, Alaska and the northwestern of the United States are also going to be at risk.⁴⁹

The declaration of the nuclear doctrine of the North Korea could create a military and diplomatic implications of possessing nuclear deterrent; command, control, operations, and safety management of the nuclear weapons; and international collaboration with regard to

⁴⁷ Sung Chull Kim, North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine and Revisionist Strategy. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328598642_North_Korea_and_Nuclear_Weapons_Entering_the_New_Era_of_Deterrence.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Young Ick Lew, Brief History of Korea: A Bird's Eye View.

https://www.koreasociety.org/images/pdf/KoreanStudies/Monographs_GeneralReading/BRIEF%20HISTORY%20OF%20KOREA.pdf

nonproliferation. It is obvious that the military alone could not have come up with such a comprehensive doctrine; only diplomats or party leaders are in charge of external affairs would have known how to employ the doctrine and messages and signals embedded in it internationally.⁵⁰

III.2. THE REDUCE TENSION UNDER MOON JAE IN

Moon Jae In, the South Korean President has confirmed that he handled the security confrontation between them and the North Korea. He stated that he had to handle the North Korea's first intercontinental tests of the ballistic missile as well the hydrogen bomb in 2018, while he also trying to managed the relations between the South Korea and the North Korea, as well the other two super power countries of the United States and China. Despite of that, he also need to quickly maintain his promises on the stimulating economic growth of the South Korea as well the job opportunities of the nation, and attempting to create breakthrough in the Inter Korean relations between them and the North Korea.⁵¹

The Moon's other initiatives have been less fruitful. His domestic measures have yet to lower the unemployment rate, which for workers under twenty-nine has consistently been over 9 percent and reached 11.6 percent once during his presidency.⁵² Moon's ongoing efforts in these areas will affect the trajectory of his inter-Korean agenda. Korean presidents typically maximize their use of extensive executive power to implement major policies in the first half of the

⁵⁰ See Timothy W. Crawford, "The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and Complexity in Theory and Policy," in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 279

⁵¹ Chung Min Lee and Kathryn Botto. "President Moon Jae-In and the Politics of Inter-Korean Detente." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/16/president-moon-jae-in-and-politics-of-inter-korean-d-tente-pub-77730>.

⁵² "yeonlyeongbyeol gyeongjehwaldon-ingu cong-gwal" [General Economically Active Population by Age], Korean Statistical Information Service, <http://kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/index.action>.

presidency, but their authority becomes significantly constrained and diluted in the second half as public approval diminishes and potential successors' campaigns begin in earnest. Moon's approval ratings have remained very high, especially with boosts from each inter-Korean summit.⁵³

For Moon, emphasizing the primacy of Inter Korean détente as the cornerstone of his legacy is both highly strategic but also very risky. Three inter-Korean summits have ushered in new hopes for South-North reconciliation and the possibility of implementing a paradigm shift in South-North relations. No one could have imagined a year ago that a South Korean president would be addressing 150,000 North Koreans in Pyongyang. At the same time, however, Moon runs the risk of overplaying North and South rapprochement because his presidency is going to be judged not only on his diplomatic acumen, but also on his ability to foster sustained economic growth and greater job security.⁵⁴

Domestically, if he is unable to build a bipartisan policy toward North Korea, Moon won't be able to garner the support of the now weakened, but still very influential, conservative forces in Korean society and politics. Creating a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula is a long process that will involve many subsequent administrations. If Moon is unable to foster bipartisan support, future presidents from different parties may be inclined to change or even reverse his policy.⁵⁵

⁵³ Chung Min Lee and Kathryn Botto. "President Moon Jae-In and the Politics of Inter-Korean Detente." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/16/president-moon-jae-in-and-politics-of-inter-korean-d-tente-pub-77730>.

⁵⁴ Chi-dong Lee, "China Urges Korea to Resolve THAAD Issue in Ministerial Talks," Yonhap News Agency, August 3, 2018, <http://english.yonhap-news.co.kr/news/2018/08/03/0200000000AEN20180803008900315.html>.

⁵⁵ Adam Taylor, "South Korea and China Move to Normalize Relations After THAAD Dispute," Washington Post, October 31, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-korea-and-china-move-to-normalize-relations-after-thaad-conflict/2017/10/31/60f2bad8-bde0-11e7-af84-d3e2ee4b2af1_story.html?utm_term=.bbf0d63f434c.

The first volume of the annual Korea Strategic Review details the Moon administration's approach to South Korean domestic politics, North Korean domestic politics, inter-Korean relations, and South Korean foreign policy. These four sections reveal key factors that will impact the success of Moon's main agenda items,

The first section examines major political developments in the Moon administration including a very ambitious domestic agenda under the rubric of a wide-ranging corruption crackdown. Two former conservative presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hy are in jail awaiting final sentencing for abuse of presidential powers and corruption. The ruling Democratic Party handily won the June 2018 local election, but while the president received a major boost by engineering inter-Korean rapprochement, the real litmus test for the party and the president will be whether they can deliver on South Korea's economic performance.⁵⁶

Kim Jong Un's "new look," or his tactical shift from ramping up military threats and shifting to dialogue and engagement with South Korea and the United States, is covered in detail in the second section. Kim was confident enough to hold the 7th Party Congress in May 2016, the first time one had been held since 1980, and during the plenum of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) in April 2018, he announced the end of his "byeongjin noseon" (parallel line) of simultaneously pursuing economic growth and developing nuclear weapons. Kim announced that he would focus exclusively on economic development.⁵⁷

The third section assesses the unfolding of a flurry of summits between the two Koreas and the first-ever U.S.–North Korea summit in June 2018 in Singapore. Moon and Kim met three

⁵⁶ Lee Boo-hyeong, Han Jae-jin, and Cheon Yong-chan, "choegeun hanjung sanghogan gyeongje sonsil jeomgeomgwa daeungbang-an" [The assessment on South Korea's economic loss due to China's THAAD retaliation and the possible counterplan], Hyundai Research Institute, Current Issue and Assignment 17, 10 (2017); and Eun-Young Jeong, "South Korea's Companies Eager for End to Costly Spat With China," Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-companies-eager-for-end-to-costly-spat-with-china-1509544012>.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

times in April, May, and September. During the September 18–20 meeting in Pyongyang, Kim promised that he would visit Seoul in the fall of 2018 barring any major crisis. Chinese President Xi Jinping also met with Kim three times in 2018, after not having met since Xi took power in 2012.⁵⁸

In the fourth section, South Korea’s major foreign policy initiatives and developments are analyzed including Moon’s ability to develop a surprisingly friendly relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump. The deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile system in South Korea in response to North Korea’s nuclear test was made by the previous government, but it was Moon who had to cope with China’s extremely aggressive responses and the resulting fallout. Key issues in the Korean-Japanese relationship are also examined, including security cooperation and Moon’s ultimate decision not to withdraw from the contentious Korean-Japanese agreement on the comfort women in December 2015 or the conclusion of military information sharing agreement. Deep historical scars such as the comfort women issue, a euphemism for sex slaves who were forced to serve Japanese soldiers in World War II, is a constant reminder of the powerful historical narratives that shape Korean-Japanese ties.⁵⁹

Other than Moon, no democratically elected South Korean president has entered the Blue House without the customary two months transition period. Owing to the special circumstances created by the prolonged political crisis from fall 2016 until spring 2017, when then president

⁵⁸ Chi-dong Lee, “China Urges Korea to Resolve THAAD Issue in Ministerial Talks,” Yonhap News Agency, August 3, 2018, <http://english.yonhap-news.co.kr/news/2018/08/03/0200000000AEN20180803008900315.html>.

⁵⁹ Lee Boo-hyeong, Han Jae-jin, and Cheon Yong-chan, “choegeun hanjung sanghogan gyeongje sonsil jeomgeomgwa daeeungbang-an” [The assessment on South Korea’s economic loss due to China’s THAAD retaliation and the possible counterplan], Hyundai Research Institute, Current Issue and Assignment 17, 10 (2017); and Eun-Young Jeong, “South Korea’s Companies Eager for End to Costly Spat With China,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-companies-eager-for-end-to-costly-spat-with-china-1509544012>.

Park was impeached by the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court, Moon had to assume the presidency the day after being elected on May 9, 2017. This section highlights three major elements of the Moon presidency: (1) launching the widest anticorruption drive ever spearheaded by a Korean president; (2) engineering the most rapid pace of South-North rapprochement, with a promise to solicit Kim Jong Un's commitment to full and final denuclearization and locking in inter-Korean détente so that it can't be reversed; and (3) championing unprecedented state intervention in the market in the name of structural economic reforms.⁶⁰

Although Moon enjoyed some of the highest approval ratings in history a year and a half into his presidency consistently above 70 percent such support rarely lasts in South Korea. Indeed, in the second quarter of 2018, Moon's approval rating dropped to 60 percent, his lowest thus far according to Gallup. Despite putting almost all of his eggs in the inter-Korean détente basket, if Moon is unable to secure verifiable denuclearization from Kim Jong Un or the process becomes drawn out, his domestic support will falter. More importantly, unless Moon triggers economic and job growth—especially in lowering the historically high youth unemployment rate that has consistently hovered between 9 and 10 percent during his presidency—his political fortunes will be hampered.⁶¹

The precipitous downfall and impeachment of Park Geun-hye left the conservative Liberty Korea Party (LKP) with little recourse to challenge the liberal Democratic Party government's agenda, giving the Moon administration carte blanche on domestic agendas and

⁶⁰ "Korea, Republic of," World Trade Organization, <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=KR&Language=F>.

⁶¹ Eun-Young Jeong, "South Korea's Companies Eager for End to Costly Spat with China," Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-companies-eager-for-end-to-costly-spat-with-china-1509544012>.

implementing unparalleled dialogue and exchanges with Kim Jong Un. Moon won 41.08 percent of the vote in the snap election, a 17.4 percent lead over conservative candidate Hong Joon-pyo and the largest difference between a winner and a runner-up in the history of South Korea's direct presidential elections.⁴ This major win gave Moon a broad mandate to pursue across-the-board engagement with North Korea that he had long advocated for, with an emphasis on building an irreversible peace regime that includes announcing the end of the Korean War and signing of a peace treaty, implementing military confidence-building measures (CBMs), and enhancing inter-Korean cooperation. Indeed, inter-Korean relations have proved to be Moon's top priority.⁶²

Korean voters have become much more attuned to economic issues, including greater social-welfare benefits and job security, since the economy no longer generates double-digit growth as it did in the 1970s and 1980s. They appreciate Moon's rapprochement with Kim Jong Un, but most Koreans are much more concerned about their pockets and longer-term economic welfare. In Gallup polling, South Koreans consistently cite the "lack of solutions to economic and public welfare issues" as their primary reason for disapproving of Moon, especially in recent months.⁵ Like its rich neighbor Japan, South Korea has one of the lowest birth rates in the world with a rapidly aging society, a dynamic that creates further economic pressure on the social welfare system and the younger generation. These structural economic issues are difficult to

⁶² "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on February 15, 2016," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, February 15, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1340636.shtml.

remedy and will likely be a deciding factor in the popularity of Moon's party in the next National Assembly election in 2020.⁶³

Moon has been able to dominate the political arena thanks to a bureaucracy that toes the government's policy guidelines and a conservative opposition that hasn't been able to regroup from its defeat. Thus far, Moon's North Korea policy has been popular domestically, with constituents consistently citing inter-Korean relations as the primary reason for their support of his presidency, especially after each inter-Korean summit.⁶ But as he enters his third year in power in May 2019 and the bill for inter-Korean projects comes due, voters may not be so enticed by South-North summit pageantry. For starters, they're going to demand clear-cut answers on how much it will cost to rebuild North Korean roads and railways—estimated by some at nearly \$40 billion—and what South Korea is going to get in return.⁷ If Moon tries to lock in South Korea's unilateral aid to North Korea without viable checks and balances and no real evidence that Kim Jong Un is giving up his nuclear arsenal and other military capabilities, he will be caught in an intractable political vice.⁶⁴

⁶³ "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on February 15, 2016," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, February 15, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1340636.shtml.

⁶⁴ Steven A. Hildreth, Susan Lawrence, and Ian E. Reinhart, *Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition*, CRS Report No. R43116, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2015), 11-12, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf>; Raytheon, "Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2)," 2017, <http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/antpy2/>.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTER KOREA (NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA) SPORT

DIPLOMACY IN THE PYEONGCHANG WINTER OLYMPICS 2018

IV.1. SOUTH KOREA FOREIGN POLICY

The year 2017 was characterized as the year of uncertainty in the international order as the regional and global challenges are increasing. The Korean Peninsula, the advancing the nuclear and the missile capabilities of the North Korea as well continuing provocations increased tensions in the Northeast Asian region, as well the competition among the key countries are deepening. One of the South Korea Foreign Policy based on the 2018 White Paper, the South Korean governments are trying to secure the momentum for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In such ways the Korean government fostered the conditions, shortly after the launch of the Moon Jae In administration, for leading role in resolving Korean Peninsula issues by actively restoring summit diplomacy and maintaining close and strategic communication.⁶⁵

Against the backdrop the North Korea having tested a series of ballistic missiles early in the year, the Moon Jae In administration was launched amid a grave security environment and declared the resolution of the security crisis and the establishment of peace on the Korea Peninsula as their top priorities. The President Moon Jae In presented the vision of the peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity in his speech on the 17th of the anniversary of the Inter Korean Summit and the Korber Foundation in Germany in July 6th, 2017. Based on this announcement, the South Korea government stated that their policy vision actively presented the position of their

⁶⁵ North Korea Diplomatic White Paper 2018. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

promotion towards the engagement of the sanctions and pressure against the North Korea provocations.⁶⁶

The South Korea government also exerted a variety of the government wide diplomatic efforts in order to realize North Korea's participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games as one of the practical means for securing momentum for peace and dialogue. In international community expressed their support for the South Korea policy towards North Korea at various meeting to create an atmosphere conducive to North Korea return to dialogue. Through these continued efforts in the close communication and solid cooperation with the international community in order to encourage the change in the approach with the North Korea.⁶⁷

He expressed the commitment to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful manner and to improve the Inter-Korean relations, while pledging the South Korea in playing the leading role of resolving the issue concerning the Korean Peninsula. The South Korea governments are also created five pillars in on the guideline to maintain the situation of the Korea Peninsula. The first one is the pursuit of the peace which neither involves the North Korea's collapse nor artificial unification; denuclearization that guarantees the security of the North Korea regime; enactment of the Inter-Korean agreements into law and conclusion of the peace agreement with the participation of relevant countries; working towards the drawing of the new economic map on the Korean Peninsula; as well the consistent pursuit of the non-political exchanges and cooperation projects.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ North Korea Diplomatic White Paper 2018. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

The attempt to converse through sports and culture is one of the soft power strategies used by South Korea in order to solve the nuclear crisis. This strategy intends to obtain North Korea's cooperation in the non-political areas which could then spread to political negotiations. As the result of this strategy, South Korea and North Korea has formed a unified team during the last Olympics and Asian games.⁶⁹ However, for it to be a success, their cooperation should not be limited to the non-political area, but instead should lead to a constructive conversation in politics. In this terms, South Korea's peaceful gesture in the Pyeong-Chang winter Olympic is seen to have brought positive change. Before the Olympics, many politicians and experts were skeptical to the gesture because North Korea conducted the 6th nuclear test in 2017, ignoring the South Korea's message.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the South Korea government has continually shown a desire to cooperate with North Korea. The strategies focus on cooperation only in soft power domains such as sports, culture, and music rather than domains that expose serious political intension.⁷¹

IV.1.1. THE SOUTH KOREA GOVERNMENT EFFORTS FOR NORTH KOREA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PYEONGCHANG WINTER OLYMPIC GAMES

The South Korea government exerted as a variety of government wide diplomatic efforts, including the summit diplomacy, in order to achieve one of the four practical proposals of the Berlin Initiative, North Korea's Participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games. The South Korea government aimed to foster a positive atmosphere for the successful hosting of the

⁶⁹ Yonhapnews, 2018.

⁷⁰ Korea Times, 2018.

⁷¹ "South Korea's Soft Power Strategies to Deal with North Korea's Threat. Universidad de Navarra, Facultad de Derecho-Relaciones Internacionales." <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/south-korea-s-soft-power-strategies-to-deal-with-north-korea-s-threat>.

PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games and to secure international support for the North Korea's participation by utilizing various opportunities like the bilateral policy planning consultations and strategic dialogues, and the Korean Peninsula Roundtable.⁷²

Through the diplomatic of the South Korea, the government continued efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to North Korea's participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games and to enhance the international community's understanding by holding a briefing session on the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games attended by the approximately 90 diplomatic missions of the South Korea; a roundtable discussion for the heads of missions of EU members in the South Korea; a briefing session for missions in the South Korea covering the South and North Korea; and for missions in the South Korea that also have permanent missions in North Korea.⁷³

IV.1.2. THE INTER KOREA RELATIONS

The relations between Seoul and Pyongyang relations have evolved through four stages. The first stage is characterized by the zero-sum game of the mutual antagonism which ended in the July 4th of 1972, where the Seoul and Pyongyang for the first time established official contacts. The second one is when both countries are making several agreements which one of them is the agreement of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in February 1992. The second stage set of this agreement also resulted from the changes in the Cold War environment, as well including the development of the economic and diplomatic ties between the South Korea

⁷² North Korea Diplomatic White Paper 2018. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁷³ Ibid.

and the Korea. The third and fourth stages of the Inter Korean relations have been driven more by internal dynamics on the Korean Peninsula itself.⁷⁴

The President Kim Dae Jung of the South Korea, considered the improvement for both states of North-South relations as one of the priorities in the government. He stressed that he and the administration would actively pursue the Inter Korean dialogue and exchanges in a wide range of the fields that includes the culture, family exchanges tourism as well the humanitarian assistance as well in the term of economic the trade between both countries. While talking about the economic relations, in the hopes of the encouragement of greater openness and economic development within the North Korea.⁷⁵ The President Kim tried to increase the trade relations with the North Korea. The trade relations had already grown steadily since the year of 1991, as well it could lifted the restrictions on the South Korean investment in North Korea in 1998.⁷⁶

Over the course of 2017, Moon's consistent overtures for talks initially met Pyongyang's disinterest. However, the Winter Olympic Games in February 2018 provided an opportunity for sport diplomacy and the initiation of direct inter-Korean contact. In early March, Seoul's special envoy delegation conveyed the agreement to hold an Inter Korean summit on 27 April in Panmunjom, on the South Korean side of the border, as well as Pyongyang's willingness to hold a summit meeting with US President Donald Trump.⁷⁷

North Korea had previously announced a nuclear and missile test moratorium, refrained from criticizing the annual South Korean-US military exercises, and thus fulfilled Seoul's conditions for Inter Korean dialogue. At their first summit meeting in April, Moon Jae-in and

⁷⁴ Charles K. Armstrong, *The Inter Korean Relations in Historical Perspective*. International Journal of Korean Unification Studies. <http://campus.unibo.it/278118/1/Charles%20K.%20Armstrong.pdf>.

⁷⁵ Yung-Sup Han, *Peace and Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula* (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 2005), p. 209.

⁷⁶ Korea Economic Institute, "North Korean Economic Data."

⁷⁷ Benjamin A. Engel, "South Korea's Strategy to Bring Peace to the Peninsula: Credit Trump", *The Diplomat*, 3 May 2018.

Kim Jong Un signed the Panmunjom Declaration and vowed to work towards reconciliation, peace and prosperity. Both sides agreed on the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation, the reduction of military tensions along the demarcation line and sea borders, and joint efforts towards a peace regime.⁷⁸

Both also declared a nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula to be their common goal. Through the Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK recognizes the RK for the first time as a negotiating partner regarding security issues as well as a peace regime. The swiftly initiated implementation of the summit agreements, particularly the resumption of military talks whose agenda includes the withdrawal of North Korean artillery from the border line, gives cause for optimism.⁷⁹

IV.1.3. THE SUNSHINE POLICY

This policy is also created by the South Korea former President, Kim Dae Jung, that promotes the reconciliation with the North Korea. The part of this policy is that the South Korea government allowed the South Korean non governmental organizations, business, and private citizens to have a contact with the North Korea as well regarding on the bilateral food and fertilizer aid to the North Korea.⁸⁰ This policy is also being supported by the presidential summit in Pyongyang in the year of 2000, which the summit leads to the dramatic shift in South Korean

⁷⁸ For an overview, see Edward Kwon, “South Korea’s Deterrence against North Korea’s WMD”, *East Asia* 35, no. 2 (2018): 1–21.

⁷⁹ Jesse Johnson, “South Korean Defense Chief Skeptical of North Nuclear Threats, Says Tactical Nukes Won’t Be Reintroduced to Peninsula”, *Japan Times*, 29 January 2018.

⁸⁰ Charles K. Armstrong, *The Inter Korean Relations in Historical Perspective*. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*. <http://campus.unibo.it/278118/1/Charles%20K.%20Armstrong.pdf>.

attitudes toward the North as well as in the policy.⁸¹ Based on the summit as well the policy, both leaders agreed to begin a family reunion meeting as well they decided to create the Inter Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex.⁸²

This sunshine policy is also a policy that separated the humanitarian and economic cooperation between the North and South Korea from their political issues. The administration of both countries continued the engagement even there were conflicts between both countries, like the clashes in the Northern Limit Line which is about the disputed maritime boundary between the North and South Korea in the year of 1999 and 2002.⁸³ Based on the Sunshine policy, the South Korea also created the policy for peace and prosperity where the policy is increasing the bilateral aid as well the humanitarian assistance from the South as well the North as well as the substantial government investment.⁸⁴

IV.1.4. THE SPORT DIPLOMACY OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE TENSION ON NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

⁸¹ Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, "Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in Northeast Asia," *Issues & Insights*, Vol. 8, No. 16 (September 2008), 22-24.
http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/issuesinsights_v08n16.pdf

⁸² Construction at Kaesong began after Kim Dae-Jung left office, in 2003.

⁸³ Charles K. Armstrong, *The Inter Korean Relations in Historical Perspective*. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*. <http://campus.unibo.it/278118/1/Charles%20K.%20Armstrong.pdf>.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

Sport diplomacy, is a situation when the sport is being used as a political tool for enhancement.⁸⁵ The sport diplomacy has been defined as the whole range of international contacts and competitions that have implications for the overall relations between the nations concerned.⁸⁶ Even though the definition draws attention for the issue and relations between states and within a single state, but it is also provide the scope for analyzing the actions of domestic and international non state actors, as well how the use of sport as a tool of diplomacy could be applied in the relations to the target state or states concerned.⁸⁷ The attraction of the sport diplomacy is that it is a relatively low cost and low risk but high profile tool of a foreign policy, by which states and non state actors are able to publicize their views on the actions and policies of others.⁸⁸

Sports have repeatedly been able to forge cooperative relationships between previously conflicting states by acting as an alternative channel to re-establish diplomatic dialogue. For example, suspended diplomatic dialogue was between the US and Iran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution was restored following the National American Wrestling team's participation in the Takhti Cup held in Iran. Thus, away from other issues that may have caused a standstill in their communication, sports can establish an alternative channel for dialogue between antagonistic states. By the dialogue on issues related to the Winter Olympics, and not the threat of North Korea's missile program, the re-established communication paves the way towards more successful discussion on the latter at a future time.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Jesse Johnson, "South Korean Defense Chief Skeptical of North Nuclear Threats, Says Tactical Nukes Won't Be Reintroduced to Peninsula", Japan Times, 29 January 2018.

⁸⁶ Peppard & Riordan, 1993, 2.

⁸⁷ Head to Head: Korean Sport Diplomacy. 2018. <https://www.talkpolitics.org.uk/blog/2018/1/20/head-to-head-sports-diplomacy>

⁸⁸ Houlihan, 1994.

⁸⁹ Head to Head: Korean Sport Diplomacy. 2018. <https://www.talkpolitics.org.uk/blog/2018/1/20/head-to-head-sports-diplomacy>

Moreover, sports diplomacy has proved a highly effective tool in de-escalating crises between states. For instance, tensions between Pakistan and India reached boiling point following the Kashmir Crisis in 2002, the cricket matches arranged between the two states proved pivotal in both easing the tension and preventing a further escalation of violence and conflict. The same could be repeated once more during the Winter Olympics; it is a monumental opportunity for the North and South Korea to suppress the growing tension between them, and pave a way towards a peaceful resolution. Sports diplomacy has proved an essential turning point before in many states' relationships, and will do so again.⁹⁰

The positive impact of sports diplomacy is already being felt on the Korean Peninsula. The prospect of participating in and discussing details for the Winter Olympics has prompted the re-opening of a diplomatic hotline that has been dormant for two years. This could yet be another breakthrough made possible only by sports diplomacy, diplomatic approaches towards the Korean situation finally stating to turn to more cooperative means, rather than the previous coercive methods and discourse.⁹¹

IV.1.5. THE SPORT DIPLOMACY OF INTER KOREA: THE PARTICIPATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

The world knew that the relations between North Korea and the South Korea is not well even since the end of the Korean War in July 1953. The North and South Korea have remained a

⁹⁰ Head to Head: Korean Sport Diplomacy. 2018. <https://www.talkpolitics.org.uk/blog/2018/1/20/head-to-head-sports-diplomacy>

⁹¹ Ibid.

divided states with a little hope as well possibilities of reunification. In fact, both of countries are not only divided by the region but also divided through the differentiation of their politics, socials and economy.⁹² Even though both of the countries are different in their political roots, since the North is based on the ideology of the *Juche* or the self reliance and the South is based on the democratic belief, both of these two Koreans remind bound by their ethnic roots.⁹³

IV.2. THE PYEONGCHANG WINTER OLYMPIC 2018

The PyeongChang Winter Olympics is one of the biggest event in the international stage. It is being held in the 9th until 25th of February 2018 in the PyeongChang County, the Gangwon Province of the South Korea. For South Korea, this is the second time they held the Olympic event in their country, but it is the first winter Olympic held in the region.⁹⁴

The PyeongChang Winter Olympic preparation was began from the bidding, which the South Korea bid the PyeongChang to host the 2018 Winter Olympics. The South Korean city applied to host the games earlier, but lost out by just a few votes when it came to judging the 2010 and 2014 Olympics. However, in Durban, South Africa, on 6 July 2011, it came out top in the first round with 63 votes, ahead of Munich (25 votes) and Annecy (7 votes). This means that South Korea is organizing its second Olympic Games, and its first winter competition, in February. In Asia, Japan has hosted the winter competition on two occasions: Sapporo (1972) and Nagano (1998).⁹⁵

⁹² Udo Merkel. 'Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.' in *Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics*, eds. Alan Bairner, John Kelly & Jung Woo Lee. London & New York: Routledge, 2016).

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Jesse Johnson, "South Korean Defense Chief Skeptical of North Nuclear Threats, Says Tactical Nukes Won't Be Reintroduced to Peninsula", Japan Times, 29 January 2018.

⁹⁵ XXIII Winter Olympic Games, PyeongChang 2018.

http://olimpia.hu/images/Pyeongchang2018/phjongcshang_hatteranyag_mob_180226_ENG.pdf.

The International Olympic Committee announced the formation of the PyeongChang 2018 Coordination Committee on 15 August 2011. The local organizing committee was set up on 19 October. The first task of the organizing committee was drafting the overall plan for the games and designating the venues. The first inspection by the IOC was in March 2012. In February 2013, then president of the IOC Jacques Rogge made his first tour of the construction sites. Since then, the organizers have built the rapid rail line linking the capital with the Olympic city. Successful trial competitions have been arranged at all the venues. The emblem of the competition was unveiled on 3 May 2013.⁹⁶

They were elected in the 123rd IOC (International Olympic Committee) Session in Durban 2011, they earned the necessary majority of around 48 votes in one round. The beginning of the preparation is the launching of the Pyeongchang Organizing Committee for the 2018 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games or the POCOG, the committee was made official in the 19th of October 2011.⁹⁷

The February's Games will mark the first Winter Olympics in Asia in 20 years, and organizers are touting it as the "largest and most compact" Winter Games. Organizers tell PEOPLE the total budget for the 2018 Olympics, including infrastructure and operations, is estimated at approximately \$12.6 billion dollars, a fraction of the 2014 Games' reported cost.⁹⁸

All 12 venues are within a 30-minute drive of the Olympic Stadium, which was finished in September, according to Park and the PyeongChang official website. What's more, says Park, 80 percent of athletes can get to their venues in 10 minutes. And for the first time at a Winter

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Jesse Johnson, "South Korean Defense Chief Skeptical of North Nuclear Threats, Says Tactical Nukes Won't Be Reintroduced to Peninsula", Japan Times, 29 January 2018.

⁹⁸ All about the South Korea's Preparations for the 2018 Winter Olympic Games. <https://people.com/sports/what-to-know-south-korea-winter-olympic-prep/>.

Olympics, there will be more than 100 medaling events (102 to be exact, with new events such as big air snowboarding).⁹⁹

*“In terms of all the hardware, infrastructures, all of that, that is done,” Park says. “So for us as the organizing committee right now, we’re working on the final touches.”*¹⁰⁰

With competitors and media arriving in January, Park says organizers are comfortable that all of the hardware is done and now it’s a matter of details such wallpaper and stocking toiletries as well as stress testing.¹⁰¹

The preparation is not only from the side of South Korea, but North Korea’s decision to dispatch Kim Jong-un’s younger sister Yo Jong to South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) as part of a delegation to the PyeongChang Winter Olympics has opened up the possibility for the past month of sports diplomacy to garner something more substantive and lasting. With all parties to the Korean peninsula conflict sending senior delegations to South Korea for the Games, everyone should take a moment to give diplomacy a chance.¹⁰²

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this thesis is that the sport diplomacy is definitely going to help to reduce the tension of the Korean Peninsula, at least for now. The Korean Peninsula was known

⁹⁹Ibid

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ All about the South Korea’s Preparations for the 2018 Winter Olympic Games. <https://people.com/sports/what-to-know-south-korea-winter-olympic-prep/>.

¹⁰² Christopher Green. “Sports Diplomacy in the Korean Peninsula: The Opening of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games Represents and Opportunity for Diplomacy to help reduce the tension on the Korean peninsula.” 2018. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/sports-diplomacy-korean-peninsula>.

for their conflict of different political interests. The North and the South Korea has their own political agenda, in which the North is the one being mysterious rather than the South. The North Korea is being one of the more defensive one, and more likely to use their military as well the fact that they have a nuclear based missiles, made the states around them are being threatened by their existence. While the South Korea, is the country that believe in the use of diplomacy to maintain their relations with the other states in the international stage.

It could be stated that the relations between both countries are not in a good condition, in which there are several conflicts that are happening between both states. The conflict known as the Korean War, The Korean War happened due to the invasion did by the North Korea towards the South Korea in 1950. North Korea, at that time was being supported by the Soviet Union and China. Meanwhile the South Korea was being supported by the United Nations Security Council which also supported by the 21 countries as the contribution from the international stage towards the UN force. The primary support is coming from the United States, whom provided around 90% of their military personnel towards the South Korea.

A characteristic fluctuation of the intensity of sports exchanges and cooperation between North and South Korea has been observed, what on the other hand pertains to the secondary character of sports relations in respect to political relations. As has been pointed, Inter Korean sports diplomacy directed at bringing the two states closer flourished in the times of political détente, while being suppressed when political relations deteriorated. It does not mean though, that the use of sport by two Koreas in order to shape positive bilateral relations was completely useless. There were occasions, when due to sport Koreans from North and South were able to initiate negotiations, what could often be difficult if it was not about sport. Inter-Korean sports

diplomacy should therefore be regarded as a subsidiary tool of shaping mutual relations, with limited but identifiable effectiveness.

It is often stated, that Koreans from North and South share common ethnicity and culture. Nevertheless, hostility and reluctance to dialogue remain as dominating attitudes. It appears though, that the enmity of the elites is not representative for the societies, what could be seen in the behavior of sports fans from both Koreas during sports events, who often cooperated. In this context Inter Korean sports diplomacy could be compared to famous US and China ping-pong diplomacy, which inter alia showed that both Chinese and American societies were ready for a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Inter Korean sports diplomacy appears to give policymakers the same lesson.

The Winter Olympic could be seen as the symbolic break of both countries from the tension over the North Korea's nuclear program. The leader of North Korea reached out to South Korea and raised the idea of starting high level talks for the first time as in the two years to discuss the possibility of the North Korea's participation in the Olympics. The South Korea eagerly took the offer and through the negotiation between both countries, finally both North and South Korea agreed to march under the same flag as their first contribution in the same event as well in the same team in the Olympics.

Thus, the improvement between the North and South Korea relations in term of their sport diplomacy is still on going. The relations might be in a good way in term of sporting event like the recent PyeongChang Winter Olympics 2018, in which it is also opened new door to the diplomacy between the North and the South Korea. This thesis could be one of the exact example of the proof that the sport diplomacy could be the tool to reduce the tension that happened between the North and South Korea.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

“North Korea Able to Miniaturize Nukes: DOD Intel Arm,” NTI, April 12, 2013; Ministry of National Defense, ROK, 2014 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2014), 12; Anna Fifield, “North Korea Says It Has Technology to Make Mini-nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, May 20, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com>”

Although North Korea claims that the United States and South Korea invaded the North on June 25, 1950, there is clear evidence on Kim Il Sung’s preparation for the war. See the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004 including the “Introduction” by Kathryn Weathersby.

Nye, J. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means of Success in World Politics*. Barnes & Noble.

Nye, J. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Science* , 96.

Melissen, J. (2005). *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Udo Merkel. ‘Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.’ in *Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics*, eds. Alan Bairner, John Kelly & Jung Woo Lee. London & New York: Routledge, 2016).

Journals

Full text of the communique in Kim Se Jin (ed.). 1976. *Korean Unification: Source Materials with an Introduction*. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, p. 319-320.

During the three years of the Korean War, military forces of these nations were allied as members of the UNC. Peak strength for the UNC was 932,964 on July 27, 1953, the day the Armistice Agreement was signed: Republic of Korea (South Korea) – 590,911; United States – 302,483; United Kingdom – 14,198; Philippines – 7,468; Thailand – 6,326; Canada – 6,146; Turkey – 5,453; Australia – 2,282; New Zealand – 1,385; Ethiopia – 1,271; Greece – 1,263; France – 1,119; Colombia – 1,068; Belgium – 900; South Africa – 826; Netherlands – 819; Luxembourg – 44. However, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, India and Italy extended only noncombat humanitarian aid.

Cumings, Bruce. 1981. *The Origins of the Korean War, I: Liberation and Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cumings, Bruce. 1990. *The Origins of the Korean War, II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cumings, Bruce. 1990. *The Origins of the Korean War, II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

See Timothy W. Crawford, "The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and Complexity in Theory and Policy," in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, ed. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 279

Levkowitz, A. (2018). *2018 Winter Olympics: Divided We Stand*. BESA Center Perspectives Paper.

Central Intelligence Agency. (1971). *Intelligence Memorandum: Ping Pong Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.

Murray, S. (2012). *Sports-Diplomacy: a hybrid of two halves*. Bond University.

Kobierecki, M. M. (2013). Sport in International Relations Expectations, Possibilities and Effects. *Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal* , 49-74.

Merkel, U. (n.d.). *The Sport, Politics, and Reunification: A comparative analysis of Korea and Germany*.

B.M. Suh, M. (2013, October 14). *A Tale of Two Koreas: Breaking the Vicious Circle*.

Curnings, B. (1981). *The Origins of the Korean War I: Liberation and Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kim, S. C. (2018). *North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine and Revisionist Strategy* .

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018). *North Korea Diplomatic White Paper* .

Although North Korea claims that the United States and South Korea invaded the North on June 25, 1950, there is clear evidence on Kim Il Sung's preparation for the war. See the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004 including the "Introduction" by Kathryn Weathersby.

Chung Min Lee and Kathryn Botto. "President Moon Jae-In and the Politics of Inter-Korean Detente." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/16/president-moon-jae-in-and-politics-of-inter-korean-d-tente-pub-77730>.

Chung Min Lee and Kathryn Botto. “President Moon Jae-In and the Politics of Inter-Korean Detente.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/11/16/president-moon-jae-in-and-politics-of-inter-korean-d-tente-pub-77730>.

Yung-Sup Han, *Peace and Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula* (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 2005), p. 209.

Cheng, D. (2018). Chinese Calculations of Security and the Korean Peninsula. *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* .

Grossman, D. (2018, January 4). *China's Reluctance on Sanctions Enforcement in North Korea*. Retrieved from RAND: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/01/chinas-reluctance-on-sanctions-enforcement-in-north.html>

Steinbach, A. (2016, April 26). *Competition, Cooperation, and Cultural Entertainment: The Olympics in International Relations*. Retrieved from Harvard International Review: <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=13196>

Bellamy, A. J. (2009). *Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Korea Economic Institute, “North Korean Economic Data.”.

North Korea Diplomatic White Paper 2018. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Peppard & Riordan, 1993, 2.

Articles

“yeonlyeongbyeol gyeongjehwaldon-ingu cong-gwal” [General Economically Active Population by Age], Korean Statistical Information Service, <http://kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/index.action>.

All about the South Korea’s Preparations for the 2018 Winter Olympic Games. <https://people.com/sports/what-to-know-south-korea-winter-olympic-prep/>.

Benjamin A. Engel, “South Korea’s Strategy to Bring Peace to the Peninsula: Credit Trump”, *The Diplomat*, 3 May 2018.

Cheng, D. (2018). Chinese Calculations of Security and the Korean Peninsula. *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* .

Grossman, D. (2018, January 4). *China's Reluctance on Sanctions Enforcement in North Korea*. Retrieved from RAND: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/01/chinas-reluctance-on-sanctions-enforcement-in-north.html>

Steinbach, A. (2016, April 26). *Competition, Cooperation, and Cultural Entertainment: The Olympics in International Relations*. Retrieved from Harvard International Review: <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=13196>

Bellamy, A. J. (2009). *Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

White House. (2017, November 7). *Remarks by President Trump to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea / Seoul, Republic of Korea*. Retrieved from Foreign Policy of White House: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-national-assembly-republic-korea-seoul-republic-korea/>

Campbell, C. (2018, April 26). *Don't Hold Your Breath: What Would Korean Reunification Look Like? Five Glaring Problems to Overcome*. Retrieved from Time: <http://time.com/5255381/north-south-korea-kim-jong-un-reunification/>

Telegraph Staff. (2018, January 17). *North and South Korea to march under same flag at Winter Olympics in diplomatic breakthrough*. Retrieved from The Telegraph: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/17/north-south-korea-agree-united-womens-hockey-team-single-flag/>

Levkowitz, A. (2018). *2018 Winter Olympics: Divided We Stand*. BESA Center Perspectives Paper.

Nye, J. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means of Success in World Politics*. Barnes & Noble.

Nye, J. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Science* , 96.

Central Intelligence Agency. (1971). *Intelligence Memorandum: Ping Pong Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.

Murray, S. (2012). *Sports-Diplomacy: a hybrid of two halves*. Bond University.

Kobierecki, M. M. (2013). Sport in International Relations Expectations, Possibilities and Effects. *Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal* , 49-74.

Melissen, J. (2005). *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Merkel, U. (n.d.). The Sport, Politics, and Reunification: A comparative analysis of Korea and Germany.

B.M. Suh, M. (2013, October 14). A Tale of Two Koreas: Breaking the Vicious Circle.

Curnings, B. (1981). *The Origins of the Korean War I: Liberation and Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kim, S. C. (2018). *North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine and Revisionist Strategy* .

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2018). *North Korea Diplomatic White Paper* .

“North Korea Able to Miniaturize Nukes: DOD Intel Arm,” NTI, April 12, 2013; Ministry of National Defense, ROK, 2014 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2014), 12; Anna Fifield, “North Korea Says It Has Technology to Make Mini-nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, May 20, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost>

“yeonlyeongbyeol gyeongjehwaldon-ingu cong-gwal” [General Economically Active Population by Age], Korean Statistical Information Service, <http://kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/index.action>.

All about the South Korea’s Preparations for the 2018 Winter Olympic Games.
<https://people.com/sports/what-to-know-south-korea-winter-olympic-prep/>.

Benjamin A. Engel, “South Korea’s Strategy to Bring Peace to the Peninsula: Credit Trump”, *The Diplomat*, 3 May 2018.

Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in Northeast Asia,” *Issues & Insights*, Vol. 8, No. 16 (September 2008), 22-24.
http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/issuesinsights_v08n16.pdf

Charles K. Armstrong, *The Inter Korean Relations in Historical Perspective*. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*.
<http://campus.unibo.it/278118/1/Charles%20K.%20Armstrong.pdf>.

com/world/pyongyang-says-it-has-technology-to-make-small-submarined-mounted-nuclear-warheads/2015/05/20/0e96d0bc-fec0-11e4-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html;
“N. Korea Conducts 5th Nuclear Test,” *Yonhap News*, September , 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea_2016/09/09/0401000000AEN20160909002556315.html

Construction at Kaesong began after Kim Dae-Jung left office, in 2003.

Dr. Mark B.M. Suh. “A Tale of Two Koreas: Breaking the Vicious Circle”. October 14th, 2013.
http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo14/doc/suh_A-Tale-of-Two-Koreas.pdf

Dr. Mark B.M. Suh. “A Tale of Two Koreas: Breaking the Vicious Circle”. October 14th, 2013.
http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo14/doc/suh_A-Tale-of-Two-Koreas.pdf

Edward Kwon, “South Korea’s Deterrence against North Korea’s WMD”, *East Asia* 35, no. 2 (2018): 1–21.

Head to Head: Korean Sport Diplomacy. 2018.
<https://www.talkpolitics.org.uk/blog/2018/1/20/head-to-head-sports-diplomacy>

Houlihan, 1994.

http://culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/pdf/research/books/soft_power/The_New_Public_Diplomacy.pdf

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/sports>

Jesse Johnson, “South Korean Defense Chief Skeptical of North Nuclear Threats, Says Tactical Nukes Won’t Be Reintroduced to Peninsula”, *Japan Times*, 29 January 2018.

Jesse Johnson, “South Korean Defense Chief Skeptical of North Nuclear Threats, Says Tactical Nukes Won’t Be Reintroduced to Peninsula”, Japan Times, 29 January 2018.

Sung Chull Kim, North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine and Revisionist Strategy.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328598642_North_Korea_and_Nuclear_Weapons_Entering_the_New_Era_of_Deterrence.

Sung Chull Kim, North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine and Revisionist Strategy.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328598642_North_Korea_and_Nuclear_Weapons_Entering_the_New_Era_of_Deterrence.

XXIII Winter Olympic Games, PyeongChang 2018.

http://olimpia.hu/images/Pyeongchang2018/phjongcshang_hatteranyag_mob_180226_ENG.pdf.