Abstract:
This thesis explores the relationship between Nicolás Maduro’s political
survival and Venezuela’s socio-political and economic crisis between 2013 and
2024. While external factors, including declining oil prices and international
sanctions, deepened the crisis, the persistence of Maduro’s presidency highlights
the internal dynamics of authoritarian governance. Using a qualitative case study
approach and guided by Jonathan Gerschewski’s Autocratic Stability Theory, the
research examines how legitimation, repression, and co-optation have shaped
regime’s survival. This thesis shows that Maduro employed practices of
institutional manipulation, clientelism through the state-owned Oil Corporation,
PDVSA, and coercive measures enforced by Bolivarian Intelligence Body to
weaken opposition and maintain authority. These actions secured his political
survival despite hyperinflation, migration issues, and economic collapse.
Economically, limited relief emerged when Maduro restructured diplomatic
relations with the United States and Europe, resulting in partial lifting of sanctions
and renewed oil exports. In the end, this research suggest that Maduro’s survival is
sustained less by effective governance than by authoritarian strategies that prioritize
regime security over national stability. Consequently, Venezuela remains locked in
a multidimensional crisis where short-term economic openings fail to resolve
deeper structural and political breakdowns.
