Abstract:
The imposition of provisional safeguard measures on July 17, 2018, and definitive
safeguard measures on January 31, 2019, for certain steel products by the European
Commission (EC) has led to a trade dispute with Turkey. These safeguard measures
in the form of duty-free tariff-rate quotas and additional duties out of quota at 25%
are considered to threaten Turkey's domestic industry because the European Union
(EU) has become the main destination for Turkish steel exports. Therefore, Turkey
brought the dispute to the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiating table on
March 13, 2020. As an international organization that regulates trade between
countries, the WTO has a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to deal with disputes
between members through a Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). Thus, this
research addresses the issue of how the DSM followed by the WTO DSB in
resolving this EU-Turkey dispute case.
Through qualitative research methods and literature studies used as data collection
techniques, this study aims to understand the WTO DSM, investigate the results of
the EU-Turkey dispute settlement through the WTO DSB, and analyze the
international relations theories on the role of the WTO in dispute settlement. The
concept of international organization and the neoliberal institutionalism theory are
used to examine the practice of DSM by the WTO DSB in the EU-Turkey case.
This study finds that the WTO DSB has fulfilled its primary role and independence
characteristics as an international organization in resolving this dispute.
Furthermore, this study also validates the assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism
theory regarding the importance of international institutions to promote cooperation
among states and ensure state compliance with regulations, despite the potential for
state cheating.
